United States v. William Cox

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4334
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM ANDREW COX,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cr-00478-CMC-1)
Submitted: December 17, 2014 Decided: December 19, 2014
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kimberly H. Albro, Research & Writing Specialist, FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
William N. Nettles, United States Attorney, William K.
Witherspoon, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Andrew Cox appeals his conviction pursuant to
a guilty plea to dealing in firearms without a license, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 923(a), 924(a)(1)(D)
(2012). Cox argues that the district court erred by failing to
sua sponte hold a competency hearing and by denying his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
Cox first argues that the district court should have
ordered a competency hearing sua sponte due to Cox’s mental
condition. A district court must order a competency hearing sua
sponte “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the
defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he
is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.”
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (2012). To show error in failing to order a
competency hearing, “the defendant must establish that the trial
court ignored facts raising a bona fide doubt regarding [his]
competency.” United States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 291 (4th
Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of
the record establishes that Cox was capable of understanding the
nature and consequences of the proceedings and assisting
properly in his own defense. Accordingly, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to
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order a competency hearing sua sponte. See United States v.
Bernard, 708 F.3d 583, 592 (4th Cir.) (stating standard of
review), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 617 (2013).
Cox also challenges the district court’s denial of his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. A defendant does not have
an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. United States v.
Bowman, 348 F.3d 408, 413 (4th Cir. 2003). Rather, the
defendant bears the burden of “show[ing] a fair and just reason
for . . . withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B); see United
States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing
six factors courts consider in making such determination); see
also United States v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1995)
(holding that only first, second, and fourth Moore factors can
justify withdrawal and that other factors can merely support
presumption against it). Here, Cox presented only his own
testimony in support of withdrawal, and the district court found
that testimony lacking in credibility. We defer to this
determination. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 736 F.3d 263,
270-71 (4th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1572 (2014).
Therefore, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Cox’s motion to withdraw his plea. See
United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376, 383 (4th Cir. 2012)
(stating standard of review).
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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