Andre Myers v. Warden Loretto FCI

ALD-027 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-3422
___________
ANDRE MYERS,
Appellant.
v.
WARDEN MARIANA, FCI Loretto
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 13-cv-00030)
District Judge: Honorable Kim R. Gibson
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 31, 2013
Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 21, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Andre Myers appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the
1
Western District of Pennsylvania that denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. We
will summarily affirm because no substantial question is presented by this appeal.
Myers was arrested on a federal offense in November 1999 and released on bond
11 days later.1 On March 8, 2000, Myers was arrested by New York authorities for a
parole violation. Myers was transferred from state parole custody to the New York State
Department of Corrections on June 9, 2000, to continue service of his original state
sentence. The State credited Myers with 93 days of jail time for the period of March 8,
2000 through June 8, 2000. The state parole board issued a notice on February 5, 2001,
indicating that Myers had an “open date,” or “earliest release date” of March 8, 2001.
On March 12, 2001, while in state custody, Myers was “borrowed” on a writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum to answer the federal charges. Myers was convicted
following a jury trial and was sentenced to a 235-month term of imprisonment. The
judgment did not specify whether it was to run concurrent or consecutive to any other
sentence.2 Myers was returned to state authorities on November 29, 2001. Myers was
released to federal custody on January 18, 2002, his maximum release date.
Myers filed this habeas petition seeking credit against his federal sentence for time
served in state custody from March 9, 2001 to January 18, 2002. Because Myers’ claim
challenges execution of his sentence, it is cognizable in a § 2241 petition. See McGee v.
1
The Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) later credited Myers’ federal sentence for these 11
days. On March 14, 2000, Myers was indicted and an arrest warrant was issued for his violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition).
2
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), “[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different times run
consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently”; see also BOP
Sentence Computation Manual at 31-33.
2
Martinez, 627 F.3d 933, 935 (3d Cir. 2010). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We exercise de novo review over the denial of Myers’ habeas petition. See
Vega v. United States, 493 F.3d 310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007).
In calculating a federal prisoner’s sentence, the BOP determines (1) when the
federal sentence commenced, and (2) whether there are any credits to which the prisoner
may be entitled. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585. In the instant case, the BOP correctly determined
that pursuant to § 3585(a), Myers’ federal sentence commenced on January 18, 2002, the
date he was released to federal custody for service of his sentence. See Rios v. Wiley,
201 F.3d 257, 274 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] prisoner detained pursuant to a writ of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum remains in the primary custody of the first jurisdiction unless
and until the first sovereign relinquishes jurisdiction over the prisoner.”). Pursuant to
§ 3585(b), the BOP must give a defendant credit for any time that he spent in official
detention prior to the date on which he commenced service of that sentence, as a result of
the offense for which the sentence was imposed or any other charge for which he was
arrested after he committed that offense, that has not been credited against another
sentence. That section expressly prohibits awarding a prisoner “double credit for his
detention time.” United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 337 (1992). As the District
Court determined, all of the time that Myers served in custody has been credited toward
either his state or his federal sentence, and he is not entitled to any additional credit.
Myers argues that he is entitled to credit for the ten-month delay between the date
he was first eligible for parole and the date he was released from state custody, because
the federal detainer prevented him from being considered and released for state parole.
3
Although § 3585 generally prohibits the award of “double credit,” some federal courts
have held that credit toward a federal sentence should be given where the federal detainer
alone caused continued state confinement. See Shaw v. Smith, 680 F.2d 1104, 1106 (5th
Cir. 1982) (credit against federal sentence required “if the continued state confinement
was exclusively the product of such action by federal law-enforcement officials as to
justify treating the state jail as the practical equivalent of a federal one.”) (citation
omitted).3 We need not determine whether we would follow such reasoning, as Myers’
belief that he may have been granted earlier release on parole had he been in the custody
of New York State in March 2001 is not supported by the record,4 and is simply
insufficient to mandate that the BOP award such credit. Moreover, although the federal
sentencing court had the authority to account for this time period, there is no support for
the argument that it intended to do so.
As no substantial question is presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm the
District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
3
Shaw was decided before § 3585 was amended to explicitly prohibit double credit.
4
Myers relies on Rosemond v. Menifee, 137 F. Supp. 2d 270 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), where a
petitioner was borrowed on a federal writ just two days prior to his conditional release
date from state custody. The state was without authority to release him while he was in
temporary federal custody pursuant to the writ, but when he was returned to state
custody, the state released him just two days later. Given the facts presented, the
Rosemond court held that the BOP could not “unilaterally lengthen a petitioner’s state
sentence by use of a federal writ,” and that “to deny petitioner credit toward his federal
sentence--for time that was not credited toward his state sentence which was lengthened
solely by the actions of the federal authorities--would represent a manifest injustice.” Id.
at 275. In contrast here, federal authorities did not “borrow” Myers until four days after
his earliest release date. And once Myers was returned to state authorities, they did not
immediately release him, but waited until the day of his maximum release date,
suggesting that the delay in his release was not due to any action by federal authorities.
4