United States v. Lee Richardson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4252
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEE RONDELL RICHARDSON, a/k/a Lee Rondell Jones, a/k/a
Porky,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 14-4267
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LEE RONDELL JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Henry Coke Morgan, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (4:13-cr-00071-HCM-LRL-1; 4:01-cr-00074-
HCM-1)
Submitted: October 21, 2014 Decided: October 23, 2014
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Patrick L.
Bryant, Appellate Attorney, Larry M. Dash, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Robert
Edward Bradenham, II, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport
News, Virginia, Kelly Kathleen Pearson, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
In these consolidated appeals, Lee Rondell Richardson,
a/k/a/ Lee Rondell Jones, 1 appeals his jury conviction and
ninety-six-month sentence for one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924(a)(2) (2012), as well as the revocation of his supervised
release and twenty-four-month term of imprisonment. Appellate
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), in each appeal. In the felon-in-possession
case, counsel questions whether there was sufficient evidence to
prove Richardson constructively possessed the firearm. In the
supervised release revocation case, counsel questions whether
the district court abused its discretion in running the
supervised release revocation sentence consecutive to the felon-
in-possession sentence. Counsel concludes, however, that there
are no meritorious issues in either appeal. Richardson filed a
pro se supplemental brief raising several challenges, including
questioning the sufficiency of the evidence for his felon-in-
possession conviction. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review the denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion
de novo. See United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 403 (4th
1
Although the Appellant’s names in these appeals are
different, both refer to the same individual, to whom we refer
as “Richardson.”
3
Cir. 2012). When a Rule 29 motion was based on a claim of
insufficient evidence, the jury’s verdict must be sustained “if
there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to
the Government, to support it.” United States v. Abu Ali, 528
F.3d 210, 244 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Substantial evidence is “evidence that a reasonable
finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to
support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.” United States v. King, 628 F.3d 693, 700 (4th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In resolving issues of substantial evidence, this
court does not reweigh the evidence or reassess the factfinder’s
determination of witness credibility, and it must assume that
the jury resolved all contradictions in testimony in favor of
the Government. See United States v. Roe, 606 F.3d 180, 186
(4th Cir. 2010). Thus, a defendant challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence faces a heavy burden. See United States v.
Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). To establish a
§ 922(g)(1) violation, the Government was required to prove
that: (i) Richardson was a convicted felon at the time of the
offense; (ii) he voluntarily and intentionally possessed a
firearm; and (iii) the firearm traveled in interstate commerce
at some point. United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 136
(4th Cir. 2001). We have reviewed the record and have
4
considered Richardson’s arguments and conclude that the
Government produced sufficient evidence to support the jury’s
conviction. Accordingly, we affirm Richardson’s conviction.
We also find no error in the district court decision
to reject Richardson’s request that his revocation sentence run
at least partially concurrent to his felon-in-possession
sentence. Sentences for breaches of supervised release are
meant to sanction the abuse of the court’s trust inherent in
those violations, and not to punish the underlying offense
conduct. Therefore, these sentences are intended to run
consecutively to other sentences. Thus, “[a]ny term of
imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of probation or
supervised release shall be ordered to be served consecutively
to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving,
whether or not the sentence of imprisonment being served
resulted from the conduct that is the basis of the revocation of
probation or supervised release.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 7B1.3(f) (2013). Accordingly, it was not error for the
district court to run Richardson’s supervised release revocation
sentence consecutive to his felon-in-possession sentence.
5
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in these cases and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. 2
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court as to the
felon-in-possession conviction and sentence in Appeal No. 14-
4252, and affirm the judgment revoking supervised release and
imposing a twenty-four-month consecutive sentence in Appeal No.
14-4267. This court requires that counsel inform Richardson, in
writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Richardson requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Richardson. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2
We have considered the arguments raised by Richardson in
his pro se supplemental brief and find them to be without merit.
6