Miguel Molina v. Laural Harry

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 21-3374
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MIGUEL MOLINA,
Appellant
v.
LAURAL R. HARRY; JENNIFER DIGBY; SCOTT WHALEN;
TIM HORNUNG; RANDY BLEASE; A. MAXWELL; GREGORY CARBAUGH
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-18-cv-01391)
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
February 16, 2023
Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 24, 2023)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Appellant Miguel Molina, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals from
the District Court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration pertaining to a discovery
dispute, and the subsequent judgment in favor of the Defendants on his First Amendment
retaliation claims. For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm.
I.
Molina, a Pennsylvania state inmate previously confined at SCI-Camp Hill, filed a
civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, raising various claims, including allegations of
retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. Molina’s operative amended complaint
asserted that the Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances by moving him to
another housing block and firing him from his prison job. The amended complaint also
alleged that, after Molina filed his initial complaint in this matter with the court, the
Defendants further retaliated by having him transferred to SCI-Huntingdon.
In October 2020, Molina filed a motion to compel discovery, seeking documents
related to his transfer, as well as his “block worker job” and “change of housing block”
reports. D.Ct. ECF No. 63 at 4-6.1 Defendants objected to the requested discovery as
overly broad, unduly burdensome, and not proportional to the needs of the case.
Defendants further asserted generally that disclosure of some of the items sought could
adversely impact institutional safety and security. D.Ct. ECF 66-2 at 2-6. In taking the
1
We utilize the pagination given to the pleadings by the CM/ECF docketing system.
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motion to compel under advisement, the District Court directed the Defendants to
“submit, for in camera inspection . . ., all answers and materials to Plaintiff’s discovery
requests sought in the motion to compel that Defendant has not already provided to
Plaintiff,” so that the District Court could “determine whether the materials should be
disclosed to Plaintiff.” D.Ct. ECF No. 99 at 3-4.
After an in camera review of the documents filed under seal, the District Court
partially granted the motion to compel and ordered that certain documents related to the
transfer to SCI Huntingdon be produced to Molina.2 In so doing, the District Court noted
that “there appears to be no vote sheet on the issue of Plaintiff’s transfer.” D.Ct. ECF
No. 99 at 6. As to Molina’s request for his block worker job reports and change of
housing block reports, the District Court denied the requests on the grounds that Molina
requested those documents for the first time in his motion to compel.
Molina thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration asserting that the District
Court erroneously concluded that he requested “block worker job reports” and “change of
housing block reports” for the first time in the motion to compel. Molina also challenged
the District Court’s determination that the transfer “vote sheet” did not appear to exist,
arguing that such documentation was required by Department of Corrections policy.
ECF No. 101 at 9, 60. Defendants opposed the motion, noting that the absence of the
2
Our review of those items revealed no documents relating to job worker or change of
housing block reports, other than one document relating to the annual review of housing
designation codes for Molina.
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vote sheet showed at most that a policy violation occurred. Defendants did not address
Molina’s assertion that the District Court erred in determining that his block worker and
change of housing block reports were sought for the first time in the motion to compel.
Defendants thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment. D.Ct. ECF No. 104.
Molina opposed the motion, arguing that summary judgment was inappropriate because
his motion for reconsideration was still pending and therefore discovery was not yet
complete. D.Ct. ECF No. 111. On December 9, 2021, the District Court denied Molina’s
motion for reconsideration. The court did not address the merits of the motion, but rather
denied it for failure to comply with the local rules. On that same date, the District Court
also entered its order granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismissing
Molina’s claims on the merits. Molina filed a timely notice of appeal, appealing both the
denial of his motion for reconsideration and the grant of summary judgment in favor of
Defendants. Molina asserts that “[t]his appeal turns on a single issue: how the District
Court erred by Failing to resolve Plaintiff’s discovery disputes before entering summary
judgment on the merits.” 3d Cir. ECF No. 12 at 15.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over a
grant of summary judgment, applying the same standard that the District Court applies.
Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 2017).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
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as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a). We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s discovery orders.
Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010).
We turn first to Molina’s allegations regarding discovery. As to the District
Court’s determinations regarding documents relating to the transfer to SCI-Huntingdon,
including allegations regarding “vote sheets,” we discern no abuse of discretion.
However, as conceded by the Defendants on appeal, the District Court was incorrect in its
determination that Molina sought the production of his “Block Worker Job Reports” and
“Change of Housing Block Reports” for the first time in his motion to compel.
Nonetheless, we will not disturb a district court’s discovery orders “without a showing of
actual and substantial prejudice.” Cyberworld Enter. Techs, Inc. v. Napolitano, 602 F.3d
189, 200 (3d Cir. 2010). While Molina’s motion for reconsideration of the District
Court’s discovery order, as well as his brief on appeal, are rife with unsubstantiated and
conclusory allegations of bias and intentional misconduct by defense counsel and the
District Court, Molina fails to establish, or even assert, “actual and substantial prejudice”
resulting from the denial of the requested reports. Accordingly, we can discern no basis
to disturb the District Court’s discovery orders or the subsequent denial of Molina’s
motion for reconsideration.
We turn next to the motion for summary judgment. Molina does not challenge the
merits of the District Court’s summary judgment determination. Rather, he alleges only
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that it was error for the District Court to consider the motion because his motion for
reconsideration was still pending at the time the motion was filed. “Whether a district
court prematurely grants summary judgement is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”
Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1393 (3d Cir. 1989). A court may defer ruling on a
summary judgment motion if the “nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for
specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition . . . .” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(d). In addition to filing an affidavit or declaration, the rule “requires that a
party indicate to the district court its need for discovery, what material facts it hopes to
uncover and why it has not previously discovered this information.” Radich, 886 F.2d at
1393-94. Summary judgment may be granted if the Rule 56(d) declaration is inadequate.
See Shelton v Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 568 (3d Cir. 2015).
Despite the District Court’s discovery error discussed above, we find no abuse of
discretion in the District Court’s consideration of Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment. While the District Court broadly construed Molina’s brief in opposition as a
motion for additional discovery, Molina did not file a Rule 56(d) affidavit or declaration.
Nor did he ever clearly address Rule 56(d)’s other requirements. Even excusing Molina’s
failure to comply with the technical requirements of Rule 56(d), he failed, crucially, to
specify, either in the District Court or on appeal, what specific evidence he hoped to
obtain through further discovery and how that evidence would create a genuine issue of
material fact with respect to his claims of retaliation.
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Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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