United States v. Christopher Squire

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4862
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER BLAKE SQUIRE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior District Judge. (5:15-cr-00305-F-1)
Submitted: November 30, 2017 Decided: December 20, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and NIEMEYER and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geoffrey W. Hosford, HOSFORD & HOSFORD, P.C., Wilmington, North Carolina, for
Appellant. John Stuart Bruce, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, First
Assistant United States Attorney, Phillip A. Rubin, Assistant United States Attorney,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Christopher Blake Squire was convicted of aiding and
abetting and possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2
(2012) and 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012) (Count 1); possession with intent to distribute
100 grams or more of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 2); using a
place for manufacturing, distributing, or using controlled substances, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (2012) (Count 3); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (2012) (Count 4). The district
court sentenced Squire to a total term of 140 months’ imprisonment. Finding no error,
we affirm.
Squire challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for
aiding and abetting and possession with intent to distribute heroin and for possession of a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. We review de novo the district court’s
denial of a Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v.
Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452, 462 (4th Cir. 2014). We review the sufficiency of the evidence
underlying a criminal conviction “by determining whether there is substantial evidence in
the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, to support the
conviction.” United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 93 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not review the
credibility of the witnesses, and we assume that the factfinder resolved all contradictions
in the testimony in favor of the government. United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 245
(4th Cir. 2007). We will not overturn a verdict if “any rational trier of fact could have
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found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 387 (4th Cir. 2012) (emphasis and internal quotation marks
omitted). As we have explained:
Where physical facts and evidence are capable of more than one
interpretation and reasonable inferences therefrom can be drawn by a jury,
its verdict should not be disturbed. It is the jury’s duty to weigh
contradictory evidence and inferences, pass on the credibility of witnesses,
and draw the ultimate factual conclusions. When there is substantial
evidence to support the jury’s verdict, as there is in this case, the verdict
should not be set aside, even if we were inclined to draw contrary
inferences.
United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 379 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Thus, “a sufficiency challenge presents a heavy burden, which a defendant will only
overcome in cases where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” Zayyad, 741 F.3d at 462
(internal quotation marks omitted).
With regards to Count 1, “[t]he essential elements of . . . a distribution offense are
(1) possession of the controlled substance; (2) knowledge of the possession; and
(3) intent to distribute.” United States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 267 n.10 (4th Cir. 2009);
see United States v. Arrington, 719 F.2d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 1983) (“To be convicted of
aiding and abetting, participation in every stage of an illegal venture is not required, only
participation at some stage accompanied by knowledge of the result and intent to bring
about that result.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). Taking the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, testimony established that a
cooperating witness telephoned Squire’s codefendant, Brandon Anderson, seeking to
purchase a substantial quantity of heroin. Within three to five minutes of that phone call,
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Squire left his apartment and drove to Anderson’s apartment. Squire entered Anderson’s
apartment for approximately one minute, and then both men exited the apartment and got
into Squire’s truck. Squire drove Anderson to a local Motel 6, and law enforcement
officers arrested the men as Squire exited the vehicle in the motel parking lot.
When the officers searched the men incident to arrest, they found a blue zipper-
sealed bag containing approximately 9 grams of heroin on Anderson and $921 in cash on
Squire. Testimony established that the going rate for heroin in the Raleigh, North
Carolina, area was between $100 and $350 per gram, such that the $921 recovered from
Squire was consistent with selling 9 grams of heroin. The officers also found a blue
Samsung Verizon flip phone on the driver’s side floorboard of Squire’s truck.
Law enforcement officers subsequently executed a search warrant at Squire’s
apartment. The officers discovered a loaded revolver, ammunition, a large digital scale,
and approximately 300 grams of heroin in the apartment in distinctive blue zipper-sealed
bags that matched the bag recovered from Anderson at the motel. The color and
consistency of the heroin in Squire’s apartment was similar to that of the heroin
recovered from Anderson. In a statement to police, Squire admitted ownership of the
firearm and the heroin found in his apartment. Finally, the officers also discovered in the
apartment a container of three blue Samsung Verizon flip phones that matched the phone
recovered from Squire’s truck. The phones were consistent with disposable “burner
phones” used by drug dealers.
Taking the evidence together and permitting the government the benefit of all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the evidence is sufficient to establish
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Squire’s participation in the possession with intent to distribute heroin at the motel.
Accordingly, we affirm Squire’s conviction as to Count 1.
Squire next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction
for the possession of a firearm during or in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense.
Squire does not contest his engagement in a drug trafficking offense as charged in
Count 2, nor does he contest his possession of the firearm recovered from his apartment;
rather, he argues that the evidence failed to show that the firearm furthered the drug
trafficking crime.
“[T]o prove the § 924(c) violation, the government was required to present
evidence indicating that the possession of a firearm furthered, advanced, or helped
forward a drug trafficking crime. However, whether the firearm served such a purpose is
ultimately a factual question.” United States v. Perry, 560 F.3d 246, 254 (4th Cir. 2009)
(internal quotation marks omitted). In reaching this determination, the jury may consider:
the type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the
firearm, the type of weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the status of the
possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is loaded, proximity to
drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the gun
is found.
United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). We review the factual existence of the requisite nexus between the firearm and
the drug trafficking crime for clear error. United States v. Moore, 769 F.3d 264, 269 (4th
Cir. 2014).
Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence presented at
trial established that, subsequent to Squire’s arrest for the drug offense at the Motel 6,
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law enforcement officers executed a search warrant at Squire’s apartment. The officers
recovered a loaded .357 revolver from Squire’s living room floor. The firearm was in
plain sight approximately one foot away from, and within an arm’s length of, a bag
containing more than 100 grams of heroin. Testimony established that 100 grams of
heroin was a trafficking quantity and that firearms are tools of the drug trade commonly
used by drug dealers for protection. Applying the Lomax factors, we conclude that a
reasonable jury could find that Squire possessed the firearm in furtherance of his drug
trafficking activities.
Squire’s remaining arguments on appeal challenge his sentence, specifically, the
district court’s assessment of two criminal history points for his consolidated 2010 state
convictions. We review a sentence for reasonableness under a deferential abuse-of-
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). First, we ensure “that
the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate
(or improperly calculating) the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence.” Id. We review a preserved claim of sentencing error for abuse of discretion
and, if error is found, will reverse unless we conclude that the error was harmless. United
States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010).
Squire argues that the district court procedurally erred by assessing two criminal
history points for state offenses that Squire committed prior to age 18. We reject Squire’s
argument, as U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) (2016) contemplates
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that juvenile offenses may, in certain circumstances, be taken into account when
calculating criminal history points. Squire’s convictions meet these circumstances and,
thus, were appropriately assessed criminal history points.
Finally, Squire argues that the same prior convictions were improperly scored
because the state court failed to advise him of the full implications of his guilty pleas,
rendering his pleas involuntary and his convictions infirm. Generally, unless a prior
conviction has been “reversed, vacated, or invalidated in a prior case,” a defendant may
not collaterally attack the validity of an identified prior conviction that is being used to
enhance his federal sentence. United States v. Bacon, 94 F.3d 158, 161-63 (4th Cir.
1996). The only recognized exception to the rule is in the case of convictions obtained in
violation of the right to counsel. See Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994);
United States v. Hondo, 366 F.3d 363, 365 (4th Cir. 2004). Because Squire has not
alleged a violation of his right to counsel, we conclude that he cannot collaterally attack
his prior state convictions.
Accordingly, we affirm Squire’s convictions and sentence. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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