Thomas Kairys v. Southern Pines Trucking Inc

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
Nos. 22-1783 & 22-2055
____________
THOMAS J. KAIRYS
v.
SOUTHERN PINES TRUCKING, INC.,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-19-cv-01031)
District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan
____________
Argued on April 20, 2023
Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FISHER, Circuit
Judges.
(Filed: July 25, 2023)
Audrey J. Copeland [Argued]
Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin
620 Freedom Business Center, Suite 405
King of Prussia, PA 19406
Teresa O. Sirianni
Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin
Union Trust Building, Suite 700
501 Grant Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for the Appellant
Christine T. Elzer [Argued]
Tamra Van Hausen
Elzer Law Firm, LLC
100 First Avenue, Suite 1010
Pittsburgh, PA 15222
Counsel for the Appellee
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Southern Pines Trucking, Inc. (Southern Pines or the
Company) appeals the District Court’s judgment for Thomas
Kairys on his retaliation claim under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
Southern Pines also challenges the Court’s award of
$111,981.79 in attorneys’ fees and costs. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm.
2
I
A
In March 2016, the owner and Chief Executive Officer
of Southern Pines, Pat Gallagher, recruited Kairys to serve as
Vice President of Sales to help the Company grow its
cryogenic trucking services. Southern Pines had just two other
employees when Kairys joined the Company: Bob Gallagher
(Pat’s brother and the Vice President of Operations) and a truck
fleet manager. Soon after he started working for Southern
Pines, Kairys was diagnosed with degenerative arthritis and
required hip replacement surgery. Kairys notified his
supervisor, Chad Vittone—the Chief Financial Officer of PGT
Trucking, an affiliated business also owned by Pat Gallagher—
that he would use a week of vacation time. Vittone said that
was “no problem,” so Kairys had the surgery on November 30,
2017. Kairys missed seven days of work.
The Southern Pines employee health insurance plan
with the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC)
covered Kairys’s surgery. Because the Company was self-
insured, it paid a portion of each claim made under the UPMC
policy. Kairys’s surgery caused the Company’s health
insurance costs to rise markedly. The claims invoice paid for
the week of December 10–16, 2017, shortly after Kairys’s hip
replacement, totaled $23,277.07, with $13,394.94 billed to
employee payroll code “SP01.” That invoice was the highest
weekly amount in a six-month period by nearly $8,000. And
the SP01 row was highlighted on every healthcare invoice that
Southern Pines produced in discovery.
According to Kairys’s trial testimony, after he returned
to work in December 2017, Bob Gallagher told him to “lay
3
low” because Pat was upset about Kairys’s surgery. App. 320.
Four months later, on April 23, 2018, Pat fired Kairys. Pat
claimed that Kairys’s position was eliminated because
Southern Pines had “maxed out” its sales potential in cryogenic
trucking and was unwilling to buy more equipment,
particularly because qualified drivers were hard to find. App.
475–76. Less than two months after Kairys’s termination, the
Company hired Kyle Kunkle, an employee of PGT, to work
part-time for Southern Pines in a hybrid role. Kunkle mainly
helped the Company with operations, but he also did some
sales maintenance, like helping entertain Southern Pines
customers. Maintaining customer relationships had been part
of Kairys’s role before he was terminated.
B
Kairys sued Southern Pines, alleging that his
termination was discriminatory and retaliatory contrary to
various state and federal statutes. His six claims included:
discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (Count I); discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (Count II); retaliation
under ERISA (Count III); breach of contract (Count IV);
violation of the Pennsylvania Wage Payment and Collection
Law (WPCL) (Count V); and discrimination and retaliation
under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA) (Count
VI).
After discovery, the Company moved for summary
judgment on all counts. Kairys cross-moved for partial
summary judgment only as to his breach of contract and WPCL
claims (Counts IV and V). The District Court denied the
Company’s motion and granted in part Kairys’s cross-motion.
It determined that a reasonable factfinder could conclude that
4
the Company retaliated or discriminated against Kairys in
violation of the ADA, ADEA, ERISA, and PHRA. It also
determined that Southern Pines breached its contract with
Kairys, but it reserved the damages determination for the jury.
The Court denied summary judgment to Kairys on the WPCL
claim.
The case proceeded to trial, and the jury found for
Southern Pines on Kairys’s claims under the ADA, ADEA, and
PHRA. The jury also returned an advisory verdict for the
Company on the ERISA claim, finding that Kairys did not
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Southern Pines
retaliated against him for exercising his right to ERISA-
protected benefits or interfered with his right to future benefits.
That verdict was only advisory because Kairys had no right to
a jury trial on his ERISA claim for equitable relief. See Pane
v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 636 (3d Cir. 1989). Kairys
prevailed on his WPCL claim and the jury awarded him
$5,384.62 in separation pay, which included damages on
Kairys’s breach of contract claim.
The parties then briefed the ERISA claim to the District
Court. Southern Pines asked the District Court to adopt the
advisory verdict because Kairys failed to prove his case on that
claim. The District Court disagreed. The Court observed that
“the jury made no specific findings of fact,” and explained that
it would independently consider the trial evidence to evaluate
the ERISA claim. Kairys v. S. Pines Trucking, Inc., 595 F.
Supp. 3d 376, 380 (W.D. Pa. 2022). The Court then found that
Kairys had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the
Company retaliated against him for using ERISA-protected
benefits and interfered with his right to future benefits. The
Court awarded Kairys $67,500 in front pay and determined that
he was entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
5
Kairys petitioned for those fees and costs under 29
U.S.C. § 1132(g), and the District Court awarded $111,981.79.
Southern Pines timely appealed the judgment on the ERISA
claim and the order awarding fees and costs, and we
consolidated the appeals.
II
The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s factual findings,
including its finding of intentional discrimination, for clear
error. See Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564,
573 (1985); Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (in action tried with
advisory jury, “[f]indings of fact . . . must not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and the reviewing court must give
due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the
witnesses’ credibility”). We review the sufficiency of the
evidence de novo. Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion,
242 F.3d 151, 157 (3d Cir. 2001). And we review the District
Court’s attorneys’ fees determination for abuse of discretion.
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 892 F.2d 1177, 1182 (3d Cir. 1990).
III
We first consider the Company’s argument that the
District Court’s ERISA judgment conflicted with the jury’s
factual findings on evidence common to all claims.
A
Kairys argues that Southern Pines forfeited this
argument. We disagree. Kairys is correct that the Company
never argued to the District Court that it was bound to accept
6
the jury’s factual findings common to the equitable and legal
claims. But parties cannot forfeit the application of
“controlling law.” United States v. Reading Co., 289 F.2d 7, 9
(3d Cir. 1961); see also Gardner v. Galetka, 568 F.3d 862, 879
(10th Cir. 2009) (“It is one thing to allow parties to forfeit
claims, defenses, or lines of argument; it would be quite
another to allow parties to stipulate or bind us to application of
an incorrect legal standard.”). So the District Court had to
adhere to the principle that “[w]hen litigation involves both
legal and equitable claims . . . the right to a jury trial on the
legal claim, including all issues common to both claims, must
be preserved by . . . accepting the jury’s findings on common
facts for all purposes.” AstenJohnson, Inc. v. Columbia Cas.
Co., 562 F.3d 213, 228 (3d Cir. 2009).
B
The District Court wrote that it was “not bound by the
advisory verdict,” citing Hayes v. Community General
Osteopathic Hospital for the proposition that “[a] trial court
has full discretion to accept or reject the findings of an advisory
jury.” Kairys, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 380 (quoting 940 F.2d 54, 57
(3d Cir. 1991)). But Hayes involved an advisory jury only, so
we had no occasion to consider the relationship between
binding and advisory jury verdicts issued in the same suit. 940
F.2d at 56. Here, AstenJohnson’s more specific command
applied—Kairys’s suit involved both a binding jury verdict on
legal claims and an advisory jury verdict on the equitable
claim. So the District Court had to “accept[] the jury’s findings
on common facts” when deciding the equitable ERISA claim.
AstenJohnson, 562 F.3d at 228. Otherwise, “the seventh
amendment right to a jury trial would be significantly
attenuated.” Roebuck v. Drexel Univ., 852 F.2d 715, 737 (3d
Cir. 1988).
7
The District Court faced a quandary because the jury
made no specific findings of fact. Neither Southern Pines nor
Kairys proffered a special verdict form, and the general verdict
form asked only whether Kairys had proved “by a
preponderance of the evidence” that the Company
discriminated or retaliated against him because of a particular
protected characteristic or activity. The jury could check “Yes”
or “No” in response for each claim. But that the “basis of the
jury’s verdict [wa]s unclear” did not absolve the District Court
of its duty to ensure that its disposition of the equitable claim
was consistent with any common factual findings underlying
the jury’s verdict on the legal claims. Miles v. Indiana, 387
F.3d 591, 600 (7th Cir. 2004).
We therefore hold that, in a suit with equitable and legal
claims and facts common to both, a district court must
determine whether the jury verdict on the legal claims
“necessarily implie[s]” the resolution of any common factual
issues, even when the jury fails to make explicit findings of
fact. Ag Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Nielsen, 231 F.3d 726, 731 (10th
Cir. 2000). The court then “must follow the jury’s implicit or
explicit factual determinations in deciding the equitable
claims.” Teutscher v. Woodson, 835 F.3d 936, 944 (9th Cir.
2016) (cleaned up). The converse is also true. “[A]ny findings
not necessarily implied by, but nonetheless consistent with, the
verdict” are for the court to decide. Covidien LP v. Esch, 993
F.3d 45, 56 (1st Cir. 2021); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (“In
an action tried . . . with an advisory jury, the court must find
the facts specially and state its conclusions of law separately.”).
So the trial court retains full discretion to diverge from an
advisory jury verdict (or to reach a result without the help of
an advisory jury), so long as the factual findings underlying its
contrary conclusion are consistent with those explicitly or
8
implicitly found by the jury on the claims for which the jury
sat as factfinder.
C
Though the District Court should have analyzed in the
first instance whether the jury’s verdict on the ADA, ADEA,
and PHRA claims necessarily implied the resolution of any
factual issues common to the ERISA claim, we do so here. See
TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 276 n.9 (3d Cir. 2019)
(“[W]e may affirm on any ground supported by the record.”).
Southern Pines argues that “[t]here is no set of facts
where [the Company] could prevail on the disability and age
discrimination claim, but not prevail on the ERISA claim.”
Southern Pines Br. 41. We disagree. The ADA, ADEA, PHRA,
and ERISA claims have distinct elements of proof. Each
required the jury to find that a different protected characteristic
or activity was a determinative factor in Kairys’s termination.
So a jury could possibly find that Kairys’s use of his health
benefits motivated the Company’s decision, not his age,
disability (arthritis), or request for time off work.
Consider first the ADA retaliation claim. Kairys had to
prove a causal connection between his termination and his
request for a reasonable accommodation (i.e., leave for hip
surgery). By contrast, the ERISA retaliation claim required
Kairys to prove “that there was a causal connection between
his termination and his use of the employee benefit plan.” Dist.
Ct. Dkt. 119, at 18. A jury could conclude that, although Kairys
was not fired in retaliation for requesting time off, he was fired
in retaliation for using his healthcare benefits.
9
Next, consider the ADA, ADEA, and PHRA
discrimination claims. The ADA and PHRA discrimination
claims required Kairys to prove that “his disability was a
determinative factor in [the Company’s] decision to terminate
[him].” Id. at 8 (emphasis added). Similarly, the ADEA and
PHRA discrimination claims required Kairys to prove “that his
age was a determinative factor in [the Company’s] decision to
terminate his employment.” Id. at 20 (emphasis added). By
contrast, the ERISA claim required Kairys to prove that
“utilizing the employee benefit plan was a determinative factor
in [the Company’s] decision to terminate his employment.” Id.
at 18 (emphasis added). That neither Kairys’s arthritis nor his
age was a determinative factor in his termination does not
necessarily mean that his use of benefits also must not have
been a determinative factor.
Southern Pines contends that the jury instructions on the
ADA claim tell a different story. Those jury instructions
directed: “If you believe [the Company’s] stated reason(s) and
if you find that the termination would have occurred regardless
of his disability and/or the cost of the medical expenses
associated with his disability, then you must find for [the
Company] on Mr. Kairys’s ADA claim.” App. 634 (emphasis
added). The Company suggests that this instruction renders the
District Court’s ERISA decision inconsistent with the jury’s
ADA verdict.1
Though we think it a close question, the jury
instructions’ use of “or” convinces us that the jury’s ADA
verdict does not necessarily imply that Southern Pines did not
1
We express no opinion on the viability of an ADA
discrimination theory based on the cost of medical expenses
associated with the disability.
10
discriminate against Kairys based on the cost of his medical
expenses. The jury was instructed that it must find for Southern
Pines if the Company would have fired Kairys (1) regardless
of his disability or (2) regardless of the cost of his medical
expenses. Based on that disjunctive choice, the jury could have
ruled for Southern Pines because it concluded the Company
would have fired Kairys regardless of his disability, even if the
Company would not have fired Kairys regardless of the cost of
his medical expenses. Indeed, a few lines later, the Court
emphasized: “[e]ven if you find [the Company] had other
reasons for terminating Mr. Kairys, you should find in his favor
if you find that but for his disability, [the Company] would not
have ended his employment.” App. 635 (emphasis added). Our
supposition is buttressed by the verdict form, which asked the
jury if Kairys had proven that Southern Pines “discriminated
against him because of his disability,” with no reference to
discrimination based on medical expenses. App. 710. Without
more, we cannot say that the District Court’s ERISA judgment
was inconsistent with the jury’s ADA verdict. See Miles, 387
F.3d at 600 (“[W]hen the basis of the jury’s verdict is unclear,
each of the potential theories supporting the verdict is open to
contention unless this uncertainty [is] removed by extrinsic
evidence showing the precise point involved and determined.”)
(cleaned up).
For these reasons, the District Court’s judgment and
findings for Kairys on the ERISA claim were not inconsistent
with the jury’s verdict on the ADA, ADEA, and PHRA claims.
IV
We turn next to the Company’s argument that the
evidence was insufficient to support the District Court’s
verdict for Kairys on his ERISA claim. Kairys again says that
11
the Company forfeited this argument.2 Not so. The Company
raised the same arguments before the District Court about the
sufficiency of the evidence it raises now on appeal. So we turn
to the merits of the Company’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence
argument.
Kairys’s ERISA claim arose under Section 510, which
states:
It shall be unlawful for any person to
discharge . . . a participant or beneficiary for
exercising any right to which he is entitled under
the provisions of an employee benefit plan . . . or
for the purpose of interfering with the attainment
of any right to which such participant may
become entitled under the plan . . . .
2
Kairys also characterizes the Company’s sufficiency-of-the-
evidence argument as seeking judgment as a matter of law on
the ERISA claim and contends that the Company waived this
argument by failing to renew its motion for judgment as a
matter of law. But judgment as a matter of law under Rule
50(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure may be granted
only on claims tried by a jury, so the Company’s failure to
renew its motion is inapplicable to the equitable ERISA claim
before the Court. See Spartan Concrete Prods., LLC v. Argos
USVI, Corp., 929 F.3d 107, 111 n.1 (3d Cir. 2019); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 52(a)(5) (in an action tried by an advisory jury, “[a]
party may later question the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the findings, whether or not the party requested
findings, objected to them, moved to amend them, or moved
for partial findings”).
12
29 U.S.C. § 1140. By its plain terms, Section 510 prohibits not
only retaliation for use of past benefits, but also interference
with the right to future benefits. Kowalski v. L & F Prods., 82
F.3d 1283, 1288 (3d Cir. 1996). The District Court found that
Kairys prevailed on both theories.
Kairys had to prove that Southern Pines intended to
violate Section 510. DiFederico v. Rolm Co., 201 F.3d 200,
204–05 (3d Cir. 2000). Because he offered no direct evidence
of discriminatory intent, the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework applied. Id. The Company’s appeal focuses
on the third step of that framework, where Kairys had to show
that the Company’s proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for his termination was pretextual by persuading the
Court either “that the discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or . . . that the employer’s proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence.” Jakimas v. Hoffmann-
La Roche, Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 785–86 (3d Cir. 2007), as
amended (May 31, 2007) (cleaned up).
A
Southern Pines first attacks the District Court’s
credibility determinations. The Company argues that the
District Court should not have credited Kairys’s testimony that
Bob Gallagher told him to “lay low” following his surgery,
because Bob and Pat testified to the contrary. This argument is
a nonstarter because such credibility determinations are for the
trier of fact, not the appellate court. We give “great[ ]
deference” to the District Court’s factual findings that rest on
credibility because that Court is in a “superior[ ] . . . position
to make” such determinations. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574–75;
13
see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) (stating that a “reviewing court
must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge
the witnesses’ credibility”). Here, after hearing Kairys and the
Gallaghers testify at trial and “comparing their statements with
other evidence submitted,” the Court found Kairys “more
credible on this point.” Kairys, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 385. And it
disbelieved Pat Gallagher’s explanation for why he became
upset after Kairys’s hip surgery—that he didn’t know Kairys
would miss work—for good reason. Kairys reported to
Vittone, not Pat Gallagher, and Pat was not involved in the day-
to-day management of Southern Pines. The District Court’s
credibility determinations and related factual findings were not
clearly erroneous.
B
Southern Pines also challenges the Court’s factual
findings supporting pretext. The Company insists there is “no
evidence that the elimination of Kairys’s position and his
termination was anything other than a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory business decision.” Southern Pines Br. 17.
The record does not support that broad statement. The District
Court identified several “weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions” in the
Company’s proffered legitimate reason. Kowalski, 82 F.3d at
1289 (citation omitted).
The District Court found implausible the Company’s
explanation for terminating Kairys: that his position was
unnecessary once the Southern Pines cryogenic truck fleet
reached full utilization. The Court explained that the
Company’s bonus plan showed that utilization of trucking
leases varied, so “it [was] not plausible that reaching full
utilization any given month would lead Pat Gallagher to
14
decide—that same month—that there would be no more work
for Mr. Kairys to do.” Kairys, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 384. And
Kairys’s offer letter specifically incentivized full utilization
with a $3,000 bonus. The letter also did not warn Kairys that
full utilization may cost him his job; instead, it explained that
bonuses are calculated monthly, recognizing that utilization
could fluctuate. The Court further found that Pat’s testimony
about another reason for Kairys’s termination—an alleged
shortage of certified drivers—was “evasive” and “lacking in
credibility.” Id. Pat never mentioned that reason in his
deposition testimony.
The Court also determined that the circumstances
surrounding Pat Gallagher’s termination of Kairys were
unusual. Pat considered no documents and consulted no one
before firing Kairys, though he had unilaterally terminated
employees only when the employee performed poorly or
misbehaved. And Pat acknowledged that Kairys was a high-
performing employee who earned an $11,458 bonus less than
a week before he was fired.
Finally, the Court found that the Company’s decision to
borrow Kunkle from a sister company after firing Kairys
undermined its claim that Kairys was no longer needed. Some
of Kunkle’s duties overlapped with Kairys’s; though Kairys
focused on sales and Kunkle focused on operations, the Court
credited Kairys’s testimony that his role involved both
operations and sales work.
We discern no clear error in these findings. Taken
together, the Court’s “interpretation of the facts” to find pretext
“has support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in
the record.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 577.
15
C
Last, Southern Pines argues that the District Court
clearly erred by finding that Kairys’s past and anticipated
future use of his ERISA benefits motivated the Company’s
termination decision. We disagree because the record shows
the District Court thoroughly considered the evidence and
drew reasonable inferences to conclude that Southern Pines
terminated Kairys because of the cost of his past and
anticipated future hip replacement surgeries.
The District Court reasonably inferred that the
Company knew about the cost of Kairys’s surgery. It first
determined that the many highlights on the Company’s
healthcare invoices corresponded to Kairys’s hip replacement
surgery costs based on these facts: (1) employees on the
invoices were listed using codes beginning with “P,” “S,” and
“SP”; (2) Pat Gallagher had three companies starting with
those letters: PGT, Sudbury Express, and Southern Pines;
(3) only 20 employees from those three companies used the
same UPMC plan as Kairys; (4) Southern Pines had only three
employees; and (5) December 10–16, 2017, shortly after
Kairys’s surgery, showed a spike in expenses because of a
claim paid for “SP01.” From these facts, the Court concluded:
“it would not have been difficult [for someone at the Company]
to identify ‘SP01’ as Mr. Kairys and parse his expenses.”
Kairys, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 387. And the Company offered no
contrary explanation for why SP01 was the only employee
code highlighted on the invoices.
The Court also found that the proximity between the end
of the healthcare benefits year and Kairys’s termination was
probative of the Company’s discriminatory intent. Though Pat
Gallagher testified he had never seen the invoices on which
16
Kairys’s expenses were highlighted, he admitted that he “may
have looked at” healthcare invoices “in the course of reviewing
the financials,” App. 472, and that he had a general awareness
of the company’s insurance costs because he reviewed them
annually. The Court inferred that Pat “would have reviewed
medical costs near the end of the benefit year”—that is, shortly
before May 1, 2018. Kairys, 595 F. Supp. 3d at 387. So the
Court concluded that Pat learned the true cost of Kairys’s
insurance expenses shortly before Kairys was fired on April 23
of that year. That finding is not clearly erroneous, nor is it
inconsistent with Kairys’s testimony that Pat was upset upon
learning of Kairys’s surgery in December. Pat may have
delayed making a termination decision until he reviewed the
health insurance records and considered the actual financial
impact of Kairys’s surgery.
Finally, the Court credited Kairys’s testimony that he
told Pat Gallagher he would need a second hip replacement,
and it found that Pat was “evasive” when asked whether he
knew that Kairys would need more surgery. Id.
For the reasons stated, none of the Court’s factual
findings supporting its holding that Kairys’s past and
anticipated future use of ERISA benefits was a determinative
factor in the Company’s termination decision leaves us “with
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573 (citation omitted).
* * *
In sum, the District Court’s factual findings and
credibility determinations were not clearly erroneous. And its
17
judgment on Kairys’s equitable ERISA claim was supported
by sufficient evidence.3
V
We turn finally to the Company’s challenge to the
District Court’s award of reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
Southern Pines does not claim that Kairys is entitled to no fees.
Instead, it contends the District Court did not sufficiently
reduce fees to account for Kairys’s losses before the jury on his
age and disability claims.
ERISA provides that “the court in its discretion may
allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of action to either
party.” 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). When the party entitled to fees
“succeeded on only some of his claims,” a district court should
reduce fees to accurately reflect the “results obtained.” Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). And where that party’s
claims “involve a common core of facts” or are “based on
related legal theories,” the court “should focus on the
significance of the overall relief” obtained by that party “in
relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation.” Id.
at 435.
Kairys proposed a 10 percent reduction in fees to
account for his losses at trial; Southern Pines asked for at least
40 percent. The District Court acknowledged that “a
substantial portion of the case” related to claims on which
3
Southern Pines also argues in one paragraph, with no citation
to authority, that the District Court erred by awarding Kairys
$67,500 in front pay. That argument fails because it is
derivative of the Company’s unsuccessful contention that
Kairys should not have prevailed on his ERISA claim.
18
Kairys did not prevail. Kairys v. S. Pines Trucking, Inc., 2022
WL 1457786, at *1 (W.D. Pa. May 9, 2022). Yet it found that
“much of the evidence presented did overlap between the
successful and unsuccessful claims” because all claims had a
“common core of facts” and were “‘based on related legal
theories’ of discrimination and pretext.” Id. (quoting Hensley,
461 U.S. at 435). Based on this overlap, the Court determined
that a 25 percent reduction in pre-verdict fees was reasonable.
Id. at *2. The Company offers no reason why a 25 percent
reduction did not reflect Kairys’s losses before the jury, and we
find none. The District Court did not abuse its discretion.4
The Company’s specific challenges to Kairys’s
counsel’s time entries fare no better. The time entries were
sufficiently detailed. See Rode, 892 F.2d at 1190 (stating that a
fee petition must be “specific enough to allow the district court
to determine if the hours claimed [were] unreasonable for the
work performed”) (cleaned up). And the entries were not so
duplicative to warrant a reduction. See id. at 1187 (“A
reduction for duplication is warranted only if the attorneys are
unreasonably doing the same work.”) (cleaned up). Fees were
appropriately awarded for work related to Kunkle’s testimony
because that testimony influenced the ERISA claim. And
Kairys properly excluded work related to the WPCL claim in
4
Nor did the District Court abuse its discretion in declining to
reduce fees related to Kairys’s “successful ERISA claims, his
successful motion to mold the verdict, and his counsel’s fee
petition.” Kairys, 2022 WL 1457786, at *2. That work was
“reasonably expended” on successful claims. Hensley, 461
U.S. at 435–36. And the Company’s contention that the ERISA
briefing was at Kairys’s counsel’s sole “insistence” is belied
by the record. Southern Pines Br. 50.
19
his petition for fees. Last, we do not discern any abuse of
discretion in the District Court’s award of costs.
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s
award of attorneys’ fees and costs.
* * *
The District Court’s judgment for Kairys on the ERISA
claim was neither inconsistent with the jury’s verdict on his
other claims, nor unsupported by the trial evidence. And the
Court did not abuse its discretion in calculating reasonable
attorneys’ fees and costs. We will affirm.
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