Joseph Nagy v. Social Security Administration

ALD-232 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-1264
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JOSEPH EUGENE NAGY,
Appellant
v.
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION;
ELIANA I. MCGRATH; ATTORNEY GENERAL TEXAS;
THE 382ND DISTRICT COURT OF ROCKWALL COUNTY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 3-16-cv-09559)
District Judge: Honorable Peter G. Sheridan
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
May 11, 2017
Before: MCKEE, JORDAN, and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 25, 2017)
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OPINION*
_________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
The appellant, Joseph Eugene Nagy, and his ex-wife, Eliana McGrath, are the
parents of two minor children who are currently living with their mother in Rockwall
County, Texas. In January 2017, Nagy—who resides in New Jersey—commenced this
federal civil rights action in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey claiming that, pursuant to a child support order issued by the Rockwall County
Court, the Texas Attorney General was wrongfully garnishing two-thirds of his Social
Security retirement benefits. In the complaint, which he later amended, Nagy named as
defendants Eliana McGrath, the Rockwall County Court, the Office of the Attorney
General of Texas, and the Social Security Administration (SSA). By way of relief, Nagy
asked the District Court to restrain the defendants from garnishing any further funds, and
requested compensatory and punitive damages.
The District Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds
that: (1) the Office of the Attorney General and the Rockwall County Court were entitled
to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; and (2) Nagy’s claims against his
ex-wife and the SSA were barred under the “domestic-relations exception” to federal
diversity jurisdiction. Nagy timely appealed from the District Court’s order. The SSA
now moves this Court for summary affirmance.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. See PennMont Secs. v. Frucher, 586 F.3d 242, 245 (3d
2
Cir.2009). We may affirm the District Court’s decision on any basis supported by the
record. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
We will grant the SSA’s motion to summarily affirm the District Court’s order
because this case presents no substantial question. See Third Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P.
10.6. First, the District Court correctly concluded that Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity deprived the District Court of jurisdiction to hear Nagy’s suit against the Office
of the Attorney General and the Rockwall County Court, which are state entities. See
Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100-01 (1984). While a state
may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, there is no suggestion that Texas has
done so in this case. Second, the SSA could not be liable for honoring the County
Court’s writ of garnishment given that nothing in the record indicates that the order was
not valid legal process. See United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 836 (1984) (holding
that, under the statute granting the United States immunity from suit with respect to
support payments, the government “cannot be held liable for honoring a writ of
garnishment which is ‘regular on its face’ and has been issued by a court with subject-
matter jurisdiction to issue such orders.”).
Furthermore, because all of the allegations in Nagy’s amended complaint
challenge the terms of the Rockwall County Court child-support order—and the SSA’s
compliance with that order—his claims against McGrath are barred by the Rooker-
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Feldman doctrine.1 See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615
F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that a federal court may not exercise jurisdiction
over cases brought by litigants who lost in state-court and are essentially inviting the
district court to overturn the state-court judgment). Lastly, insofar as Nagy intended to
assert state-law tort claims against the defendants, the District Court could not exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over them via 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because all of Nagy’s
constitutional claims were subject to dismissal. See Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123
(3d Cir. 2000).
Accordingly, we grant Appellee SSA’s motion and will summarily affirm the
District Court’s order. See Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. Nagy’s motion to
strike is denied. To the extent that Appellee SSA asked the Court to stay the briefing
schedule pending resolution of its motion for summary action, the request is denied as
moot.
1
Because we conclude that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Nagy’s claims against
McGrath, we do not address the District Court’s application of the “domestic-relations
exception” below.
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