United States v. Anthony Sering

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4281
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY SERING,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Ellen L. Hollander, District Judge.
(1:13-cr-00153-ELH-1)
Submitted: December 22, 2014 Decided: January 7, 2015
Before NIEMEYER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Meghan Skelton, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, A. David Copperthite, Assistant United States
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Anthony Sering appeals the 135-month sentence imposed
by the district court following his guilty plea to conspiracy to
interfere with commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951 (2012). On appeal, Sering contends that his sentence is
both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Finding no
error, we affirm.
Because Sering argued for a sentence different than
the sentence imposed by the district court, we review for
reasonableness under an abuse of discretion standard. United
States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576, 578 (4th Cir. 2010); see
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 46 (2007). In reviewing a
sentence, we must first ensure that the district court did not
commit any “significant procedural error,” such as failing to
properly calculate the applicable Guidelines range, failing to
consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, or failing to
adequately explain the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The
district court is not required to “robotically tick through
§ 3553(a)’s every subsection.” United States v. Johnson, 445
F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). However, the district court
“must place on the record an ‘individualized assessment’ based
on the particular facts of the case before it. This
individualized assessment need not be elaborate or lengthy, but
it must provide a rationale tailored to the particular case at
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hand and adequate to permit ‘meaningful appellate review.’”
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50) (internal citation and footnote
omitted)).
We conclude that the district court’s sentence is
procedurally reasonable. Our review of the sentencing hearing
transcript reveals that the district court considered the
§ 3553(a) factors in finding that a within-Guidelines sentence
was appropriate and provided an adequate explanation for the
sentence imposed. Further, it is apparent from the transcript
that the court did not ignore or reject Sering’s mitigating
arguments.
Once we have determined that the district court
committed no procedural error, we consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence, “tak[ing] into account the
totality of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The
sentence imposed “must be sufficient, but not greater than
necessary,” to satisfy the purposes of sentencing. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). If the sentence imposed is within the appropriate
Guidelines range, we consider it presumptively reasonable.
United States v. Yooho Weon, 722 F.3d 583, 590 (4th Cir. 2013).
The presumption may be rebutted by a showing “that the sentence
is unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.”
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United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir.
2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court recognized the necessity to
impose a sentence that was sufficient but not greater than
necessary to serve the purposes of sentencing, and it balanced
Sering’s personal circumstances with the other § 3553(a) factors
to arrive at the 135-month sentence. Given the district court’s
broad discretion in balancing the § 3553(a) factors, see United
States v. Jeffery, 631 F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011), we
conclude that Sering has not overcome the presumption of
reasonableness afforded to the within-Guidelines sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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