Sheila Seeney v. Elwyn Inc

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 10-2707
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SHEILA SEENEY,
Appellant
v.
ELWYN, INC.
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 08-cv-05032)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 25, 2011
Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 1, 2011)
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OPINION OF THE COURT
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PER CURIAM.
Appellant Sheila Seeney appeals the District Court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of her former employer, Elwyn, Inc. For the foregoing reasons, we
will affirm.
Seeney, an African-American, was a long-time employee of Elwyn, Inc., a
residential treatment facility for people with mental and physical disabilities. Seeney was
employed by Elwyn from December, 1980 until February, 2006, and worked the third
shift, serving Elwyn’s neediest, round-the-clock care clients. Sometime prior to October
18, 2005, a new supervisor, Luceni Kamara, a male of African descent, was appointed
her supervisor. When Seeney reported to work on October 25, she observed that one of
the residents had severely soiled himself, and had been left unattended by the previous
shift. Seeney asked Kamara for his help in placing the resident in the shower. Kamara
demanded that Seeney first clean the resident up in the wash basin. Seeney declined
because the resident had a history of biting. Following a disagreement about how to
properly clean the resident, Kamara sent Seeney home without completing her shift. She
later was suspended for three days without pay for refusing to accept a reasonable job
assignment. Seeney served the suspension and returned to work.
Thereafter, Seeney reported Kamara to Elwyn management when he was sleeping
on duty. Kamara was suspended for this infraction. In December, 2005, Seeney
complained to management that Kamara had falsely accused her of improperly leaving
her shift. Neither Seeney nor Kamara was disciplined for this event. In January, 2006,
Seeney complained that Kamara intentionally bumped into her in the hallway, and she
claimed that this was in retaliation for her reporting that he was sleeping on the job. She
complained that Kamara’s behavior was aggressive, erratic and abusive. In February,
2006, Seeney submitted a letter complaining that Kamara had yelled at her for removing
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a log book from his desk. On the morning of February 22, 2006, after one more incident
with Kamara over cleaning a refrigerator, Seeney resigned.
After Seeney filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, and the EEOC issued
a right to sue letter, Seeney filed suit against Elwyn in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. She alleged racial discrimination, disparate
treatment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 et seq. See Amended Complaint, at ¶¶ 7, 11. The District Court
appointed counsel to assist Seeney. After taking Seeney’s deposition, Elwyn moved for
summary judgment, and Seeney submitted a written response in opposition.
In an order and judgment entered on April 26, 2010, the District Court granted
summary judgment to Elwyn. Noting that Seeney had relied on a theory of constructive
discharge to show that she was forced to resign, the court concluded that Seeney could
not point to any evidence that her resignation was on account of racial discrimination by
Kamara or Elwyn. There was no direct evidence that Kamara’s alleged harassment was
based on her race, and her many letters to Elwyn complaining about Kamara made no
reference to racial discrimination, disparate treatment based on her race, or retaliation
after making race-based complaints. Moreover, Seeney was never threatened with
discharge, she was not encouraged to resign, she was not demoted, her pay was not
reduced, she was not involuntarily transferred to a less desirable position, her job
responsibilities were not altered, and she was not subjected to unsatisfactory job
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evaluations. With respect to the October 18, 2005 incident, the court observed that she
did not follow up on her suspension with Elwyn officials or her union. Accordingly, a
reasonable jury could not conclude that the conditions faced by Seeney during the five-
month period in question were so intolerable that a reasonable employee facing the same
conditions would leave the job. Therefore, she did not establish a prima facie case of
race discrimination.
With respect to her allegation that Kamara retaliated against her by harassing her
after she reported that he was sleeping on the job, the District Court determined that
Seeney’s evidence was insufficient to show that Elwyn took an adverse action after, or
contemporaneous with, her complaint. Although Seeney was suspended in October,
2005, she had never complained about Kamara prior to the suspension, and the
suspension thus could not form the basis of a retaliation claim. There was no other
evidence in the record of any other action that arguably could be regarded as adverse.
Kamara’s alleged retaliatory behavior, while rude and unprofessional, did not rise to the
level of racially motivated retaliation. Therefore, there was no prima facie showing of
retaliation. In the margin, the District Court noted that the claim was time-barred in any
event because Seeney filed her EEOC charge on December 1, 2006, more than 300 days
after the 2005 suspension, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
Seeney appeals. A motions panel of the Court previously denied her motion to
restrict electronic access to certain items filed in the court of appeals.
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We will affirm. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Seeney contends
on appeal that her case presents a triable issue with respect to whether she had no choice
but to resign given the intolerable conditions at work, and that Elwyn management,
which is predominantly Caucasian, “fell flat at supervising L. Kamara.” See Reply Brief,
at 2. She contends in her opening Informal Brief on appeal that the District Court failed
to consider Vice President Scott Campbell’s “Action Sheet,” which foretold her
termination and thus forced her to resign. See Informal Brief, at 11.
Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary and we
must affirm if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(c)(2). “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational
trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). A genuine
issue of material fact is one that could change the outcome of the litigation. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986).
To prevail on a claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). A prima facie
case is established where the plaintiff shows that (1) she is a member of a protected class;
(2) she was qualified for the position in question; (3) she suffered an adverse employment
action; and (4) that adverse employment action gives rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253
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(1981). Only if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case does the burden of production
shift to the defendant to set forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its action.
St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993).
The District Court determined that Seeney could not show a genuine issue for trial
with respect to whether she suffered an adverse employment action that gave rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. We have carefully
reviewed the record and the items Seeney attached to her briefs on appeal and conclude
that there was an insufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find in
her favor on this issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50. It is undisputed that Seeney was
not terminated by Elwyn. Therefore, to show that her resignation was an adverse
employment action taken by Elwyn, she had to show that she was forced to resign or
constructively discharged under circumstances that give rise to an inference of racial
discrimination. To establish a constructive discharge claim, a plaintiff must show that the
employer knowingly permitted conditions of discrimination in the workplace “so
intolerable that a reasonable employee would be forced to resign.” Levendos v. Stern
Entertainment, Inc., 860 F.2d 1227, 1230 (3d Cir. 1988) (internal quotations removed).
The analysis focuses on what a reasonable person would do if placed in the position the
employee was in when she resigned. See id.Courts consider a number of factors in determining whether an employee was
forced to resign, including whether (1) she was threatened with discharge; (2) she was
encouraged to resign; (3) she was demoted or suffered a reduction in pay or benefits; (4)
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she was involuntarily transferred to a less desirable position; (5) her job responsibilities
were altered; and (6) she began receiving unsatisfactory job evaluations. See Clowes v.
Allegheny Valley Hospital, 991 F.2d 1159, 1161 (3d Cir. 1993). See also Colwell v. Rite
Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 502-03 (3d Cir. 2010).
We agree with the District Court that Seeney came forward with no evidence that
she was forced to resign because of racial discrimination. There was no direct evidence
that Kamara’s alleged harassment of her was based on her race. She did not identify any
employee of Elwyn who was treated more favorably, and she offered no evidence that
any incidents involving Kamara or any other employee were motivated by racial bias.
See Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 161 (3d Cir. 1999) (to establish a prima facie
case plaintiff must “present sufficient evidence to allow a fact finder to conclude that the
employer is treating some people less favorably than others based upon a trait that is
protected under Title VII”). Seeney’s contemporaneous letters to Elwyn management
complaining about Kamara made no reference to racial discrimination, disparate
treatment based on her race, or retaliation after making race-based complaints, and this
seriously undermines her claim of race discrimination. Seeney’s contention in her brief
on appeal that Elwyn failed to adequately supervise Kamara, and that this failure was
motivated by Elwyn management’s racial bias, finds no support whatever in the record.
Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 56(e)(2) (non-moving party must come forward with affidavits or other
evidence specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial).
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Moreover, as determined by the District Court, it was undisputed that Seeney was
not encouraged to resign, she was not demoted, her hourly pay was not reduced, she was
not involuntarily transferred to a less desirable position, her job responsibilities were not
altered, and she did not begin to receive unfavorable job evaluations. With respect to her
contention on appeal that she was threatened with termination, we note that the October,
2005 suspension was, as she states, approved by Vice President Scott Campbell. The
suspension letter was written by Unit Director Maryanne Booth, and it stated that,
“should a situation arise in the future warranting additional disciplinary action, we will
proceed to the next progressive step, up to and including termination of your employment
at Elwyn, Inc.” Supp. App. 84. However, a rational trier of fact would not find a threat
of termination in this letter because the statement about proceeding to the next step is
conditioned on an event that might not ever happen – a need for further discipline.
Furthermore, although a three-day suspension without pay may be considered an
adverse employment action, see, e.g., Russell v. Board of Trustees of the University of
Illinois, 243 F.3d 336, 341 (7th Cir. 2001) (suspension for five days without pay is
adverse employment action), the question with respect to summary judgment in Seeney’s
case is not whether the suspension was adverse but whether a reasonable person, when
faced with the suspension, would have felt forced to resign. Seeney has never alleged
that the suspension by itself forced her to resign. She asserts on appeal that Kamara sent
her home for a second time on February 22, 2006 after they fought about how to properly
clean the refrigerator, and she believed she would eventually be terminated by Elwyn for
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this incident. Rather than waiting to learn the outcome of her latest conflict with Kamara,
she resigned. Thus, Seeney subjectively determined that she was likely to be disciplined
again and possibly terminated, but the law of constructive discharge “does not permit an
employee’s subjective perceptions to govern [the] claim.” Gray v. York Newspapers,
Inc., 957 F.2d 1070, 1083 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d
1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985)).
Attached to Seeney’s Reply Brief on appeal is a decision of the state
Unemployment Compensation Board of Review reversing a decision of the Referee and
determining that Seeney “had cause of a necessitous and compelling nature for quitting”
under section 402(b) of the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Law. See
Exhibit to Appellant’s Reply Brief. Although Seeney did not raise a contention on appeal
that this decision has a preclusive effect in her case, we note for the sake of completeness
that a state unemployment agency’s ruling that an employee had just cause to resign has
no preclusive effect in subsequent Title VII proceedings. Roth v. Koppers Indus., 993
F.2d 1058, 1062 (3d Cir. 1993).
Title VII bars retaliation against an employee who exercises her right to complain
about discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). It does so by prohibiting an employer
from doing anything that is likely to deter a victim of discrimination from complaining
to the EEOC, the courts, or her employer. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
346 (1997). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, an employee
must show that (1) she engaged in a protected employment activity, (2) her employer
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took an adverse employment action after or contemporaneous with the protected activity,
and (3) a causal link exists between the adverse action and the protected activity. Weston
v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 2001). Seeney offered no evidence to show
that she suffered an adverse employment action after or contemporaneous with an action
she took that was protected by Title VII. Although Seeney submitted complaints about
Kamara to management, those complaints were devoid of any mention of racial
discrimination or discrimination of any kind, and thus are not protected by Title VII. In
addition, as explained by the District Court, Seeney’s suspension without pay in October,
2005 is the only adverse employment action she suffered, and it preceded any of her
complaints about Kamara. It thus could not form the basis of a prima facie retaliation
claim.1
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court
awarding summary judgment to Elwyn, Inc.
1
We have not overlooked Seeney’s complaints throughout her briefs on appeal that
appointed counsel failed to investigate her allegations, and took no depositions of
potentially helpful witnesses in the proceedings below. Evidently, she did not bring her
concerns to the attention of the District Court. Nevertheless, we note that counsel was
present at her deposition, and he also submitted a response in opposition to Elwyn’s
motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was a triable constructive discharge
issue. Because Seeney has yet to come forward with any witnesses to support her claim
of racial discrimination, and her deposition testimony did not support a case for racial
discrimination, we fail to see how additional activity on appointed counsel’s part would
have made a difference in her case.
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