United States v. Michael Woodard, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4373
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
MICHAEL LEONARD WOODARD, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:10-cr-00191-BO-1)
Submitted: September 21, 2011 Decided: October 18, 2011
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jennifer P.
May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Leonard Woodard, Jr., pleaded guilty to
possession with intent to distribute marijuana and MDMA, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006), and possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense, in
violation of 18 U.S. C. § 924(c) (2006). The district court
sentenced Woodard to a total of 180 months of imprisonment and
he now appeals. His attorney has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), raising a sentencing
issue but stating that there are no meritorious issues for
appeal. Woodard was informed of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but did not do so. The Government has filed
a motion to dismiss Woodard’s appeal based on Woodard’s waiver
of his right to appeal in his plea agreement. For the reasons
that follow, we dismiss the appeal of Woodard’s sentence and
affirm his conviction.
A defendant may, in a valid plea agreement, waive the
right to appeal under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2006). United States v.
Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53 (4th Cir. 1990). This court reviews
the validity of an appellate waiver de novo, and will enforce
the waiver if it is valid and the issue appealed is within the
scope thereof. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168 (4th
Cir. 2005).
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An appeal waiver is valid if the defendant knowingly
and intelligently agreed to the waiver. Id. at 169. To
determine whether a waiver is knowing and intelligent, this
court examines “the totality of the circumstances, including the
experience and conduct of the accused, as well as the accused’s
educational background and familiarity with the terms of the
plea agreement.” United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400
(4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Generally, if the district court fully questions a defendant
regarding the waiver of his right to appeal during the Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is both valid and enforceable.
United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1991).
We have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that Woodard
knowingly and intelligently entered into the plea agreement and
that the agreement waived Woodard’s right to appeal his sentence
under the circumstances presented.
Accordingly, because we conclude the appellate waiver
was valid and bars Woodard from appealing his 180-month
sentence, we grant the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal
to the extent it seeks appellate review of Woodard’s sentence.
We have examined the entire record in accordance with the
requirements of Anders and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm Woodard’s conviction.
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This court requires that counsel inform Woodard, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Woodard requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Woodard. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART
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