Shawn Walker v. George Little

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 22-3451
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SHAWN T. WALKER,
Appellant
v.
GEORGE LITTLE, Acting Secretary of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections;
MR. J. HALL; KELLY LONG; MR. WILLIAMS, III; MR. B.A. GAY; MR. J.
FREEMAN; MR. D.K. SMITH; MR. N. MACCAIN; MR. S. SWARY; MR. J. BLUME;
MR. C. FOREMAN; MR. M. SOMPEL; MR. W.L. JAMES; JOHN DOE; JANE ROE
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-20-cv-04460)
District Judge: Honorable Gene E.K. Pratter
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 16, 2023
Before: KRAUSE, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 20, 2023)
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OPINION*
_________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Shawn T. Walker appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his complaint for
failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. For the reasons that follow, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s order.
Walker, a Pennsylvania prisoner, filed a civil rights complaint alleging that prison
officials violated his rights in several instances when they gave him photocopies of his
legal mail and kept the originals. 1 He also alleged that on a few occasions prison officials
returned his legal mail to the sender when Walker refused to sign the legal mail log to
acknowledge that he had received his legal mail. Before service, the District Court
dismissed Walker’s claims that Appellees’ actions violated due process, the Eighth
Amendment, and his First Amendment right to access the courts. It also dismissed his
claims for declaratory relief. Only Walker’s claims that his First Amendment right to
free speech was violated remained. The Appellees then filed a motion to dismiss, arguing
that Walker had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The District Court agreed
and dismissed Walker’s complaint. Walker filed a timely notice of appeal.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. A prisoner may not file a
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until he has exhausted available administrative
remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). In order to properly exhaust a claim, a prisoner
must comply with the prison’s deadlines and procedural rules. Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 81, 90-91 (2006). “[I]t is the prison’s requirements, and not the [Prison Litigation
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The prison officials were acting pursuant to a policy that has since been discontinued.
2
Reform Act], that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.
199, 218 (2007). Appellees argued, and the District Court agreed, that Walker did not
exhaust his claim for monetary relief because he did not request money damages in his
grievance as required by the prison’s grievance policy. We exercise de novo review over
the District Court’s determination that Walker failed to properly exhaust his
administrative remedies. Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI, 831 F.3d 148, 153
(3d Cir. 2016).
In Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir. 2004), we concluded that an inmate
did not default his claim for money damages when he failed to request such damages in
his grievance. The prison’s grievance policy at the time did not require an inmate to
request specific relief in a grievance. See id. (examining prior exhaustion policy and
noting that “[n]othing in the Grievance System Policy would have put Spruill on notice
that he had to ask for money damages–or any particular form of relief at all.”). We noted
that prison officials could amend the grievance policy to require more of inmates in order
to exhaust a claim. Id. at 235. The prison officials in Pennsylvania did, in fact, amend
the grievance policy to require that if an inmate seeks compensation, the inmate must
request that relief in the grievance. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of
Corrections, Inmate Grievance System, Policy No. DC-ADM 804(1)(A)(11)(d) (“If the
inmate desires compensation or other legal relief normally available from a court, the
inmate shall request the relief with specificity in his/her initial grievance.”); cf. Spruill,
372 F.3d at 234 (contrasting language in prior policy with a potential amendment); Byrd
v. Shannon, 715 F.3d 117, 127 (3d Cir. 2013) (concluding that prisoner failed to exhaust
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when he did not name defendant in his grievance as required by the prison grievance
procedure).
In response to Appellees’ arguments in the District Court, Walker did not dispute
that he did not request monetary relief in any of his grievances. Rather, he argued that
the Inmate Handbook that he was given did not instruct inmates that they must request
compensation in their grievances or refer them to any additional instructions or
requirements. He is correct that the section of the handbook describing the grievance
process does not include the requirement that specific relief such as monetary damages be
requested. However, at the beginning of the handbook, the inmate is advised that any
changes to the prison’s policies will be effective regardless of whether they are in the
handbook. The inmate is informed that copies of the policies are available in his housing
unit. Thus, Walker had notice that the inmate handbook may not include all the details of
the grievance procedure. And as noted by the District Court, the inmate grievance form
refers the inmate to DC-ADM 804 for the relevant procedures. Moreover, the
instructions on the grievance form advise the inmate to “[s]tate all relief that you are
seeking.” The Chief Grievance Officer in her Final Appeal Decisions for several
grievances noted that Walker had sought no relief in his initial grievances. There was no
misrepresentation by prison staff that rendered the grievance process unavailable to
Walker. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 644 (2016) (holding that there is an exception
to the exhaustion requirement if the process is made unavailable by prison officials
thwarting its use through “machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.”); Hardy v.
Shaikh, 959 F.3d 578, 588 (3d Cir. 2020) (explaining that inmate must show, inter alia,
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that the “misrepresentation is one which a reasonable inmate would be entitled to rely on
and sufficiently misleading to interfere with a reasonable inmate’s use of the grievance
process”).
The District Court did not err in determining that Walker had failed to properly
exhaust his claim for money damages and dismissing his complaint. Summary action is
appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the appeal. See 3d Cir. LAR
27.4. For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by the District Court, we will
summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 2 Appellant’s
motion for the appointment of counsel is denied.
2
We find no error in the District Court’s dismissal before service of Walker’s due
process, legal access, and Eighth Amendment claims as well as his request for
declaratory relief. See Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating that in
order to allege a claim of the denial of access to the courts, a prisoner must allege that he
was hindered in his efforts to litigate a nonfrivolous or arguable claim); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that post-deprivation remedies provide
sufficient due process for deprivations of property).
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