Ronald Breda v. Delaware Valley School District

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 22-2671
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RONALD BREDA; MELANIE BREDA; JOSEPH BREDA,
Appellants
v.
DELAWARE VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
District Judge: Honorable Jennifer P. Wilson
(District Court No. 3:20-cv-01853)
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
June 5, 2023
Before: HARDIMAN, AMBRO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: June 13, 2023)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Joseph Breda, along with his parents Ronald and Melanie Breda, appeal the
District Court’s order dismissing their claim for denial of educational benefits with
prejudice. We will affirm.
I1
Joseph Breda was a student at the Delaware Valley School District (the School
District). In elementary school he was identified as having a learning disability. The
School District provided him with an Individualized Education Plan but later withdrew it
for Joseph’s eighth grade year and did not reinstate it despite later objections by Joseph’s
parents. During Joseph’s tenth grade year his parents filed a complaint with the School
District that resulted in Joseph receiving a math tutor and additional time to complete
tests as part of a Service Agreement pursuant to Chapter 15 of the Pennsylvania Code.
The allegedly discriminatory conduct forming the basis for this suit occurred
when, in eleventh grade, Joseph enrolled in a nursing occupational program. A “Ms.
Coyle” supervised the program. Coyle allegedly harassed Joseph and threatened to throw
him out of the program. The Bredas filed a complaint with the School District and Coyle
was reprimanded. Coyle allegedly continued to harass Joseph by accusing him of
cheating and refused to let him take completed work home. So the Bredas complained
1
We review de novo the District Court’s order granting a motion to dismiss. Allen v.
DeBello, 861 F.3d 433, 438 (3d Cir. 2017). We apply the same standard as the District
Court, so we accept as true the Bredas’ allegations and draw all reasonable inferences in
their favor. Foglia v. Renal Ventures Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014).
2
again. The parties entered into another Chapter 15 Service Agreement, this time
providing that Coyle was to have no contact with Joseph. But Coyle later “bump[ed]” and
“bang[ed]” into Joseph in what the Bredas contend was an “apparent attempt to threaten,
harass and annoy Joseph.” App. 135 (Amended Complaint ¶ 22). Joseph sought
counseling after the incident. The counselor recommended homeschooling and Joseph
later withdrew from the School District when the family moved to Florida. The Bredas
sued the School District. In a one-count complaint, they claimed discrimination against
Joseph based on his disability. They also claimed the School District denied Joseph a free
appropriate public education and failed to protect him from physical and mental abuse in
violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Pennsylvania’s parallel provisions
in Chapter 15 of the Pennsylvania Code.
The case was referred to a magistrate judge for pretrial management pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). After the District Court agreed with the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation to dismiss the complaint, the Bredas filed an Amended Complaint. On
consideration of the School District’s motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint, the
Magistrate Judge flagged the Amended Complaint as “virtually identical” to the first
complaint and again recommended dismissal. App. 179–181. The Bredas filed objections
to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, but the District Court adopted it
and dismissed the Amended Complaint. The Bredas timely appealed.
3
II2
The Bredas argue the District Court erred in denying their objections to the
Magistrate Judge’s R & R and in granting the School District’s motion to dismiss. We
disagree. The District Court correctly applied clear error review because the Bredas’
objections were not specific.
The District Court did not err in granting the motion to dismiss because the
Bredas’ Amended Complaint failed to state a claim under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and Chapter 15 of the Pennsylvania Code.3
The Magistrate Judge found that the only factual allegation in the Amended
Complaint to indicate discrimination was the “bump[]” by Coyle. App. 190 (quoting
Amended Complaint ¶ 22). The Bredas argued in their objections and now on appeal that
there was no single incident, but rather repeated harassment. We consider the bump and
prior statements together and determine the allegations insufficient to state a claim.
Isolated comments or conduct by a teacher, while perhaps hurtful, do not violate
the Rehabilitation Act in the absence of allegations that the student was excluded from
participation in educational activities or denied educational benefits. See Ridley Sch. Dist.
2
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
We apply the same analysis to these two laws. See 22 Pa. Code § 15.11 (Chapter 15
does not “preempt, create, supplant, expand or restrict the rights or liabilities of protected
handicapped students or school entities beyond what is contemplated by Section 504.”);
see also Lower Merion Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 931 A.2d 640, 644 (Pa. 2007) (“Chapter 15 of
the Pennsylvania Code, before it says anything else, states it is meant to comply with
§ 504 and its implementing regulations.”).
4
v. M.R., 680 F.3d 260, 282 (3d Cir. 2012). Here there is nothing alleged that would
suggest that Coyle’s statements resulted in any denial of Joseph’s participation in the
program or that Coyle’s conduct rose to the level of discrimination under the
Rehabilitation Act.
The Bredas had to plead that Joseph’s disability was the cause of the
discrimination or denial of the benefits. See Andrew M. v. Delaware County Off. Mental
Health and Mental Retardation, 490 F.3d 337 (3d Cir. 2007). But they did not allege
facts to suggest Joseph’s disability was the cause of discrimination. The Amended
Complaint’s conclusory allegations of harassment do not suffice. See Fowler v. UPMC
Shadyside, 578 F. 3d 203 (3rd Cir. 2009).
The Bredas further argue that Vicky M. v. N.E.I.U. established that abuse by school
district staff is sufficient to demonstrate that a free and appropriate education was not
provided. See 689 F. Supp. 2d 721, 736–37 (M.D. Pa. 2009). Vicky M. is not binding
authority and does not make their Amended Complaint sufficient. Vicky M. involved
ample evidence of extreme repeated abuse over two years. Id. at 727. Here there is an
allegation of Coyle “bumping” into Joseph once and making some scattered statements,
which did not amount to or result in the School District’s exclusion of Joseph from
educational opportunities or programs due to any alleged disability. So the Bredas failed
to state a plausible claim for relief.
Finally, we also agree with the School District that the Bredas’ claim fails because
they did not allege facts to show any intentional conduct committed by the School
District, as required for compensatory damages, the only relief sought. See S.H. ex rel.
5
Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 262 (3d Cir. 2013). To the contrary,
the Amended Complaint catalogs how the School District responded to the Bredas’
complaints and accommodated Joseph. The Amended Complaint thus failed to allege
anything beyond mere negligence, which is insufficient to make out a claim against the
School District under Section 504 and its state counterpart. See id. at 263.
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order.
6