Joy Global, Inc. v. Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development

Opinions of the United
2007 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
12-10-2007
In Re: Joy Global
Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
Docket No. 06-3885
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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No: 06-3885
IN RE: JOY GLOBAL, INC., f/k/a
HARNISCHFEGER INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Debtor
JOY GLOBAL, INC., f/k/a
HARNISCHFEGER INDUSTRIES, INC.,
Appellant
v.
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(Civ. No. 01-cv-00039)
District Judge: Hon. Kent A. Jordan
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 24, 2007
Before: McKEE, BARRY and FISHER,
Circuit Judges.
(Opinion filed: December 10, 2007 )
OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Joy Global, Inc., appeals the district court’s ruling that the Wisconsin Department
of Workforce Development’s (“DWD”) state law claim against Joy Global for unpaid
severance payments is not preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act,
29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the order
appealed from is not an appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and we will
therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I.
Inasmuch as we write primarily for the parties who are familiar with this case, we
need not set forth the procedural or factual background except insofar as may be helpful
to our brief discussion.
On November 15, 2006, a motion panel of this court denied DWD’s motion to
dismiss. Our Internal Operating Procedures provide, in relevant part:
A motion panel may grant a motion to dismiss an appeal. If the motion
seeks dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, and the panel votes not to grant the
motion, the motion is referred by order, without decision and without
prejudice, to the merits panel.
Third Circuit IOP 10.3.5.
Here, DWD once again contends that we have no jurisdiction over Joy Global’s
appeal. DWD relies on the argument it made in support of its motion to dismiss Joy
Global’s appeal. In a “nutshell,” DWD contends that appeals based on a denial of
ERISA preemption are interlocutory and can only be reviewed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b). DWD’s Br. at 20-21 (citing, inter alia, Levine v. United Healthcare Corp., 402
F.3d 156, 161 & 163-64 (3d Cir. 2005)). DWD argues that Joy Global did not seek
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certification to appeal under § 1292(b), and claims we therefore lack jurisdiction.
Joy Global contends that we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1)
because, in holding that DWD’s state law claims were not preempted by ERISA, “the
district court denied Joy Global an injunction.” Joy Global’s Br. at 2. In making that
contention, Joy Global cites to that portion of the district court’s opinion which reads as
follows:
This proceeding began when DWD allegedly requested that
the Wisconsin Attorney General prosecute Harnischfeger and
Beloit for failure to pay severance benefits to certain
employees. Harnischfeger and Beloit then sued DWD, as
well as officials from the Wisconsin Attorney General’s
Office and the Wisconsin Labor Standards Division,
requesting injunctive relief, claiming that the prosecution was
precluded under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., and Article VI,
Section 2 of the United States Constitution.
346 B.R. 659, 661 n. 2 (D. Del. 2006) (emphasis added). Joy Global argues that the
district court’s rejection of its attempt to argue that ERISA prevented DWD from
pursuing state law claims was therefore tantamount to a denial of injunctive relief.
Although that argument is not without appeal, we cannot agree.
Except for footnote 2, the district court’s opinion does not mention any request for
injunctive relief. The court’s order states only that “the claim brought by [DWD] in this
case is not preempted by” ERISA. Id. at 669. It is difficult to fashion a denial of an
injunction from an order that was clearly only intended to reject Joy Global’s assertion
that DWD’s state law claims were preempted by ERISA.
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We realize, of course, that an order can have the practical effect of granting or
denying injunctive relief even though it does not specifically refer to an injunction. Such
an order may constitute an appealable interlocutory order under § 1292(a)(1). See
General Electric Co. v. Marvel Rare Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430, 433 (1932), see also
Presinzano v. Hoffman - LaRoche, Inc., 726 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir. 1984).
However, in Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79 (1981), the Supreme
Court cautioned:
[F]or an interlocutory order to be immediately appealable
under § 1292(a)(1), . . . a litigant must show more than that
the order has the practical effect of refusing an injunction.
Because § 1292(a)(1) was intended to carve out only a
limited exception to the final-judgment rule, we have
construed the statute narrowly to ensure that appeal as of
right under § 1292(a)(1) will be available only in
circumstances where an appeal will further the statutory
purpose of [permitting] litigants to effectually challenge
interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable,
consequence. Unless a litigant can show that an interlocutory
order of the district court might have a “serious, perhaps
irreparable, consequence,” and that the order can be
“effectually challenged” only by immediate appeal, the
general congressional policy against piecemeal review will
preclude interlocutory appeal.
Id. at 84. It is clear on this record that Joy Global can not meet the stringent demands of
Carson.
Joy Global contends that “[t]his case has always been about Joy Global’s efforts to
obtain injunctive relief barring DWD from prosecuting its Wisconsin state law claims in
any forum, state or federal.” Joy Global’s Opposition to [DWD’s] Motion to Dismiss
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Appeal for Lack of Jurisdiction, at 2. As recited earlier, the district court commented:
This proceeding began when DWD allegedly requested that the Wisconsin
Attorney General prosecute Harnischfeger and Beloit for failure to pay
severance benefits to certain employees. Harnischfeger and Beloit then
sued DWD, as well as officials from the Wisconsin Attorney General’s
Office and the Wisconsin Labor Standards Division, requesting injunctive
relief, claiming that the prosecution was precluded under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., and
Article VI, Section 2 of the United States Constitution.
346 B.R. at 661 n.2 (emphasis added). The district court was referring to a § 1983
action, captioned Harnischfeger Indust., Inc. v. Doyle, No. 1:00-cv-00873 (D. Del. Sept.
28, 2000), filed by Harnischfeger and Beloit on September 28, 2000, against James
Doyle, individually and in his official capacity as Attorney General of Wisconsin,
Jennifer Reinert, individually and in her official capacity as Secretary of the DWD, and
various other state officials, in their individual and official capacities. Joy Global filed
that suit because it believed that DWD’s “actions and threats of prosecution violated its
federal statutory rights under ERISA,” and, therefore, it “decided to seek injunctive relief
barring DWD for prosecuting any state law claims for severance benefits in state or
federal court.” Joy Global’s Opposition to [DWD’s] Motion to Dismiss Appeal for Lack
of Jurisdiction, at 3. DWD moved to dismiss Joy Global’s complaint, claiming sovereign
immunity. DWD also filed its proofs of claim against Harnischfeger and Beloit in the
bankruptcy court on November 10, 2000, two months after Harnischfeger and Beloit
filed their § 1983 suit against it in the district court.
We do not believe that Joy Global’s request for injunctive relief in its § 1983
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action against DWD carried over into the district court when DWD’s claims were
withdrawn from the bankruptcy court. The district court did not, as Joy Global asserts,
“combine” Joy Global’s § 1983 action against DWD with DWD’s proofs of claim filed
against Harnischfeger and Beloit “in [the] parallel bankruptcy proceeding.” Rather, Joy
Global’s § 1983 action was dismissed by stipulation of the parties. The request for
injunctive relief in that action did not survive the dismissal. Therefore, the district
court’s holding that DWD’s state law claims are not preempted by ERISA did not have
the practical effect of denying Joy Global’s request for a preliminary injunction barring
DWD from prosecuting its state law claims. Consequently, we do not have jurisdiction
under § 1292(a)(1).
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the district court’s order had the practical
effect of denying Joy Global’s request for injunctive relief, we would still not have
jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) because Joy Global can not satisfy the Carson inquiry.
On this record, we can not find that the order has “serious, perhaps irreparable,
consequence[s]” Carson, 450 U.S. at 84, that can be “effectually challenged only by
immediate appeal.” If any error has been committed in rejecting Joy Global’s preemption
argument, it can be raised and vindicated on appeal without resorting to the extraordinary
and narrow avenue afforded under § 1292(a)(1).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, we will dismiss Joy Global’s appeal for lack of appellate
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jurisdiction.
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