United States v. Leonaldo Harris

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4195
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEONALDO HARRIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Paul W. Grimm, District Judge. (8:13-
cr-00202-PWG-1)
Submitted: March 30, 2017 Decided: April 5, 2017
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mirriam Z. Seddiq, MIRRIAM Z. SEDDIQ, LLC, Upper Marlboro,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Nicolas A. Mitchell, Bryan E. Foreman, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Leonaldo Harris was charged with conspiracy to distribute and
possess with intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A) (2012).
Harris pled guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement, but he
subsequently moved to withdraw his plea. He argued that an
affidavit revealed new information about his case that called into
question the district court’s previous denial of his motions to
suppress. The district court denied his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. We affirm.
We review the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d
376, 383 (4th Cir. 2012) (defining abuse of discretion). “A
defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea,” id. at
383-84 (internal quotation marks omitted); thus, the defendant has
the burden of showing a fair and just reason for withdrawal, see
United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 72 (2012). “[A] fair and just
reason . . . is one that essentially challenges . . . the fairness
of the [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 proceeding.” United States v.
Puckett, 61 F.3d 1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995). In determining
whether a defendant has met his burden, courts consider multiple
factors:
(1) whether the defendant has offered credible evidence
that his plea was not knowing or not voluntary;
(2) whether the defendant has credibly asserted his
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legal innocence; (3) whether there has been a delay
between the entering of the plea and the filing of the
motion to withdraw the plea; (4) whether the defendant
had the close assistance of competent counsel;
(5) whether withdrawal will cause prejudice to the
government; and (6) whether withdrawal will
inconvenience the court and waste judicial resources.
Nicholson, 676 F.3d at 384 (citing United States v. Moore, 931
F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991)).
“The most important consideration in resolving a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea is an evaluation of the Rule 11 colloquy at
which the guilty plea was accepted.” Id. at 384 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, where the district court
substantially complied with the Rule 11 requirements, the
defendant must overcome “a strong presumption that [his guilty]
plea is final and binding.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted); United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir.
1992) (en banc) (same). Additionally, we have stated that although
all of the Moore factors should be considered, the first, second,
and fourth are the most important factors in making the
determination of whether to allow withdrawal of the plea. United
States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1995).
We have reviewed the record on appeal, and we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Harris’
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The record shows that the
district court held a hearing and properly weighed all of the Moore
factors before deciding to deny the motion. The district court
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conducted a thorough and comprehensive Rule 11 hearing prior to
accepting Harris’ guilty plea. The record further shows that
counsel vigorously pursued several pretrial motions on Harris’
behalf, and negotiated a favorable sentence for Harris. We also
agree with the district court that the affidavit Harris presented
with his motion did not credibly call into question the court’s
earlier rulings made on the motions to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of the
motion to withdraw the plea and the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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