United States v. George Bratsenis

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 23-1695
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
GEORGE BRATSENIS,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2:22-cr-00199-001)
District Judge: Honorable John M. Vazquez
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on March 15, 2024
Before: BIBAS, MONTGOMERY-REEVES, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 30, 2024)
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OPINION*
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BIBAS, Circuit Judge.
George Bratsenis pleaded guilty to conspiracy to murder for hire. With one exception,
he waived the right to appeal if his sentence reflected a total offense level of 40 or less. In
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
turn, the government agreed not to appeal if the sentence reflected a total offense level of
40 or more.
The District Court, following the Presentence Report, adopted a total offense level of
40 and a criminal history category of V. After hearing from the parties, the court departed
downward to level 32. It then sentenced Bratsenis to sixteen years in prison, higher than
either party sought but within the agreed-upon range.
Bratsenis now appeals. His court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief and
moved to withdraw, arguing that any appeal would be frivolous. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 109.2(a) (citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)). Having reviewed the
briefs and the record, we agree.
The Anders brief shows that counsel reviewed the record thoroughly in search of
appealable issues. The brief is “adequate on its face.” United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296,
301 (3d Cir. 2001). Though we still review the record ourselves, counsel’s analysis lights
our way. See id. Counsel identifies four possible issues for appeal, Bratsenis adds a fifth,
and we see no others. None has merit.
First, there is no question about jurisdiction. The District Court had jurisdiction under
18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Second, the plea hearing shows that Bratsenis pleaded freely. See Boykin v. Alabama,
395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). The District Court followed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(b) to a tee: It established that Bratsenis was competent. It walked through his constitu-
tional rights to confirm that he understood them and waived them willingly. It made sure
that his lawyer had explained the plea agreement and that no one had pressured him to take
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it. And after the government explained the agreement on the record, the court walked
through the agreement with Bratsenis, confirmed that he understood the terms, and described
the process of calculating and imposing a sentence.
At each stage, Bratsenis agreed under oath that he understood and would accept these
terms willingly. Only then did the court turn to the facts covering each element of the crime.
Even then, it did not accept his plea until it was satisfied that there was an adequate
factual basis.
Third, the appellate waiver is enforceable. So long as Bratsenis received a sentence
within or below the range for an offense level of 40, he agreed to waive his right to appeal.
He retained only the right to challenge his criminal-history category. The court and gov-
ernment each explained this waiver. Plus, Bratsenis agreed that his lawyer had explained
it and that he understood it.
Nothing in the record casts doubt on his knowing and voluntary decision to waive his
right to an appeal. Nor is there anything to suggest that enforcing the waiver would “work
a miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Grimes, 739 F.3d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 2014) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). And the ultimate sentence of sixteen years fell well below
the top of the Probation Office’s suggested range—life imprisonment. So the plea agree-
ment’s valid waiver bars all challenges but one.
Fourth, Bratsenis’s sentencing was free of procedural or substantive error. The court
calculated the Guidelines range and heard from the parties. It then considered their depar-
ture motions and decided to depart downward eight levels. And it weighed the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) factors. So the record reveals no reason to question the sentencing procedure.
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Plus, the sentence itself was reasonable: It fell far short of the life sentence that Bratsenis
could have gotten and was comfortably within the adjusted Guidelines range.
But Bratsenis wants to challenge his criminal-history category. He argues that his 1984
conviction should not count because it was almost forty years old. Yet he was not released
from prison for that crime until 2010, only four years before this crime. So his conviction
is recent enough to count toward his criminal history. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(1). There
was no calculation error.
Finally, in his pro se brief, Bratsenis insists that he should not have gotten a longer
sentence than his coconspirators. But he did not. Rather, he got a greater downward depar-
ture than one of them and a shorter sentence than either of them. So his final argument
also fails.
* * * * *
Our review of the record confirms that any appeal would be frivolous. We will affirm
Bratsenis’s conviction and sentence, grant counsel’s motion to withdraw, and excuse coun-
sel from petitioning for rehearing or for certiorari. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 35.4, 109.2(a)–(b).
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