Jones v. ECMC

BLD-250 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 09-3395
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IN RE: IRVING C. JONES a/k/a Karamo Muchuri Sulieman, Debtor
IRVING C. JONES,
Appellant
v.
ECMC
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-02590)
District Judge: Honorable J. William Ditter, Jr.
____________________________________
Submitted by the Clerk for Possible Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 22, 2010
Before: RENDELL,CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 19, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Appellant Irving C. Jones, proceeding pro se, filed this appeal seeking review of
the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that certain of his student loans were not
dischargeable. Appellee Educational Credit Management Corporation (“ECMC”) has
moved for summary dismissal on the ground that the present action is moot. For the
reasons that follow, we will grant ECMC’s motion for summary dismissal.
On June 18, 2007, Irving C. Jones filed an adversary proceeding in the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania against ECMC, seeking
to discharge his student debt owed to ECMC. See Bankr. No. 07-00217 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa.). The Bankruptcy Court entered judgment against him on July 22, 2008, holding that
these loans were nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). Jones then attempted to
appeal this decision to the District Court and then to this Court. We initially informed the
parties that the appeal might be dismissed as untimely. Then, by order dated December 4,
2009, the parties were informed that the question of appellate jurisdiction would be
referred to the merits panel. Due to the complicated procedural history of this case and
our conclusion that we lack jurisdiction because this appeal is now moot, we decline to
address the question of the timeliness of this appeal at the present time. See Merle v.
United States, 351 F.3d 92, 94 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We lack jurisdiction when ‘the issues
presented are no longer “live” or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the
outcome.’”).
In his informal brief, filed on January 19, 2010, Jones argued that his appeal was
timely and that the Bankruptcy Court erred in concluding that his student loans
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guaranteed by ECMC were not dischargeable. On March 29, 2010, ECMC filed a motion
to summarily dismiss the appeal. In it, ECMC argues that a motion to dismiss filed by
Jones in a separate proceeding indicates that his student loans have all been consolidated
into a single loan under the William D. Ford Loan Program. See Dkt. Entry No. 6, Civ.
No. 09-01913 (E.D. Pa.). According to ECMC, in consolidating all of his outstanding
student loans, Jones entered into a new loan, which discharged the debt to ECMC. See
Clarke v. Paige (In re Clarke), 266 B.R. 301, 307 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001) (indicating that
“federal consolidation loans are new agreements which discharge the liabilities of the old
loans and create their own obligations”); see also Hiatt v. Ind. State Student Assistance
Comm’n, 36 F.3d 21, 23 (7th Cir. 1994) (explaining that debtor’s consolidated loan
constituted a “new” loan which discharged the original loan). Because all of the loans
guaranteed by ECMC, which were the subject of the underlying proceedings, have been
paid in full through the consolidation, ECMC maintains that there is no case or
controversy presently before this court and that the instant appeal should therefore be
dismissed. See In re Abbotts Dairies of Pa., Inc., 788 F.2d 143, 150 n.6 (3d Cir. 1986)
(explaining that an appeal must be dismissed as moot when an event occurs that prevents
the appellate court from granting effective relief); In re United Merchs. & Mfrs., Inc., 138
B.R. 426, 428 (D. Del. 1992) (stating that dismissal of bankruptcy appeal is appropriate
where there has been “‘substantial consummation’ of the bankruptcy plan or a
comprehensive change of circumstances has occurred”); Resolution Trust Corp. v.
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Haught (In re Haught), 120 B.R. 233, 235 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (explaining that where a debt
arose prior to the commencement of the case, “the question of dischargeability is rendered
academic when that debt is fully satisfied postpetition”).
Appellant has not filed a response to ECMC’s motion and did not address the
question of mootness in his informal brief. We are satisfied, however, by Appellant’s
own motion to dismiss filed in Civ. No. 09-01913 (E.D. Pa.) and by the printout from the
National Student Loan Data System, attached to ECMC’s motion as Exhibit B, that
Appellant’s original debt to ECMC no longer exists. Accordingly, we conclude that this
appeal is moot, and we will grant ECMC’s motion for summary dismissal. See 3d Cir.
LAR 27.4 & I.O.P. 10.6.
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