Melvin Lindsey v. Jeffrey Beard

BLD-042 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-3091
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MELVIN LINDSEY,
Appellant
v.
DONNA ROMAN; ROBERT WADDELL; JENNIE MACKNIGHT;
SALLY GENNARINI; JOHN KERESTES; JEFFREY A. BEARD;
PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. No. 10-cv-00953)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect
or for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 18, 2010
Before: SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 1, 2010)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Melvin Lindsey, an inmate presently confined by the Pennsylvania Department of
Corrections, appeals from orders of the District Court dismissing his complaint without
prejudice and denying his subsequent motion for reconsideration. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I.
In April 2010, Lindsey filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
By administrative order dated May 6, 2010, the District Court gave Lindsey thirty days to
either pay the $350.00 filing fee or complete an application to proceed in forma pauperis
(IFP). Lindsey filed an incomplete IFP application – it did not include an authorization
form – two weeks later. In June 2010, the District Court dismissed Lindsey‟s civil action
without prejudice because “[t]hirty (30) days have elapsed from the date of our Order and
the Plaintiff has neither filed an authorization form nor requested an extension of time in
which to do so.”
Lindsey then moved for reconsideration of the District Court‟s order, claiming that
his failure to timely file a complete IFP application was due to forces “beyond his
control.” Lindsey attached to his motion a filled-out authorization form. In July 2010,
the District Court denied the motion for reconsideration, concluding that “petitioner fails
to rely on one of three major grounds for reconsideration . . . and merely reargues matters
addressed by the court and disposed of in the previous order.”1 The District Court
1
The District Court did not consider whether Lindsey‟s motion for reconsideration
could be construed as a motion for relief from judgment, based on excusable neglect,
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1). Any error was harmless, however,
because Lindsey‟s allegations – that his failure to file an authorization form was the
result “of a lack of information and misfiling” – are belied by the record. See Nara v.
Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2007) (“The test for „excusable neglect‟ is
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instructed that Lindsey “may file a new action.” The District Court reinforced that
instruction in a footnote to its order, stating that its previous “dismissal was without
prejudice to plaintiff‟s right to refile the action with the appropriate forms.” Lindsey
appealed.
II.
We must first consider our jurisdiction. The District Court dismissed Lindsey‟s
civil action without prejudice. The general rule is that a without-prejudice dismissal “is
neither final nor appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff
without affecting the cause of action.” Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d
Cir. 1976) (per curiam). Here, however, the District Court‟s July 2010 order made clear
to Lindsey that the defect in his filing could not be cured in the civil action at issue, and
that he would have to “file a new action” to advance his civil rights claims. See Deutsch
v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995). Therefore, we have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 notwithstanding the District Court‟s without-prejudice dismissal.
III.
A District Court‟s dismissal for failure to pay fees is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See Jones v. Zimmerman, 752 F.2d 76, 78 (3d Cir. 1985). That same
standard is used in reviewing the denial of a motion for reconsideration. See United
equitable, and requires us to weigh the „totality of the circumstances.‟”) (citation
omitted).
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States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010). We may take summary action if an
appeal presents no substantial question. See 3d Cir. LAR 24.7; I.O.P. 10.6.
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
Lindsey‟s civil action for failure to either pay the associated filing fee or file a completed
IFP application. Lindsey‟s IFP application was plainly lacking an authorization form,
even though the District Court‟s May 6, 2010 administrative order explained to Lindsey
that the form was a necessary component. The administrative order also indicated that
“[a]n application to proceed in forma pauperis and an authorization form [were]
enclosed” in the District Court‟s mailing.
We also conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Lindsey‟s motion for reconsideration. “The purpose of such a motion is to correct a clear
error of law or to prevent a manifest injustice in the District Court‟s original ruling.”
Dupree, 617 F.3d at 732. The District Court committed no error of law in dismissing
Lindsey‟s case. Moreover, we cannot say that there was some manifest injustice latent in
the District Court‟s decision; Lindsey can refile his complaint, accompanied by the
documents that are required to obtain IFP status, at any time within the applicable
limitations period.2
2
Based on Lindsey‟s allegations, the earliest complained-of civil rights violation
appears to have occurred “on or about August 14, 2009.” Despite the time exhausted
while Lindsey pursued this appeal, he should have no difficulty with timely refiling
his complaint. See Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 111 n.2 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In § 1983
cases, federal courts apply the state personal injury statute of limitations, which in
[Pennsylvania] is two years.”) (citations omitted).
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Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.
Appellant‟s motion for remand under Rule 27, Fed. R. App. P., is denied.
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