Erie Insurance Exchange v. Erie Indemnity Co

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 23-1053
_______________________
ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, an unincorporated
association, by TROY STEPHENSON, CHRISTINA
STEPHENSON, and STEVEN BARNETT, trustees ad
litem, and alternatively, ERIE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
by TROY STEPHENSON, CHRISTINA STEPHENSON,
and STEVEN BARNETT
v.
ERIE INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Appellant
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-22-cv-00166
Magistrate Judge: The Honorable Cynthia R. Eddy
__________________________
Argued April 20, 2023
Before: HARDIMAN, BIBAS, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: May 22, 2023)
Edwin J. Kilpela, Jr. [ARGUED]
James LaMarca
Elizabeth Pollock-Avery
Lynch Carpenter
1133 Penn Avenue
5th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Appellee
Neal R. Devlin
Aurora L. Hardin
Knox McLaughlin Gornall & Sennett
120 W. Tenth Street
Erie, PA 16501
Steven B. Feirson
Michael H. McGinley [ARGUED]
Dechert
2929 Arch Street
18th Floor, Cira Centre
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Counsel for Appellant
David R. Fine
K&L Gates
17 N. Second Street
18th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17101
2
Counsel for Amici Appellant Chamber of Commerce of
the United States
and Pennsylvania Chamber of Business & Industry
Casey A. Coyle
Babst Calland
603 Stanwix Street
Two Gateway Center, 6th Floor
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for Amici Appellant American Property
Casualty Insurance Association
and Pennsylvania Coalition for Civil Justice Reform
__________________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Erie Indemnity Co. (“Indemnity”) appeals the District
Court’s order remanding this matter to Pennsylvania state
court. Indemnity argues that the District Court had jurisdiction
because the case is a “class action” for purposes of the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4
(“CAFA”). In the alternative, Indemnity argues that federal
jurisdiction exists because this case is a continuation of a
previous federal class action against Indemnity involving
similar parties and claims. We are not persuaded on either
ground and will affirm the District Court’s order.
3
I.
A.
Erie Insurance Exchange (“Exchange”) is an
unincorporated association that operates as a reciprocal
insurance exchange under Pennsylvania law. See 40 Pa. Stat.
§ 961 (authorizing creation of insurance exchanges through
which individuals “exchange reciprocal or inter-insurance
contracts with each other . . . providing indemnity among
themselves”). Exchange is owned by its members, who are
subscribers to insurance plans offered by Erie Insurance
Group. Exchange is, essentially, a pool of funds comprised of
insurance premiums and other fees paid by subscribers.
Exchange’s funds are mainly used to cover claims by
subscribers. Exchange has no independent officers nor a
governing body.
Indemnity is a Pennsylvania corporation that serves as
the managing agent and attorney-in-fact for Exchange. In
return, and under an agreement between Indemnity and each
Erie Insurance Group subscriber, Indemnity receives a
management fee paid out from Exchange’s funds.
In August 2021, Erie Insurance Group subscribers Troy
Stephenson, Christina Stephenson, Susan Rubel, and Steven
Barnett (collectively, the “Stephenson Plaintiffs”) sued
Indemnity in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County. See Stephenson v. Erie Indem. Co., 2:21-cv-1444
(W.D. Pa. Nov. 3, 2021). The suit alleged that Indemnity
breached its fiduciary duty to Erie Insurance Group subscribers
by charging an excessive management fee. The Stephenson
4
Plaintiffs brought the case as a class action under Pennsylvania
law on behalf of themselves and other “Pennsylvania
residents” who subscribed to Erie Insurance Group policies. JA
99.
Invoking federal jurisdiction under CAFA, Indemnity
removed Stephenson to the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania. Shortly thereafter, the Stephenson
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the case. See Notice of
Voluntary Dismissal, Stephenson v. Erie Indem. Co., No. 21-
1444, Dkt. 12 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2021).
B.
One month after the voluntary dismissal of Stephenson,
Exchange filed this case in the Court of Common Pleas of
Allegheny County. As in Stephenson, the Complaint here
alleges that Indemnity breached its fiduciary duty by charging
an excessive management fee. The operative facts and the legal
theory in this case are identical to those in Stephenson. But
unlike Stephenson, this case is not pled as a class action—
rather, it is pled in Exchange’s name “by” Troy Stephenson,
Christina Stephenson, and Steven Barnett (the “Individual
Plaintiffs”).1 The Individual Plaintiffs purport to bring the case
“on behalf of Exchange and . . . to benefit all members of
Exchange.” JA 54.
Though the Complaint alleges only a single count of
breach of fiduciary duty, it advances two legal theories for why
1
Susan Rubel, who was named as a plaintiff in Stephenson, is
not named as a trustee ad litem in this case.
5
the Individual Plaintiffs have a right to sue on Exchange’s
behalf. First, the Complaint characterizes the claim as one
brought pursuant to Rule 2152 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure, which authorizes “[a]n action prosecuted by
an association . . . in the name of a member or members thereof
as trustees ad litem for such association.” Pa. R. Civ. P. 2152.
Alternatively, the Complaint characterizes the claim as one
brought pursuant to Rule 2177 of the Pennsylvania Rules of
Civil Procedure, which authorizes “a corporation or similar
entity” to prosecute an action “in its corporate name.” Pa. R.
Civ. P. 2177.
Indemnity removed the case to the U.S. District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, again citing CAFA.
Though the Complaint characterizes this case as an individual
action on Exchange’s behalf—not as a class action—
Indemnity argued that the case is in substance a class action
insofar as Exchange is a stand-in for a class of Erie Insurance
Group subscribers. Indemnity also argued that the case was a
continuation of Stephenson and therefore fell within the
District Court’s jurisdiction under “the well-established rule
that plaintiffs cannot extinguish federal jurisdiction” once it
has attached. JA 14. The District Court disagreed and, on
Exchange’s motion, remanded the case to state court.
Indemnity timely petitioned this Court for leave to
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453. The motions panel first
denied the petition, reasoning that this case is distinct from
Stephenson and that our precedents therefore dictate that the
case is not a class action. Indemnity petitioned for rehearing.
6
The same motions panel then vacated its order and granted
Indemnity leave to appeal.
II.
Whether the District Court had jurisdiction is the sole
question on appeal. “Federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction,” and “[t]hey possess only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). We therefore “presume[]
that a cause lies outside [our] limited jurisdiction.” Id. As the
party seeking removal, Indemnity bears the burden of
establishing federal jurisdiction, see id., and here, the burden
of showing that this case falls within CAFA’s jurisdictional
grant, see Morgan v. Gay, 471 F.3d 469, 473 (3d Cir. 2006),
abrogated on other grounds by Dart Cherokee Basin
Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81 (2014).
Indemnity asserts that the District Court had jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d). We have jurisdiction to review the
District Court’s remand order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c).
See Erie Ins. Exch. v. Erie Indem. Co., 722 F.3d 154, 158 (3d
Cir. 2013) (“Erie Insurance I”). We review issues of subject
matter jurisdiction and statutory interpretation de novo. Id. at
158 n.1.
A.
To start, this case is not a class action as that term is
defined in CAFA. Congress enacted CAFA to ensure federal
7
jurisdiction over “interstate cases of national importance.” 2
CAFA § 2(b)(2). To that end, CAFA authorizes federal
jurisdiction over class actions that arise under state law but that
involve minimally diverse parties and an aggregate amount in
controversy in excess of $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
The statute defines a class action as “any civil action filed
under rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or similar
State statute or rule of judicial procedure authorizing an action
to be brought by 1 or more representative persons as a class
action.” Id. § 1332(d)(1)(B).
Our precedent in Erie Insurance I makes clear that this
case is not a class action on its face. Erie Insurance I involved
the same nominal parties and the same state procedural rules
as this case. 722 F.3d at 156–57. We held that the case was not
2
CAFA does not define what makes a class action nationally
important, and we have not yet had the opportunity to address
that question. When our sister circuits have sought such a
definition, they generally have looked to the citizenship of the
parties, the location of the operative facts, and which state’s
laws provide the basis for the legal claims. See, e.g., Dominion
Energy, Inc. v. City of Warren Police & Fire Ret. Sys., 928 F.3d
325, 338 (4th Cir. 2019) (concluding that class action against
large utility company on behalf of “thousands of . . . class
members across the United States” was nationally important);
Bridewell-Sledge v. Blue Cross of Cal., 798 F.3d 923, 933 (9th
Cir. 2015) (characterizing case as “largely a local California
controversy involving routine employment discrimination
claims arising solely under California law”).
8
a class action for CAFA purposes because Rule 2152 was not
“similar” to Rule 23.3 Id. at 159. Accordingly, and on a record
materially identical to this case, we affirmed the district court’s
order remanding the case to state court. Id. at 163.
Despite Indemnity’s insistence to the contrary, we are
bound to follow Erie Insurance I. Only when Supreme Court
authority has “undermine[d] the rationale” of our precedent
may a panel of this Court “reconsider contrary prior holdings
without having to resort to an en banc rehearing.” DiFiore v.
CSL Behring, LLC, 879 F.3d 71, 76 (3d Cir. 2018). No such
authority undermines Erie Insurance I. When we decided Erie
Insurance I, we did so with the benefit of Supreme Court dicta
and legislative history supporting a liberal construction of
CAFA’s jurisdictional provisions. That the Supreme Court has
since reiterated those directives in cases involving other
requirements of CAFA jurisdiction, see, e.g., Dart Cherokee,
574 U.S. at 89, does nothing to undermine Erie Insurance I’s
rationale. We must therefore conclude that this case is not a
class action on its face.
This does not end our inquiry. If a complaint does not
satisfy CAFA’s jurisdictional requirements on its face, we
must cut through any pleading artifice to identify whether the
3
We further explained, albeit in dictum, that “Rule 2177 is
even less like Rule 23 [than is Rule 2152] in that it contains
none of Rule 23’s class-related requirements, and, unlike Rule
2152, does not even explicitly contemplate a suit filed by a
member ‘on behalf of’ an association.” Id. Suits brought under
Rule 2177 thus also are not “class actions” for CAFA purposes.
9
case is in substance an interstate class action. In Standard Fire
Insurance Co. v. Knowles, the Supreme Court noted that courts
must be careful not to “exalt form over substance” when
determining whether a case satisfies CAFA’s jurisdictional
requirements. 568 U.S. 588, 595 (2013). At least one of our
sister circuits has taken this dictum as an “instruct[ion] . . . to
look beyond the complaint to determine whether the putative
class action meets [CAFA’s] jurisdictional requirements.”
Rodriguez v. AT & T Mobility Servs. LLC, 728 F.3d 975, 981
(9th Cir. 2013). Though we have not addressed that precise
issue in the CAFA context, we repeatedly have held that courts
may look beyond a complaint when ruling on factual
challenges to their subject matter jurisdiction. See Davis v.
Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016). Indemnity
invites us to look beyond the Complaint’s characterization of
this case as an individual action to the fact that the Complaint
ultimately seeks to benefit a large interstate class of Erie
Insurance Group subscribers.
But we have made clear—albeit outside the CAFA
context—that we will look beyond the four corners of a
complaint only when addressing factual predicates, not legal
requirements, for our subject matter jurisdiction. See Davis,
824 F.3d at 346. And indeed, the overwhelming majority of
CAFA cases in which courts have looked beyond the four
corners of the complaint have turned on CAFA’s amount in
controversy requirement—a quintessentially factual inquiry.
See, e.g., Standard Fire, 568 U.S. at 596 (holding that a
plaintiff may not evade CAFA jurisdiction by stipulating that
the class would seek damages below CAFA’s jurisdictional
threshold); Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d
10405, 410 (6th Cir. 2008) (aggregating the amount in
controversy across five related cases to determine whether case
at bar met CAFA’s jurisdictional threshold). But the primary
obstacle preventing this case from falling within CAFA’s
definition of a class action is a quintessentially legal
requirement: whether the Pennsylvania procedural rules
governing Exchange’s claim are similar to Rule 23. Search as
we might, there are no facts beyond the Complaint that could
alter our conclusion that the relevant state rules are dissimilar
to Rule 23 and that this case therefore falls beyond the scope
of CAFA jurisdiction. See Erie Insurance I, 722 F.3d at 160(“No amount of piercing the pleadings will change the statute
or rule under which the case is filed.” (cleaned up)).
We likewise decline Indemnity’s invitation to construe
CAFA’s text liberally in light of that statute’s “primary
objective: ensuring ‘Federal court consideration of interstate
cases of national importance.’” Standard Fire, 568 U.S. at 595(quoting CAFA § 2(b)(2)). To be sure, we are careful not to
“interpret federal statutes to negate their own stated purposes.”
N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 419–
20 (1973). Nor have we shied away from adopting purpose-
driven—even atextual—constructions of CAFA in the past.
See Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 2006) (offering
“common sense revision” to misleading statutory text that
contravened Congress’s intent in enacting CAFA). “But no
legislation pursues its purposes at all costs,” Rodriguez v.
United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26 (1987), and “we are not
free to rewrite this statute (or any other) as if it did,”
Bartenwerfer v. Buckley, 143 S. Ct. 665, 675 (2023). Indeed,
“it frustrates rather than effectuates legislative intent
11
simplistically to assume that whatever furthers the statute’s
primary objective must be the law.” Rodriguez, 480 U.S. at
526.
CAFA’s text leaves no wiggle room. A state court
proceeding will be considered a class action under CAFA only
if it is “filed under” a “State statute or rule of judicial
procedure” that “authoriz[es] an action to be brought by 1 or
more representative persons as a class action” and otherwise is
“similar” to Rule 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(b). As discussed
above, we are bound by our precedent to conclude that the state
procedural rules at issue are dissimilar to Rule 23. See Erie
Insurance I, 722 F.3d at 159. We likewise are bound by
Congress’s decision to limit CAFA jurisdiction to cases filed
under state procedural rules similar to Rule 23. We
acknowledge that CAFA was “intended to expand substantially
federal court jurisdiction over class actions.” S. Rep. No. 109-
14, at 43 (2005). Yet Congress’s “policy concerns cannot
trump the best interpretation of the statutory text.” Patel v.
Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1627 (2022). And that text plainly
dictates that this case falls beyond CAFA’s ambit.
Lastly, we note the Eighth Circuit’s insightful dictum
that when a plaintiff “seeks to return [a previously removed]
case to his original chosen forum in a form that will avoid
removal,” it is not readily apparent “who is the forum shopper.”
Tillman v. BNSF Ry. Co., 33 F.4th 1024, 1029 (8th Cir. 2022).
It is for precisely this reason that text, rather than policy, must
guide our jurisdictional inquiry. And it is for precisely this
reason that we will adhere to our precedent and decline to treat
this case as a class action.
12
B.
Recognizing the challenge that it faces in characterizing
this individual claim as a class action, Indemnity has a fallback
position: that the District Court had jurisdiction here because
this case is a continuation of Stephenson.
Federal courts have long held that “events occurring
subsequent to removal . . . do not oust the district court’s
jurisdiction once it has attached.” St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co.
v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 293 (1938). We assume, for the
purpose of this case, that this rule applies to CAFA jurisdiction.
See Louisiana v. Am. Nat. Prop. Cas. Co., 746 F.3d 633, 639
(5th Cir. 2014) (noting that “[e]very circuit that has addressed
the question has held that” the Red Cab rule applies in the
CAFA context). We likewise assume that the district court had
jurisdiction in Stephenson.
But the Red Cab rule does not support Indemnity’s
assertion of federal jurisdiction, because this case is not a
continuation of Stephenson. “[I]t is hornbook law that ‘a
voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a) leaves
the situation as if the action never had been filed.’” United
States v. L-3 Commc’ns EOTech, Inc., 921 F.3d 11, 19 (2d Cir.
2019) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 9 Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2367,
at 559 (3d ed. 2017)). It follows that when a plaintiff
voluntarily dismisses his case, “any future lawsuit based on the
same claim is an entirely new lawsuit unrelated to the earlier
(dismissed) action.” City of South Pasadena v. Mineta, 284
F.3d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 2002) (alterations omitted) (quoting
13
Sandstrom v. ChemLawn Corp., 904 F.2d 83, 86 (1st Cir.
1990)).
Our opinion in Vodenichar v. Halcon Energy
Properties, Inc., is not to the contrary. 733 F.3d 497 (3d Cir.
2013). There, as here, we addressed a situation in which the
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed a federal court class action and
refiled a new case in state court. Id. at 502. In determining
whether the case fell within the district court’s CAFA
jurisdiction, we characterized the plaintiffs’ voluntary
dismissal and refiling strategy as similar “[i]n practical terms”
to “a situation where a party amends a pleading to join parties
to an existing case.” Id. at 509. We therefore deemed it
appropriate to “consider[] the second filed action a
continuation of the first filed action.” Id.But a closer look at Vodenichar reveals this language to
have been a red herring. The issue there was whether the
dismissed action was an “other class action” as that term is
used in CAFA’s local controversy exception. Id. at 506 (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A)). And to that end, our reasoning
rested entirely on the text and purpose of the local controversy
exception. Id. at 508–10. We noted that Congress “excluded
from the local controversy exception cases where a defendant
was named in multiple similar cases” because it was concerned
that defendants would “face copycat[] suits in multiple
forums.” Id. at 508. By the same token, we reasoned that the
“other class action” requirement was linked to one of
Congress’s goals in enacting CAFA: “control[ling] the impact
of multiple class actions filed by different members of the same
class against a defendant by providing a single forum to resolve
14
similar claims.” Id. Noting the unique procedural history of
Vodenichar and its predecessor and the many commonalities
between the two suits, we determined that the situation in
Vodenichar did not implicate Congress’s policy concern
because it was “not a copycat situation where the defendants
face similar class claims brought by different named plaintiffs
and different counsel in different forums.” Id. at 509 We
therefore concluded that the predecessor suit was not, “[i]n
practical terms,” an “other class action” for the purpose of the
local controversy exception. Id.Thus despite any facial similarities to this case,
Vodenichar did not address the situation before us now, in
which a removing defendant seeks to tie the instant case to its
predecessor as a means of establishing federal jurisdiction. In
fact, our decision to treat the two actions as a single proceeding
in Vodenichar had precisely the opposite legal consequence in
that case as it would here. There, we concluded that the
successor case fell within CAFA’s local controversy exception
and thus exceeded the district court’s jurisdiction. Id. at 510.
Accordingly, we affirmed the district court’s order remanding
the case to state court. Id. By contrast if we were to treat this
case as a continuation of Stephenson, we would reverse the
District Court’s remand order and hold that the plaintiffs’
decision to file this case in state court had no bearing on
whether the case would proceed in the state or federal forum.
That result would contradict our result in Vodenichar.
We concluded there that the successor case fell within CAFA’s
local controversy exception and so belonged in state court
rather than federal court. Id. at 509. That exception applies only
15
where at least one defendant “is a citizen of the State in which
the action was originally filed.” § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(cc).
Vodenichar’s predecessor was filed in Pennsylvania federal
court and involved only one defendant, a Delaware
corporation. See id. at 502, 504. It was the plaintiffs’ addition
of two Pennsylvania corporations as defendants in the refiled
action that brought Vodenichar within the scope of the local
controversy exception and thereby provided the basis for
remanding the case to state court. See id. at 507.
That our jurisdictional determination in Vodenichar
hinged on the updates in the refiled complaint makes clear that
we considered Vodenichar to be a continuation of its
predecessor only for the purpose of the local controversy
exception. As noted above, it is an “elementary principle that
jurisdiction which has once attached is not lost by subsequent
events.” Fairview Park Excavating Co. v. Al Monzo Const.
Co., 560 F.2d 1122, 1125 (3d Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). If
we truly considered the Vodenichar plaintiffs’ voluntary
dismissal and refiling to be “no different from a situation where
a party amends a pleading to join parties to an existing case,”
733 F.3d at 509, we would have concluded that the case
belonged in federal court and vacated the District Court’s
order—just as Indemnity asks us to do here. Instead, we
concluded that the case belonged in state court without
discussing whether federal jurisdiction had attached during the
predecessor case. Vodenichar therefore supports rather than
undermines the longstanding rule that a case brought after a
voluntary dismissal is “an entirely new lawsuit unrelated to the
earlier (dismissed) action.” Sandstrom, 904 F.2d at 86.
16
What’s more, the two actions at issue here involve
different plaintiffs, further revealing that they are different
cases. Cf. Vodenichar, 733 F.3d at 502 (treating two cases with
shared plaintiffs as one). Formally, this case is pled in
Exchange’s name, while Stephenson was a class action pled on
behalf of four named plaintiffs and other Pennsylvania
residents who subscribed to Erie Insurance Group policies.
And functionally, the real parties in interest here are different
from the real parties in interest in Stephenson. While the
proposed plaintiff class in Stephenson was expressly limited to
“Pennsylvania residents,” JA 99, any benefit that Exchange
recovers here would flow to “all members of Exchange” no
matter where they reside, JA 54. That difference undermines
Indemnity’s assertion that this case is merely Stephenson by
another name.
The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Addison Automatics,
Inc. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co. likewise illustrates
that while courts have at times found it rhetorically useful to
characterize subsequent actions as continuations of voluntarily
dismissed actions, they have not relied on that analogy as a rule
of decision. 731 F.3d 740 (7th Cir. 2013). In Addison, the
Seventh Circuit looked to a prior class action in holding that
the federal courts had jurisdiction over a case that did not
purport to raise class claims. Id. at 741. The litigation began
when Addison Automatics, Inc. (“Addison”) filed a class
action against Domino Plastics Company (“Domino”), which
Domino’s liability insurer declined to defend. Id. at 741.
Domino and Addison entered into a settlement agreement in
which “Domino assigned to Addison—as class
representative—whatever claims Domino might have against
17
its absent liability insurers” conditioned on Addison’s service
as class representative in a suit against the insurers. Id. Addison
sued the insurer both individually and as a class representative,
and the insurer removed to federal court under CAFA. Id.Addison voluntarily dismissed the case and filed a new case in
state court, this time bringing only individual claims. Id. at
741–42.
In holding that the nominally individual suit was a class
action for the purpose of CAFA jurisdiction, the Seventh
Circuit noted the importance of focusing on substance rather
than form in the CAFA context and analogized voluntary
dismissal and refiling to amending the complaint. Id. at 744.
But the court emphasized that its decision did “not depend” on
that “detail[],” as the case would have been a federal class
action and the court’s “decision would [have been] the same
even if Addison had not filed th[e] first complaint.” Id. Instead,
the court concluded that the case was “in substance a class
action” because Addison had standing to sue “only in its
capacity as class representative” and not individually. Id. at
742.
We are not blind to the substantial factual and legal
overlap between this case and Stephenson. Nor do we ignore
the fact that Exchange filed this case only one month after the
Stephenson Plaintiffs dismissed their case against Indemnity
and less than two months after Indemnity removed Stephenson
to federal court. But we are not prepared to essentially set aside
a basic principle of Anglo-American law: that distinct cases
filed by distinct plaintiffs deserve distinct judicial treatment.
We therefore will not gloss over the differences—however
18
minor or formalistic—between this case and Stephenson, and
so will not treat Exchange’s individual suit as a mere
amendment to the Stephenson Plaintiffs’ class action.
III.
The District Court correctly determined that this case
was neither a class action as that term is defined in CAFA nor
a continuation of the voluntarily dismissed class action in
Stephenson. Seeing no basis for exercising federal jurisdiction,
we therefore will AFFIRM the District Court’s order
remanding this case to state court.
19