United States v. Brian Bishop

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4356
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BRIAN KEITH BISHOP,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Claude M. Hilton, Senior
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00395-CMH-1)
Argued: December 11, 2013 Decided: January 28, 2014
Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Diaz and Judge Thacker joined.
ARGUED: Joseph Michael Hannon, Jr., HANNON LAW GROUP, LLP,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF: William Coffield, COFFIELD LAW GROUP, Washington,
D.C., for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney,
Ronald L. Walutes, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE
OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:
The Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. § 2778,
regulates the export of “defense articles” such as ammunition,
and subjects to criminal liability anyone who “willfully”
violates its requirements. Brian Keith Bishop was convicted
under the law for attempting to export small-arms ammunition to
Jordan without a license. He appeals his conviction on two
grounds: first, that he did not willfully violate the AECA
because he did not know that it applied to the ammunition he
attempted to export, and second, that there was insufficient
evidence that he even knew that exporting the ammunition was
generally illegal rather than merely a violation of
administrative policy. We reject Bishop’s contentions and
affirm his conviction.
I.
A.
In 2011, Bishop worked as a financial-management Foreign
Service Officer (FSO) at the U.S. embassy in Amman, Jordan.
Pursuant to the State Department’s policy of shipping employees’
personal effects overseas at government expense, Bishop sought
in the summer of 2011 to ship certain personal possessions from
his parents’ home in Alabama to Jordan via a government contract
carrier, Paxton Van Lines (Paxton). Bishop, who describes
2
himself as an “avid hunter and sportsman,” Appellant’s Br. at 2,
included nearly 10,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition in his
shipment: 9mm, 7.62X39mm (for use in AK-47 assault rifles), and
.45-caliber rounds, as well as 12-gauge shotgun shells. Bishop
had purchased the ammunition from Cabela’s Sporting Goods
(Cabela’s), and, pursuant to federal law, the Cabela’s boxes
containing the ammunition were labeled “ORM-D” and “cartridges,
small arms.”
The day before the movers arrived, Paxton’s subcontractor
dispatched one of its employees, Brian Davis, to survey the
shipment. Davis testified that Bishop informed him that Bishop
was moving “weights” and neglected to mention ammunition. When
workers loaded Bishop’s shipment the next day, some of the
ammunition remained in the Cabela’s boxes, while the rest had
been transferred to unlatched hard-shell pelican cases.
Bishop’s father testified that, when the shippers asked Bishop
what was inside the cases, Bishop replied “bullets.” The
inventory of shipped items signed by Bishop, however, did not
reference the 366 pounds of ammunition included in his household
effects, instead listing them as weights. Bishop also signed a
statement certifying that his belongings did not include “any
unauthorized explosives, destructive devices or hazardous
materials.” An internal email between Paxton employees
suggested that Bishop “did not like [the movers] questioning him
3
on what he was shipping,” and that he had organized his
possessions so as to discourage the movers from inspecting them.
The movers transferred Bishop’s items to a Paxton warehouse
in Springfield, Virginia. At the warehouse, Paxton employees
determined that certain items required repackaging, and Bishop’s
ammunition was discovered during the repacking process.
According to one employee, the ammunition was removed from boxes
labeled “weights” on the inventory, but that one of the boxes
did in fact contain a single small weight. Two days later,
Paxton alerted the State Department, and special agents with the
State Department’s Diplomatic Security Service (DSS) ultimately
took custody of the ammunition. The Paxton employee in charge
of Bishop’s shipment testified that, when she called Bishop and
told him that ammunition had been discovered, he asked her
whether the State Department knew how much ammunition he had
attempted to ship. She also testified that Bishop told her that
the ammunition was a gift for a government official for which he
would be repaid, and that she should not speak with any of the
Jordanian nationals at the embassy about the shipment.
A little over a year later, DSS agents interviewed Bishop
and informed him that an arrest warrant had been issued for
violations stemming from his attempted shipment of the
ammunition. Bishop waived his Miranda rights and, according to
the agent who interviewed him, admitted to the attempted
4
shipment. The agent testified that Bishop claimed the
ammunition had been intended for his recreational use at firing
ranges and for shooting with “veteran tribesmen in the desert,”
and that he attempted to ship the ammunition because it would
have been prohibitively expensive to purchase it in Jordan. The
agent also testified that Bishop admitted that he had known that
the embassy prohibited FSOs from having firearms, that he had a
shotgun in his residence without his wife’s knowledge, and that
he had lied the previous year when he told a DSS agent that he
did not have any firearms in his residence.
B.
In September 2012, a federal grand jury returned a two-
count indictment against Bishop relating to his attempted
transportation of the ammunition. As amended, Count I of the
indictment charged Bishop with a violation of the AECA and its
implementing regulations. Specifically, the indictment alleged
that Bishop “knowingly and willfully attempt[ed] to export from
the United States to Jordan, without having first obtained from
the Department of State a license for such export, or written
authorization for such export, defense articles, to-wit:
approximately 7,496 rounds of 9mm and 7.62 X 39mm ammunition,
which are designated as defense articles on the United States
Munitions List, Category III.” Count II charged Bishop with
5
delivering ammunition to a common and contract carrier, Paxton,
without notice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(e). Count II
covered not only the ammunition identified in Count I, but also
the nearly 2,000 rounds of .45-caliber and 12-gauge shotgun
ammunition included in the shipment.
Bishop waived his right to a jury trial. At the bench
trial, the government argued that Bishop willfully shipped the
prohibited ammunition in violation of the AECA. The government
relied in part on an email sent by Paxton to Bishop’s wife (and
then forwarded to Bishop) which stated that ammunition was a
“prohibited item in th[e] shipment.” Among the witnesses the
government called was a DSS agent who testified that, prior to
traveling to Alabama to arrange his effects, Bishop had asked
the agent if he was permitted to use firearms while in Jordan,
and was told that he was “not allowed to have firearms in
accordance with mission policy.”
The government also called Mette Beecroft, a State
Department official responsible for educating State Department
employees on the rules and regulations governing travel.
Beecroft testified that the State Department maintains a Foreign
Affairs Manual (FAM), a collection of regulations for FSOs,
including those governing travel and transportation. The FAM
prohibits the shipment of ammunition in household effects in
three separate sections. One section identifies 27 C.F.R. § 478
6
as authority for the FAM’s ammunition provisions. This
regulation, in turn, states that ammunition exports are subject
to the AECA. Another FAM section puts employees on notice that
shipping ammunition may require special accommodations. It
notes, for instance, that household effects may not include
ammunition and further states that federal law may “prohibit
commercial shipment of certain articles in” this section. 14
U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual § 611.5. The third
section informs employees that “[a]mmunition, a hazardous cargo,
requires special handling and labeling,” and that it is the
responsibility of each FSO to check with their post “to
determine the restrictions and limitations, if any, that are
placed upon the shipment of personally owned firearms or
ammunition into the country of assignment.” Id. § 611.6-2.
According to Beecroft, all State Department employees are
required to participate in an orientation program that
introduces them to the rules contained in the FAM, including
those pertaining to the transport of ammunition. Beecroft
testified that, in every training class, she stresses that
shipping ammunition is not permitted. Beecroft also described a
manual entitled “It’s Your Move,” which is mentioned during
training and is available to all State Department employees both
in print and online. The manual repeatedly prohibits the
shipment of ammunition as a household effect, and notes that the
7
penalties for improper shipment of hazardous items include
imprisonment. On cross-examination, Beecroft admitted, “I can’t
tell you what the State Department’s reasoning is” for
prohibiting the shipment of ammunition.
In response, Bishop called Luis Roque, former branch chief
for the State Department’s transportation-management bureau and
the individual who initially dealt with the ammunition when
Paxton contacted the State Department. Roque testified that,
despite overseeing the shipment of all household effects for the
State Department, he was “desperate” for advice on how to
proceed upon being alerted of the discovery of the ammunition.
He initially instructed Paxton to dispose of the ammunition with
the assistance of the fire marshal. He subsequently contacted
diplomatic security experts, who countermanded his prior
instruction.
Bishop also called the Regional Security Officer at the
embassy in Jordan, who explained that, under the Mission
Firearms Policy, which governs FSOs stationed there, Bishop was
permitted to possess ammunition in his residence. He also
stated that the disciplinary action prescribed by the policy for
any violation is purely administrative.
Another one of Bishop’s witnesses testified to Bishop’s
general law-abidingness, emphasizing his diligence and skill at
understanding and following complex regulations. The witness,
8
an attorney, recounted an incident in which Bishop had conducted
independent research on a legal issue confronting an embassy and
reached a conclusion nearly identical to the guidance ultimately
provided by State Department headquarters.
At the conclusion of the one-day trial, the district court
convicted Bishop of Count I and acquitted him on Count II. With
respect to intent under Count I, the court found that the
“evidence is clear that [Bishop] knew what he was doing was
unlawful and simply went ahead and did it.” Regarding Count II,
the district court found “that the markings on [the Cabela’s]
boxes clearly provided notification to [Paxton] that ammunition
was being transported.”
Bishop subsequently filed a motion to vacate the judgment
and for a new trial, alleging that the government had introduced
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Bishop had the
requisite intent to violate the law. The district court denied
this motion and sentenced Bishop to two-years probation and six-
months home confinement subject to work release, in addition to
a $25,000 fine. Bishop now appeals his conviction.
II.
Count I of the indictment charged Bishop with attempting to
export 9mm and 7.62X39mm ammunition without a license in willful
violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The AECA regulates
9
the export of arms, ammunition, and other military and defense
technology. It delegates to the President the tasks of creating
the United States Munitions List (USML), which designates
certain items as “defense articles and defense services,” and of
promulgating “regulations for the import and export of such
articles and services.” 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a)(1). The President
has delegated this authority to the State Department, see Exec.
Order No. 11,958, 42 Fed. Reg. 4311 (Jan. 24, 1977), which
publicly maintains the USML, see 22 C.F.R. § 121.1. With
limited exception, anyone seeking to export items on the USML
must first apply for and receive an export license from the
State Department. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2); 22 C.F.R.
§ 123.1(a). A defendant who “willfully violates any provision”
of the AECA may be punished with a fine of up to a million
dollars, a prison term of up to 20 years, or both. 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778(c).
Bishop raises two challenges to his conviction. First, he
argues that, for his conduct to have been willful, he needed to
have known not only that exporting the 9mm and 7.62X39mm
ammunition was generally unlawful, but that the ammunition was
specifically covered by the AECA. Second, Bishop argues in the
alternative that there was insufficient evidence to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew his conduct was illegal,
10
rather than merely prohibited by State Department policy. We
address each argument in turn.
A.
Bishop and the government disagree over what constitutes a
“willful” violation of the AECA. Bishop contends that the
government must show not only that he knew that his conduct was
illegal, but also that he knew why: because 9mm and 7.62X39mm
ammunition were listed on the USML. The government, by
contrast, argues that it was enough that Bishop knew exporting
the ammunition was illegal as a general matter. On this point,
we agree with the government.
Bishop frames the issue as whether a conviction under the
AECA requires specific intent. See Appellant’s Br. at 17.
Courts regularly use the language of specific versus general
intent in discussing the AECA’s willfulness requirement. See,
e.g., United States v. Chi Mak, 683 F.3d 1126, 1138 (9th Cir.
2012). Unfortunately, the terms are often left ill-defined and
used inconsistently, and as the Supreme Court has observed, the
“venerable distinction” between general and specific intent “has
been the source of a good deal of confusion.” United States v.
Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403 (1980); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave,
Substantive Criminal Law § 5.2 (2d ed. 2013) (“The meaning of
the word ‘intent’ in the criminal law has always been rather
11
obscure . . . .”). Other courts have characterized the
willfulness provision as imposing some sort of scienter
requirement. See United States v. Wu, 711 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.
2013); United States v. Lee, 183 F.3d 1029, 1032 (9th Cir.
1999). Although courts often use the language of general and
specific intent, scienter, and the related concept of mens rea
interchangeably, see Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
252 (1952), none of these terms by itself adequately defines
willfulness under the AECA.
Rather than struggle with such confusing terminology, we
may simply ask where, on the spectrum of culpability, the AECA’s
willfulness requirement falls. Both Bishop and the government
agree that knowledge of an export’s illegality is necessary to
satisfy the AECA’s willfulness requirement; they disagree over
how precise that knowledge must be. This question is ultimately
one of statutory interpretation, since “determining the mental
state required for commission of a federal crime requires . . .
inference of the intent of Congress.” Staples v. United States,
511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Our interpretation of the AECA is guided by the Supreme
Court’s decision in Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
The Bryan Court interpreted the Firearm Owners’ Protection Act
(FOPA), Pub. L. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986) (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 921-929), which established a willfulness requirement
12
for certain violations of prohibitions against dealing in
firearms without a license under 18 U.S.C. § 922. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(1)(D). Bryan held that, “to establish a ‘willful’
violation of a statute, the Government must prove that the
defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.”
Bryan, 524 U.S. at 191-92 (internal quotation marks omitted).
It rejected the defendant’s argument that the government also
had to prove that he knew of the federal licensing requirement,
holding that, to establish willfulness, “knowledge that the
conduct is unlawful is all that is required.” Id. at 196.
In interpreting FOPA, Bryan distinguished statutes where
the Court had read “willfulness” as requiring knowledge of the
specific criminal prohibition at issue. The Court observed that
these cases -- Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991), and
Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994) -- addressed
“highly technical statutes” involving taxes and currency
transactions that “presented the danger of ensnaring individuals
engaged in apparently innocent conduct.” Bryan, 524 U.S. at
194. By contrast, the statutory scheme amended by FOPA to
“protect law-abiding citizens with respect to the acquisition,
possession, or use of firearms for lawful purposes,” id. at 187-
88, did not present comparable risks of criminalizing otherwise-
innocent behavior. Furthermore, this danger was plainly absent
on the facts of the case because, as here, the factfinder “found
13
that [the defendant] knew that his conduct was unlawful.” Id.
at 195.
Bryan is highly relevant to our task here. As with FOPA,
the AECA’s language and structure make clear that Congress
struck a balance between punishing those who intentionally
violate the law and ensnaring individuals who make honest
mistakes. As this court has previously emphasized, the
willfulness requirement ensures that “the government must prove
that a defendant intended to violate the law to obtain a
conviction, thereby eliminating any genuine risk of holding a
person ‘criminally responsible for conduct which he could not
reasonably understand to be proscribed.’” United States v. Hsu,
364 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Sun,
278 F.3d 302, 309 (4th Cir. 2002)).
At the same time, the AECA’s legislative history, while
“sparse,” United States v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410, 420 (2d Cir.
1987), makes clear that Congress was especially concerned that
arms exports not become an “automatic, unregulated process,”
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1144, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1378, 1388. To read the willfulness requirement as
narrowly as Bishop proposes would be a step toward such an
unregulated system and undermine congressional intent. The AECA
does not include such highly technical requirements as might
inadvertently criminalize good-faith attempts at compliance.
14
Unlike the complicated tax and arcane currency prohibitions
discussed in Cheek and Ratzlaf, the export of 9mm and AK-47
ammunition to Jordan would quickly strike someone of ordinary
intelligence as potentially unlawful. Bishop’s narrow reading
would thus undermine Congress’s purpose in passing the AECA and
deprive it of its rightful authority to define the elements of
federal offenses. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419,
424 (1985) (“The definition of the elements of a criminal
offense is entrusted to the legislature, particularly in the
case of federal crimes, which are solely creatures of
statute.”). For it would be unwarranted for courts to draw from
the word “willful” a desire on the part of Congress to require
not simply general knowledge of an export’s illegality, but
specific knowledge of the particulars of a certain list.
Bishop argues that the rule of lenity requires us to view
the AECA’s willfulness requirement in the light most favorable
to him. See Appellant’s Br. at 22. But “the rule of lenity
only applies if, after considering text, structure, history, and
purpose, there remains a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in
the statute.” Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2508 (2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted). That there is no such
“grievous ambiguity” in this case is underscored by the fact
that Bishop’s construction would move the AECA, even further
than the willfulness requirement already does, from “the
15
fundamental canon of criminal law that ignorance of the law is
no excuse.” United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383, 392 (2d Cir.
2004) (Sotomayor, J.). Exceptions to such a venerable rule
should be construed narrowly in the absence of clear
congressional intent to the contrary. We discern nothing in the
language or purpose of the statute to suggest that Congress
wished to jettison altogether the bedrock presumption that each
of us knows the standards applicable to our personal conduct.
Given that both the AECA’s text and purpose support the
government’s position, it is no surprise that this court’s
precedent lends no support to Bishop’s stance. In United States
v. Hsu, we upheld convictions for AECA export violations against
an as-applied void-for-vagueness challenge. We rejected in
passing a defendant’s argument that “the government presented
insufficient evidence . . . that [the defendant] acted
‘willfully’ because of the asserted lack of evidence that [he]
knew the [exported items] were on the [USML] or military items.”
Hsu, 364 F.3d at 198 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). We
noted that “[w]hatever specificity on ‘willfulness’ is required,
it is clear that this extremely particularized definition finds
no support in the case law.” Id.
We draw further support from decisions of other circuits
that have squarely considered the issue. See United States v.
Roth, 628 F.3d 827, 835 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[S]ection 2778(c) does
16
not require a defendant to know that the items being exported
are on the Munitions List. Rather, it only requires knowledge
that the underlying action is unlawful.”); United States v.
Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 162 (3d Cir. 1992) (“If the defendant knew
that the export was in violation of the law, we are hard pressed
to say that it matters what the basis of that knowledge was.”);
United States v. Murphy, 852 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1988)
(upholding a jury instruction that “made clear that conviction
[under the AECA] would not require evidence that defendants knew
of the licensing requirement or were aware of the munitions
list”).
Bishop argues, unconvincingly, that the weight of circuit
authority cuts in his favor. Many of the opinions Bishop cites
in his defense are inapposite, as they merely indicated that
jury instructions as to the defendant’s knowledge of the USML
were sufficient without indicating that the specific
instructions were required. See United States v. Smith, 918
F.2d 1032, 1037-38 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Gregg, 829
F.2d 1430, 1437 n.14 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Murphy, 852 F.2d
at 7 n.6 (reading Gregg as not requiring knowledge of the
contents of the USML to sustain a conviction under the AECA).
Moreover, the great bulk of the authority on which Bishop relies
either fails to support his position or, to the extent that it
17
does, antedates the Supreme Court’s analysis of willfulness
requirements in Bryan.
Bishop appears to recognize that the law is against him
when he argues that, even if defendants do not generally need to
know whether a particular item is on the USML for criminal
liability under the AECA, such knowledge is necessary on the
“narrow facts of this case.” Appellant’s Reply Br. at 4.
Bishop grounds this contention in the fact that his shipment
contained a mix of ammunition, some of which was on the USML
(and thus covered by the AECA) and some of which was not. Thus,
he argues, the only way he could have known that his conduct was
illegal was if he knew that 9mm and 7.62X39mm ammunition were on
the USML. If, as the district court found, Bishop believed that
the “ammunition couldn’t be shipped” and “he knew what he was
doing was unlawful,” he would necessarily have believed that
exporting each type of ammunition -- 9mm and 7.62X39mm included
-– was illegal as well. Under the standard of willfulness
described above, his true belief as to the illegality of
transporting the 9mm and 7.62X39mm ammunition is sufficient to
establish culpability under the AECA even if unaccompanied by
knowledge of the contents of the USML.
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B.
Having established that willfulness under the AECA requires
only general knowledge of illegality, we now turn to Bishop’s
argument that there was insufficient evidence to conclude that
he knew his actions were illegal rather than merely violations
of State Department policy. “In assessing the sufficiency of
the evidence presented in a bench trial, we must uphold a guilty
verdict if, taking the view most favorable to the Government,
there is substantial evidence to support the verdict.” Elliott
v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 760-61 (4th Cir. 2003).
“[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en
banc).
In reviewing the district court’s judgment, we are mindful
that, as the trier of fact, that court was in a better position
than we are to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, take into
account circumstances, and make reasonable inferences. Thus we
reverse on sufficiency grounds only where “the prosecution's
failure is clear.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 17
(1978). Bishop consequently carries a “heavy burden” on his
appeal of this issue. United States v. Hoyte, 51 F.3d 1239,
1245 (4th Cir. 1995).
19
Bishop argues that the government’s evidence fails to
satisfy even its own interpretation of the willfulness
requirement. He contends that neither the email sent by the
shipping company Paxton to Bishop’s wife, nor the training and
notifications he received as a State Department employee,
explicitly stated that transporting ammunition was illegal,
rather than merely against State Department policy. Bishop also
cites evidence that the legal prohibition on exporting certain
ammunition was not well known: Mette Beecroft’s apparent lack of
knowledge as to why the State Department prohibited shipping
ammunition; a State Department official’s testimony that a
typical law-enforcement officer would likely not know about the
prohibition; Luis Roque’s need for legal guidance after he
discovered that Bishop had attempted to transport ammunition;
and the embassy’s policy of permitting FSOs to keep ammunition
in their homes.
While admittedly probative of Bishop’s knowledge (or lack
thereof) of the legality of his actions, this evidence is
substantially outweighed by that presented by the government,
which we must view on appeal in the light most favorable to the
prosecution.
First, Bishop was thoroughly trained in the rules and
regulations surrounding the State Department’s transportation
policies. He was required to attend training that warned him
20
against transporting ammunition and was provided with numerous
documents that not only informed him that transporting
ammunition was prohibited but also referenced the AECA and
explained that violations could be punished by imprisonment.
These documents included the FAM and the “It’s Your Move”
manual, and specifically referenced criminal, rather than merely
administrative, prohibitions and penalties. Bishop also
received an email from Paxton reiterating that he could not
transport ammunition, and was told explicitly by a DSS agent
prior to his trip to Alabama that he could not keep firearms in
Jordan. Moreover, as befits an FSO charged with the financial
management of a U.S. embassy abroad, Bishop’s own witness
characterized him as skilled at following complex legal rules
and performing sophisticated independent legal research. Even
without the substantial evidence of Bishop’s deception,
discussed below, the gravity of the penalties he was repeatedly
warned about make it highly unlikely that Bishop believed that
shipping ammunition was a simple breach of State Department
policy, rather than a violation of federal law and regulation.
Moreover, Bishop engaged in numerous acts of deception that
clearly indicated his awareness of wrongdoing. Although he
claims to have told the Paxton packers that some of the boxes
contained “bullets,” he falsely described the boxes as generally
containing weights and actively deceived by failing to include
21
ammunition on inventory lists that he signed. Bishop quibbles
that the packers, rather than he, listed weights on the
inventory, Appellant’s Reply Br. at 1, but this assertion
ignores the fact that Bishop packed many of the boxes himself
and knowingly signed an inaccurate inventory as well as a
declaration that he was not transporting hazardous or explosive
items. When Paxton informed him that it had found ammunition in
his shipment, his first instinct was to ask if the State
Department knew how much ammunition he had tried to ship. He
changed his story about why he attempted to ship the ammunition,
first asserting that it was intended as a gift and later that it
was meant for his own recreational use. Finally, when
interviewed by DSS agents, he admitted to deception the year
before about not having a firearm in Jordan in violation of
mission policy.
The district court concluded that Bishop “knew from the
time he was employed at the State Department that this
ammunition couldn’t be shipped. He’d been reminded continually
over the years. I think it’s clear. I find the evidence is
clear that he knew what he was doing was unlawful and simply
went ahead and did it.” We agree. But even if we disagreed
with the district court’s conclusion that Bishop violated a
known legal duty in attempting to export the ammunition, we
would not be, on this record, in a position to disturb it. As
22
we have explained, “The relevant question is not whether the
appellate court is convinced of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt,
but rather whether, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, any rational trier of facts could
have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” See
United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982).
That standard is plainly satisfied here.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we find that there was
sufficient evidence to support the district court’s conclusion
that Bishop willfully violated the AECA. We therefore affirm
his conviction.
AFFIRMED
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