Michael Reynolds v.

HLD-087 (January 2011) NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-4299
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IN RE: MICHAEL CURTIS REYNOLDS,
Petitioner
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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(Related to M.D. Pa. Civ. No. 4-10-cv-01514)
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Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
January 31, 2011
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, ALDISERT and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed : March 22, 2011)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM.
``Michael Curtis Reynolds, a federal prisoner convicted in 2007 of various
terrorism-related offenses, requests a writ of mandamus requiring the District Court to
take judicial notice of all the facts he asserted in his civil case before the District Court.
We will deny Reynolds’s petition.
In the civil action underlying the instant mandamus petition, Reynolds
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sought compensatory and punitive damages from two FBI agents because he was
allegedly falsely arrested and maliciously prosecuted based on those agents’ false
statements. The District Court dismissed the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)
and determined that the action was also subject to dismissal under Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994), insofar as the alleged unconstitutional prosecution would imply the
invalidity of Reynolds’s 2007 federal conviction. Reynolds appealed.
While his appeal was pending, Reynolds filed the instant petition for
mandamus, requesting that this Court order the District Court to take judicial notice of all
of the facts alleged in his complaint and hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue.1 He
also filed motions in the District Court requesting that the District Court take judicial
notice of certain facts or consider those facts admitted. It appears from those motions
that Reynolds believed he was essentially entitled to a default judgment because the FBI
agents had not responded to his complaint, regardless of the fact that they had never been
served given the District Court’s disposition of the matter. We ultimately dismissed
Reynolds’s appeal because it lacked legal merit.
“We have the power to issue a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1651(a), in exceptional cases where the traditional bases for jurisdiction do not apply.”
In re Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 F.3d 383, 398 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted).
1
Since the instant petition pertains solely to Reynolds’s civil case, we will not
consider his request that we mandate a hearing pursuant to Hazel-Atlas Glass Co.
v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), in his criminal case.
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Mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary remedy” available only in “exceptional
circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, or a clear abuse of
discretion.” Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (citation
omitted). It “is not a substitute for appeal and . . . will not be granted if relief can be
obtained by way of our appellate jurisdiction.” In re Chambers Dev. Co., 148 F.3d 214,
226 (3d Cir. 1998). The party seeking mandamus must establish an absence of other
adequate means to obtain the requested relief, a “clear and indisputable” right to the writ,
and that issuance of the writ is appropriate under the circumstances. In re Pressman-
Gutman Co., 459 F.3d at 399.
Mandamus is not appropriate here because it is apparent that Reynolds’s
petition, which was filed while his appeal was pending, is in essence a second appeal
seeking to force the District Court to entertain a lawsuit it had already deemed subject to
dismissal. Furthermore, nothing in Reynolds’s petition establishes a clear and
indisputable right to the extraordinary remedy he seeks. Accordingly, we will deny his
petition for mandamus.
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