Matthew Dec v. County of Butler

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 24-1165
__________
MATTHEW P. DEC,
Appellant
v.
COUNTY OF BUTLER; BUTLER COUNTY PROBATION;
BUTLER COUNTY PRISON; GLADE RUN LUTHERAN SERVICES
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-01957)
District Judge: Honorable Christy Criswell Wiegand
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 22, 2024
Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 9, 2024)
___________
OPINION*
___________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Matthew Dec appeals pro se from the District Court’s decision dismissing his
civil-rights complaint with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the
reasons that follow, we will affirm that judgment in part, vacate it in part, and remand for
further proceedings.
I.
In 2023, criminal charges were brought against Dec in the Court of Common Pleas
of Butler County, Pennsylvania. Later that year, Dec commenced this civil-rights action
in the District Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dec’s complaint, which raised claims
under the United States Constitution and multiple federal statutes, was brought against
Butler County, Butler County Prison, “Butler County Probation,” and Glade Run
Lutheran Services (“Glade Run”), a non-profit corporation. The complaint alleged,
among other things, that after Dec posted bail in his criminal case,1 he was placed under
the authority of Glade Run as part of his bail conditions. According to Dec, Glade Run
forced him to pay that entity an additional $450 per month to facilitate his pretrial house
arrest (house arrest apparently was a condition of his bail) and ensure his appearance in
state court. Dec’s complaint sought damages against Glade Run, among other relief.
A United States Magistrate Judge screened Dec’s complaint pursuant to
§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and issued a report recommending that the District Court dismiss the
complaint in its entirety with prejudice. In doing so, the Magistrate Judge determined
1
Dec’s bail had been set at $25,000.
2
that (1) Dec had failed to allege facts that would support a plausible inference that Glade
Run qualifies as a state actor under § 1983, and (2) even if Glade Run is a state actor
under § 1983, “no allegations within the Complaint [against that defendant] rise to the
level of constitutional violations.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 7, at 8. On January 4, 2024, the
District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and dismissed Dec’s complaint with
prejudice. This timely appeal followed.2
II.
Dec has forfeited some of the issues in this case by failing to sufficiently present
them in his appellate briefing. See In re LTC Holdings, Inc., 10 F.4th 177, 181 n.1 (3d
Cir. 2021) (“[A]rguments not developed in an appellant’s opening brief are forfeited.”
(citing In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016))); see also Geness v. Cox, 902 F.3d
344, 355 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[A] passing reference to an issue will not suffice to bring that
issue before this court.” (citation to quoted case omitted)). The only issues that Dec has
preserved for our review are (1) the District Court’s dismissal of any claims brought
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”), and (2) the District Court’s
dismissal of Glade Run as a defendant. We consider these two issues in turn.
2
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the
District Court’s decision is de novo. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373-74 (3d
Cir. 2020).
3
III.
The District Court dismissed Dec’s TVPA claims because it was unclear what he
was asserting under that statute. His appellate briefing, liberally construed, attempts to
clarify his TVPA claims, invoking the statute’s prohibition on forced labor. See 18
U.S.C. § 1589.3Despite that clarification, we cannot conclude that the District Court’s dismissal of
the TVPA claims should be disturbed. Dec has not alleged facts demonstrating that any
defendant subjected him to forced labor in violation of the TVPA, nor has he otherwise
demonstrated that he might be able to plead such a claim if given a chance to file an
amended complaint. See Burrell v. Staff, 60 F.4th 25, 36-37 (3d Cir. 2023) (discussing
the standards governing forced-labor claims under the TVPA); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009) (indicating that, to survive dismissal, a complaint must
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” by alleging facts that “permit the court
to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct” (citation to quoted case omitted));
LaSpina v. SEIU Pa. State Council, 985 F.3d 278, 291 (3d Cir. 2021) (explaining that
“leave to amend need not be granted if amendment would be futile” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Dec’s
TVPA claims. See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam)
(explaining that this Court may affirm on any basis supported by the record).
IV.
3
Although § 1589 is a criminal statute, another provision of the TVPA provides a civil
remedy for violations of § 1589. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595.
4
We now turn to the District Court’s decision to dismiss Glade Run as a defendant.
“[T]o state a claim of liability under § 1983, [a plaintiff] must allege that []he was
deprived of a federal constitutional or statutory right by a state actor.” Leshko v. Servis,
423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). In certain circumstances, a private
entity qualifies as a “state actor” for purposes of § 1983. See Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d
626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). In this case, Dec has plausibly alleged facts that would support
treating Glade Run as a state actor under § 1983, for he contends that as part of his bail
conditions, he was placed under Glade Run’s authority while on pretrial house arrest.
See id. (indicating that one way in which a private entity can qualify as a state actor under
§ 1983 is if “the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the state” (citation to quoted case omitted)). Accordingly, the District
Court erred to the extent that it dismissed Glade Run based on a no-state-actor
determination.
The District Court’s alternative basis for dismissing Glade Run was that Dec had
failed to allege facts that rose to the level of a constitutional violation. But as we noted
earlier, Dec’s complaint alleged that, after he posted cash bail, Glade Run forced him to
pay that entity an additional $450 per month to facilitate his pretrial house arrest and
ensure his appearance in state court. We conclude that this allegation raises a potentially
viable claim under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Bail Clause. See U.S. Const.
amend. VIII (providing that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required”); Holland v. Rosen,
895 F.3d 272, 291 (3d Cir. 2018) (indicating that bail conditions violate the Eighth
Amendment if they are “excessive in light of the perceived evil” (quoting United States
5
v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 754 (1987))).4 Although it is unclear from the complaint
exactly what the alleged $450 monthly payment covered, this defect may be cured in an
amendment to that pleading. Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s dismissal
of Dec’s excessive-bail claim against Glade Run and remand with instructions to allow
Dec to file an amended complaint addressing that claim (and that claim alone).5 See
generally Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (explaining that when a
§ 1983 complaint is subject to dismissal “for lack of factual specificity, [plaintiff] should
be given a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect, if he can, by amendment of the
complaint” (citation to quoted case omitted)).
V.
In view of the above, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment in part, vacate it
in part, and remand for further proceedings with respect to Dec’s excessive-bail claim
against Glade Run. Dec’s “Motion for Summary Judgment” is denied. To the extent that
Dec seeks any other relief from us, that relief is denied, too.
4
The Excessive Bail Clause applies to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Holland, 895 F.3d at 288.
5
To the extent that Dec’s complaint sought to raise other claims against Glade Run
(including a TVPA claim), we cannot conclude that any such claims state a viable cause
of action or might benefit from amendment.
6