Sharon Davis v. City of Newark

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-4365
___________
SHARON DAVIS,
Appellant
v.
CITY OF NEWARK; CITY OF NEWARK POLICE DEPARTMENT; ANTHONY F.
AMBROSE, III, individually and under color of state law as Police Director for the City
of Newark; IRVING BRADLEY, JR., individually and under color of state law as Police
Chief for the City of Newark; LIEUTENANT JOHN SCOTT-BEY, individually and
under color of state law as Captain for the City of Newark Police Department; ADOLPH
VASQUEZ, individually and under color of state law as Sergeant for the City of Newark
Police Department; JOHN AND JANE DOES 1-99, (fictitious names); XYZ
CORPORATIONS 1-10, municipal or governmental entities and their supervisors, agents
and employees
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 04-5317)
District Judge: Garrett E. Brown Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 9, 2011
Before: BARRY, JORDAN and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed : March 10, 2011 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Sharon Davis appeals the District Court’s order dismissing her
complaint. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s order. See Grier v. Klem, 591 F.3d 672, 676 (3d Cir. 2010).
For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
Davis, an African-American female, was employed as a police officer with the
Newark Police Department. She filed a seven-count complaint against the City of
Newark, the Police Department, and several individuals (collectively, “defendants”),
alleging racial discrimination and impermissible retaliation under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (NJLAD). The
District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss all claims, and Davis appealed.
We affirmed the District Court’s order as to all claims except those alleging retaliation; as
to those claims, we reversed and remanded with instructions to address the claims in light
of the Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
On remand, the District Court again dismissed Davis’s remaining claims. 1 The
Court considered each of Davis’s allegations of retaliation, and concluded that she had
failed to state a prima facie case.
1
The defendants framed their motions as seeking summary judgment, but the
District Court, after noting that the defendants’ arguments focused on Davis’s complaint,
treated them as motions to dismiss and did not consider any evidence extraneous to the
pleadings. We have explained that “[if] the district court dismisses an action for failure
to state a claim on the face of the pleadings on a motion for summary judgment, a motion
2
We agree with the District Court’s analysis of Davis’s claims. To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII or the NJLAD, Davis must plead (1) that
she engaged in a protected activity; (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action;
and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action. See Abramson v. William Paterson Coll., 260 F.3d 265, 286 (3d Cir.
2001).
Most critical to this case is the first element. As relevant here, Title VII 2 protects
“those who oppose discrimination made unlawful by Title VII.” Moore v. City of
Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 341 (3d Cir. 2006). Not every complaint or report entitles its
author to protection from retaliation under Title VII. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry.,
so decided is functionally equivalent to a motion to dismiss and we must review it
accordingly.” Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1990). Accordingly, we will
accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true, construe it in the light most
favorable to Davis, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, Davis may be entitled to relief. Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
583 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 2009). Further, given that the District Court dismissed
Davis’s complaint, it was appropriate to deny as moot her cross-motion for summary
judgment. See 10 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 2713 (3d ed. 2010) (“Of course, when a court decides to dismiss an action,
on a voluntary or involuntary basis, pending motions for summary judgment against the
claimant may be treated as moot and therefore not be decided.”); cf. Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 444 (3d Cir. 1977).
2
While this discussion focuses on Title VII, the same analysis applies to Davis’s
NJLAD claim. New Jersey courts “have frequently looked to case law under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for guidance in developing standards to govern the
resolution of LAD claims.” Carmona v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 915 A.2d 518, 528 (N.J.
2007) (internal quotation marks, citation omitted). To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under the NJLAD, Davis must plead both that she opposed a “a practice
rendered unlawful” by the statute and that the employer knew about that opposition.
Young v. Hobart W. Group, 897 A.2d 1063, 1073 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). For
the reasons discussed below, Davis has failed to make a prima facie case.
3
548 U.S. at 68 (noting that Title VII does not “set forth a general civility code for the
American workplace” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rather, only complaints about
discrimination prohibited by Title VII — that is, discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 — constitute “protected
activity.” See Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 701-02 (3d Cir. 1995). Thus,
for a complaint to amount to “protected activity,” it must implicate an employment
practice made illegal by Title VII. See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington,
Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006). General complaints of unfair treatment will
not suffice. See Barber, 68 F.3d at 702.
We agree with the District Court that, even accepting Davis’s allegations, she has
failed to claim that she was retaliated against due to her complaints about conduct
prohibited by Title VII. For instance, she purportedly complained about certain
violations of departmental regulations — such as Officer Colon’s transfer, officers’
smoking on site, and the practice of sending one-officer units to two-officer areas — but
she does not claim that those complaints alleged the existence of unlawful discrimination.
Similarly, her reports to supervisors about being called a “pain” did not ascribe the
criticism to her race or gender. She either did not identify any cause for the
disparagement, or identified some cause that is outside Title VII’s ambit (as when she
complained that Officer Reitemeyer had criticized her because she was being paid
overtime for medical treatment). Because Davis’s sundry complaints to her superiors
failed to identify any conduct proscribed by Title VII, they do not amount to “protected
activity,” and thus cannot form the basis for a retaliation claim See, e.g., Sitar v. Ind.
4
DOT, 344 F.3d 720, 727 (7th Cir. 2003) (employee had not engaged in protected activity
because she “complained only that she felt picked on, not that she was discriminated
against ‘because of’ sex or gender, which is what Title VII requires”).
We note that while Davis has alleged stray incidents of race or gender
discrimination, she has not made a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to any of
those allegations. For instance, she alleged that white male officers avoided working
with her; she has not, however, claimed that she opposed that practice or that she was
then retaliated against for her opposition. See, e.g., Moore, 461 F.3d at 340-41. Instead,
those allegations appear to have been designed to support her hostile-work-environment
claim, which has already been conclusively resolved against her. Similarly, although
Davis has argued at length that certain adverse actions that were allegedly taken against
her are sufficient to make out a prima facie case pursuant to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. , these arguments do not
address her complaint’s fundamental failing — that she failed to allege that she was
retaliated against for engaging in “protected activity.”
Accordingly, we perceive no error in the District Court’s conclusion that Davis
failed to allege a prima facie case of retaliation under either Title VII or the NJLAD. We
will therefore affirm the District Court’s order dismissing her complaint.
5