Andrew Fialdini v. Eric Cote

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2257
ANDREW FIALDINI; MARYANN FIALDINI,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
ERIC COTE, Individually and Officially; JAIME SANFORD,
Individually and Officially; GARY GAITHER, Individually and
Officially; STEPHEN O. SIMPSON, Individually; JANE DOE ONE,
Individually and Officially; JOSIAH KENNEDY, Individually
and Officially,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:12-cv-01056-LMB-TRJ)
Argued: October 28, 2014 Decided: December 5, 2014
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, DIAZ, Circuit Judge, and DAVIS,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Senior Judge Davis wrote the
opinion, in which Chief Judge Traxler and Judge Diaz joined.
ARGUED: Thomas Kenneth Plofchan, Jr., WESTLAKE LEGAL GROUP,
Potomac Falls, Virginia, for Appellants. Alexander Francuzenko,
COOK CRAIG & FRANCUZENKO, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Broderick C. Dunn, COOK CRAIG &
FRANCUZENKO, PLLC, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
DAVIS, Senior Circuit Judge:
This damages action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several
local law enforcement officers arises from Appellants’ failed
effort to prevent the arrest of their teenaged son. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants
on all counts. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
A.
The material facts relevant to this appeal are mostly
undisputed. On October 19, 2009, Deputy Sheriff Eric Cote of
the Loudoun County Sheriff’s Office arrived at the residence of
Andrew and Maryann Fialdini (“Appellants”), to execute an arrest
warrant for Nicholas Fialdini, Appellants’ then eighteen-year-
old son. Deputy Cote learned of Nicholas’s address through a
DMV records search. Upon arriving at the Fialdini residence,
Deputy Cote spoke directly to Mr. Fialdini and informed him that
he had a warrant for Nicholas’s arrest. 1 Mr. Fialdini told
Deputy Cote that Nicholas was a student at the University of
Alabama, and that Nicholas would not return to the residence
1
The arrest warrant for Nicholas Fialdini contained a
typographical error. It inverted the second digit of
Appellants’ address. The district court determined that the
inversion of the two numbers did not invalidate the warrant, and
the Appellants do not dispute that ruling on appeal. Supp. J.A.
134-139.
3
until Thanksgiving. Deputy Cote requested that Mr. Fialdini
bring Nicholas to the Sheriff’s Office when Nicholas returned so
that the warrant could be executed, and Mr. Fialdini agreed to
do so. In November, Nicholas visited his parents’ residence for
three days during Thanksgiving break, but on advice of counsel,
he did not contact the Loudoun County Sheriff’s Office.
On December 23, 2009, around 9:00 p.m., Deputy Cote made a
second attempt to execute the arrest warrant for Nicholas at the
Fialdini residence. Mr. Fialdini answered the door and stepped
outside, closing the screen door behind him. Deputy Cote
announced to Mr. Fialdini that he had a warrant for Nicholas’s
arrest. Mr. Fialdini asked Deputy Cote to produce a search
warrant, and when Deputy Cote did not produce the warrant, Mr.
Fialdini stated that he wanted to speak with his attorney. When
Deputy Cote asked whether Nicholas was home, Mr. Fialdini
purported to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege to remain
silent. Mr. Fialdini attempted to reenter his residence and
close the door behind him, but Deputy Cote’s hand and foot were
on the door, preventing Mr. Fialdini from closing it fully. Mr.
Fialdini contends that he tripped over a rug in the foyer, and
thereby made contact with Deputy Cote’s shoulder. Deputy Cote
placed Mr. Fialdini under arrest for assault, and escorted him
to the Sheriff’s cruiser where Mr. Fialdini remained until he
4
was transported to jail later that evening. At some point
during this encounter, Deputy Cote called for backup assistance.
Shortly after Mr. Fialdini’s arrest, Lieutenant Gaither and
Deputy Sanford arrived at the Fialdini residence. Mrs.
Fialdini, who was grocery shopping at the time of the above
events, arrived at the residence and met the officers inside.
Deputy Cote informed Mrs. Fialdini that Mr. Fialdini had been
placed under arrest, and that he had an arrest warrant for
Nicholas. Mrs. Fialdini did not believe that Nicholas was home
at the time and declined to consent to a search of the premises.
Lieutenant Gaither called the on-call state attorney to
determine whether, in the absence of consent, the officers had
authority to search the residence for Nicholas. The attorney
advised the officers that they could search, but only spaces
large enough for a person to hide.
Lieutenant Gaither stayed in the hallway while Deputies
Cote and Sanford began searching the residence for Nicholas.
Deputies Cote and Sanford proceeded downstairs to the basement
and Mrs. Fialdini followed. The deputies instructed Mrs.
Fialdini to keep her distance. Upon hearing the officers issue
verbal commands to someone in the basement, Mrs. Fialdini began
to approach Deputy Sanford. Deputy Sanford ordered Mrs.
Fialdini to go to the floor. She complied and Deputy Sanford
5
placed her in handcuffs. The deputies ultimately found Nicholas
hiding behind dry wall in a basement closet.
Appellants were taken to the Loudoun County Adult Detention
Facility where they were placed in separate holding cells.
While in lockup, Mrs. Fialdini informed Deputy Cote that she
needed to use the restroom. An unidentified female officer
escorted Mrs. Fialdini to the restroom area. Mrs. Fialdini
alleges that, on the order of one or more of the defendants, the
female officer ordered her to remove her clothing and then
performed a strip search with a manual cavity check.
Mr. Fialdini was later charged with felony assault and
battery of a law enforcement officer and obstruction of justice.
The commonwealth did not prosecute the obstruction of justice
charge. A preliminary hearing was held on the assault charge,
and a Virginia grand jury later issued an indictment. On
October 6, 2010, the prosecutor dismissed the assault charge
with prejudice in exchange for Mr. Fialdini’s performance of
community service. Mrs. Fialdini was charged with violating a
Loudoun County ordinance prohibiting hindering, a misdemeanor.
The prosecutor dismissed that charge with prejudice on February
25, 2010.
B.
Mr. and Mrs. Fialdini filed separate lawsuits in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The
6
district court consolidated the cases. Appellants alleged that
the defendants violated their constitutional rights when they
entered and searched Appellants’ home, arrested Appellants
without probable cause, and maliciously prosecuted claims
against them. Mrs. Fialdini also alleged that she was subjected
to an unconstitutional strip search while detained at the
Loudoun County Adult Detention Facility. Appellants also
asserted Virginia tort law claims, violations of the Virginia
Constitution, and violations of Virginia common law. 2
In an oral ruling from the bench, the district court
granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The district
court made four principal determinations: (1) the officers’
entry into Appellants’ home was lawful; (2) Appellants’ arrests
were supported by probable cause; (3) the malicious prosecution
claims failed as a matter of law; and (4) Mrs. Fialdini failed
to adduce sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on the
illegal strip search claim. The district court found no
material facts relevant to these issues in dispute, and
concluded that all of the officers were entitled to qualified
immunity, leaving no basis for imposing liability on defendant
Sheriff Simpson. Appellants now appeal.
2
Appellants have briefed only the claims asserted under §
1983. We therefore do not address the merits of Appellants’
various state law claims.
7
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review an award of summary judgment on the basis of
qualified immunity de novo. Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 188
(4th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is proper if taking the
evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party, “‘no material facts
are disputed and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir.
2011) (en banc) (quoting Ausherman v. Bank of Am. Corp., 352
F.3d 896, 899 (4th Cir. 2003)).
“A government official sued under § 1983 is entitled to
qualified immunity unless the official violated a statutory or
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of
the challenged conduct.” Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 350
(2014) (per curiam). “A right is clearly established only if
its contours are sufficiently clear that ‘a reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’”
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
“[I]f a plaintiff fails to allege that an official has violated
any right, the official ‘is hardly in need of any immunity and
the analysis ends right then and there.’” Evans v. Chalmers,
703 F.3d 636, 646 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Abney v. Coe, 493
F.3d 412, 415 (4th Cir. 2007)). While we are not required to
8
analyze a qualified immunity claim by first determining whether
the plaintiffs have demonstrated a violation of a constitutional
right, see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009), we
nevertheless begin our discussion with whether defendants Cote,
Sanford, and Gaither violated Appellants’ Fourth Amendment
rights when they entered their residence armed only with an
arrest warrant for Appellants’ son.
III.
An arrest warrant supported by probable cause provides
officers with “the limited authority to enter a dwelling in
which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the
suspect is within.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603
(1980). Absent consent or exigent circumstances, police may
not, however, enter the home of a third-person to execute an
arrest warrant for a suspect named therein without first
obtaining a search warrant. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S.
204, 205-06 (1981). In order to determine whether police entry
into a home to execute an arrest warrant is lawful, courts
consider “(1) whether there is reason to believe that the
location is the defendant’s residence, and (2) whether or not
there was a ‘reasonable belief’ that he would be home.” United
States v. Hill, 649 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir. 2011).
The Supreme Court did not define the “reason to believe”
standard articulated in Payton. In the absence of this
9
guidance, our sister circuits have formulated their own
definitions. 3 In keeping with our Hill decision, we need not
enter into the midst of this debate because, even if we assume
that the “reason to believe” standard requires a showing
equivalent to probable cause, that standard is met here.
To properly assess whether probable cause existed, we look
to the “totality of the circumstances” known to Deputy Cote at
the time of the entry. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230
(1983). Probable cause “is a fluid concept - turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts - not
readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal
rules.” Id. at 232. “Under this pragmatic, common sense
approach, we defer to the expertise and experience of law
enforcement officers at the scene.” United States v. Dickey-
Bey, 393 F.3d 449, 453 (4th Cir. 2004).
3
Many circuits have concluded that the “reason to believe”
standard requires a showing less exacting than probable cause.
See, e.g., United States v. Werra, 638 F.3d 326, 337 (1st Cir.
2011); United States v. Barrera, 464 F.3d 496, 501 n.5 (5th Cir.
2006); United States v. Thomas, 429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir.
2005); Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1227 n.5 (10th Cir.
1999); United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir.
1995). The Ninth Circuit equates reasonable belief to probable
cause, see United States v. Gorman, 314 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th
Cir. 2002), and other circuits have declined to precisely define
the “reason to believe” standard. See, e.g., United States v.
Powell, 379 F.3d 520, 523 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1995).
10
Under this standard, we conclude that Deputy Cote had
reason to believe that Nicholas Fialdini both resided at the
Fialdini home and was on the premises at the time he attempted
to execute the arrest warrant. The undisputed facts bearing on
residence, and known to Deputy Cote at the time of entry, are as
follows: (1) an October 2009 DMV records inquiry showed
Nicholas’s address as the Fialdini residence; (2) Nicholas
attended college in Alabama, but was expected to return to the
Fialdini residence during Thanksgiving break; and (3) the
Fialdinis are Nicholas’s parents.
Appellants dispute a key fact, namely, whether Deputy Cote
conducted a second license inquiry before his December attempt
to execute the arrest warrant. Cote says he did so, and the
results showed Nicholas’s address as the Fialdini residence.
Appellants theorized at oral argument that once Nicholas
acquired his Alabama driver’s license in the fall, any future
DMV records search in Virginia would have reflected his Alabama
address. Because Nicholas received a permanent Alabama driver’s
license on October 20, 2009, Appellants contend that the second
DMV records search should have revealed a competing Alabama
address. Appellants have set forth no evidence in support of
this theory, however, and it stands in direct contrast to Deputy
Cote’s sworn statements that he did, in fact, conduct a second
license inquiry. Because “[m]ere speculation by the non-moving
11
party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact[,]” we
decline to find this factual dispute genuine. Cox v. Cnty. of
Prince William, 249 F.3d 295, 299 (4th Cir. 2001).
Probable cause for a search, to which we equate the reason
to believe standard for purposes of this one case today,
requires only a “fair probability” that evidence (or, as here, a
person) will be discovered, not certainty. Gates, 462 U.S. at
238. Deputy Cote was not required to know Nicholas’s actual
residence. “[R]equiring actual knowledge of the suspect’s true
residence would effectively make Payton a dead letter . . .
since [officers] could never be certain that the suspect had not
moved out the previous day and that a Bivens or a 42 U.S.C. §
1983 claim would then be made against them by another resident.”
Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 1999).
Furthermore, determining a suspect’s actual residence, where as
here, the suspect is a college student, would be especially
difficult given that many college students maintain a residence
on or near campus, in addition to a residence at their parents’
home. Cf. United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1263 (11th
Cir. 2000) (reasoning, in the context of the Payton “reason to
believe” standard, that it is not unusual for 27-year-old adults
to use their parents’ address for records such as driver’s
licenses “because in a sense it may be a more permanent or fixed
address than the address of their own residence”). Viewing the
12
totality of the circumstances, we hold that Deputy Cote had
reason to believe that Nicholas was a resident of his parents’
home, in spite of the fact that Nicholas attended college out of
state.
Appellants assert that our decision in Wallace v. King, 626
F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1980), establishes that a parent’s home
cannot automatically be considered the shared residence of a
child who is the subject of an arrest warrant. We never
addressed that issue in Wallace. Wallace involved the subject
of an arrest warrant who was known to stay with her parents
occasionally when problems arose with her husband. Wallace, 626
F.2d at 1159. Officers searched the suspect’s parents’ home,
and the home of another married couple after the suspect’s
husband informed officers that he observed his wife enter both
residences. We concluded that the officers violated the Fourth
Amendment when they searched the two residences without the
homeowners’ consent, exigent circumstances, or a search warrant.
Significantly, we did not discuss whether officers had “reason
to believe” that the subject of the arrest warrant lived at
either residence. We held – in advance of the Supreme Court’s
Steagald decision - that the arrest warrant was not sufficient
for officers to enter the third-party premises, because “[a]n
arrest warrant indicates only that there is probable cause to
believe the suspect committed a crime; it affords no basis to
13
believe that the suspect is in a stranger’s house.” Id. at
1161. Given our silence in Wallace on the issue at hand,
whether the officers had “reason to believe” that the suspect
resided in the homes searched, we decline to attach the
significance to the case that Appellants urge.
Turning to prong two of the Payton analysis, we also
conclude that Deputy Cote had reason to believe that Nicholas
Fialdini was on the premises at the time Deputy Cote attempted
to execute the arrest warrant. We have “sanctioned entry only
where multiple facts support a reason to believe that the
subject of the arrest warrant is present at the time of entry.”
Hill, 649 F.3d at 264.
Multiple facts support Cote’s nonconsensual entry here.
First, Deputy Cote arrived at the Fialdini residence around 9:00
p.m., an hour late enough to reasonably conclude that a person
would be home. Courts can look to the time of day as a factor
in determining whether officers possess a reasonable belief that
the subject of an arrest warrant is at home. See, e.g., United
States v. Magluta, 44 F.3d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1995)
(“[O]fficers may presume that a person is at home at certain
times of the day . . . .”); Bervaldi, 226 F.3d at 1267 (noting
that it was reasonable for officers to conclude that suspect
would be home at 6:00 in the morning); United States v. Thomas,
429 F.3d 282, 286 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that “the early
14
morning hour” was reason enough for the officers to believe that
the suspect would be home). Second, and importantly to our
analysis, Deputy Cote observed Mr. Fialdini behave evasively.
While Mr. Fialdini disputes any suspicious behavior on his part,
he does not deny that when asked of his son’s whereabouts, he
stated that he wanted to speak with his lawyer and he purported
to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Third, Deputy Cote visited the Fialdini
residence two days before Christmas, a period when college
students are presumably on academic break. Moreover, Mr.
Fialdini previously told Deputy Cote that Nicholas had planned
to visit the residence during Thanksgiving break, leading to the
reasonable conclusion that Nicholas would return during the
Christmas holiday school break, as well.
“[A] police officer may draw inferences based on his own
experience in deciding whether probable cause exists.” Ornelas
v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). Deputy Cote
inferred from the facts described that Nicholas was present in
the residence at the time he attempted to execute the arrest
warrant, and we find those inferences reasonable. Accordingly,
we reject Appellants’ claim of unlawful entry as to Deputy Cote,
rendering the subsequent entry by Lieutenant Gaither and Deputy
Sanford to provide assistance to Cote proper.
15
Finding no Fourth Amendment violation, we need not proceed
to an analysis of whether the alleged violation was clearly
established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) (“If no
constitutional right would have been violated were the
allegations established, there is no necessity for further
inquires concerning qualified immunity.”). We agree with the
district court that defendants Cote, Sanford, and Gaither are
entitled to qualified immunity on Appellants’ unlawful entry
claims.
IV.
We next turn to Appellants’ argument that the district
court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants
on their claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution.
Appellants contend that their arrests were made without probable
cause, rendering the ensuing prosecution against them unlawful.
Given that the malicious prosecution claims are “wholly
derivative of the false arrest claim[s] for qualified immunity
purposes[,]” we do not analyze them separately. Rogers v.
Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001).
A.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable seizures.”
U.S. Const. amend. IV. To establish an unreasonable seizure
under the Fourth Amendment, a claimant must demonstrate that he
16
was arrested without probable cause. Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d
362, 367 (4th Cir. 2002). “Probable cause to justify an arrest
arises when facts and circumstances within the officer’s
knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of
reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown,
that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense.” Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 569 (4th
Cir. 1998). “For probable cause to exist, . . . evidence
sufficient to convict is not required.” Brown, 278 F.3d at 367.
A malicious prosecution claim grounded in § 1983, “is
simply a claim founded on a Fourth Amendment seizure that
incorporates the elements of the analogous common law tort of
malicious prosecution.” Durham, 690 F.3d at 188 (quoting Snider
v. Seung Lee, 584 F.3d 193, 199 (4th Cir. 2009)). In order to
prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that “the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the
plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable
cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff’s
favor.” Evans, 703 F.3d at 647.
We conclude as a matter of law that the officers acted with
the “objective reasonableness necessary to entitle [them] to
qualified immunity.” Torchinsky v. Siwinski, 942 F.2d 257, 260
(4th Cir. 1991). We base our conclusion on the findings of
probable cause for Appellants’ arrests by judicial officers in
17
separate proceedings, and the fact that reasonable officers in
defendants’ positions would have believed that probable cause
for Appellants’ arrests existed. See id.
B.
We turn first to Mr. Fialdini’s claims of false arrest and
malicious prosecution against Deputy Cote.
1.
Mr. Fialdini was charged under Virginia law with felony
assault and battery of a law enforcement officer. The district
court pointed to three tiers of probable cause as justifying Mr.
Fialdini’s arrest. First, the magistrate judge determined that
probable cause existed, causing the arrest warrant to issue.
Second, a Loudon County district judge presiding over Mr.
Fialdini’s preliminary hearing determined that probable cause
existed and certified the case to Virginia Circuit Court, noting
that Mr. Fialdini’s description of the events leading up to his
arrest “did not seem particularly credible.” J.A. 200. Third,
a Virginia grand jury returned an indictment against Mr.
Fialdini. Appellants contend, however, that none of the
probable cause findings is dispositive of Mr. Fialdini’s claims
of false arrest and malicious prosecution.
Appellants’ argument fails for several reasons. First, the
fact that three judicial officers – the federal district judge,
the Loudoun County district judge, and the magistrate judge all
18
found that probable cause existed is “plainly relevant to a
showing that [Deputy Cote] met the lower standard of objective
reasonableness required for qualified immunity.” Torchinsky,
942 F.2d at 261. Second, we have held that, “an indictment,
‘fair upon its face,’ returned by a ‘properly constituted grand
jury,’ conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.”
Durham, 690 F.3d at 189 (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
117 n.19 (1975)). Appellants argue that the indictment cannot
support a finding of probable cause because Mr. Fialdini was not
permitted to present evidence before the grand jury, cf. Va.
Code Ann. § 19.2-191 (describing the functions of a grand jury);
Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(d), suggesting thereby that had he been
allowed to do so, he would have defeated the prosecutor’s
showing that there was probable cause for his arrest. We reject
this contention.
Appellants argue that Deputy Cote omitted material
information from the arrest warrant affidavit completed after
his warrantless arrest, namely that Deputy Cote prevented Mr.
Fialdini from closing the door of his residence, and that Deputy
Cote had no reason to believe that Nicholas resided in the home
or was on the premises when he attempted to execute the warrant.
We do not find that Deputy Cote omitted these facts “with the
intent to make, or with reckless disregard of whether they
thereby made, the affidavit misleading.” Miller v. Prince
19
George’s Cnty., Md., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007). As we
have explained, Deputy Cote had reason to believe that Nicholas
Fialdini both resided at his parents’ home and was present in
the residence at the time he attempted to execute the warrant.
Therefore, Deputy Cote had the “limited authority” to enter
Appellants’ dwelling, Payton, 445 U.S. at 603, and the omission
of the fact that Deputy Cote prevented Mr. Fialdini from closing
the door to his residence would not have negated the
magistrate’s finding of probable cause for Mr. Fialdini’s
arrest.
2.
Finally, a reasonable officer “could have believed that
arresting [Mr. Fialdini] . . . was lawful, in light of clearly
established law and the information the officers possessed.”
Rogers, 249 F.3d at 290.
In Virginia, “assault occurs when an assailant engages in
an overt act intended to inflict bodily harm and has the present
ability to inflict such harm or engages in an overt act intended
to place the victim in fear or apprehension of bodily harm and
creates such reasonable fear or apprehension in the victim.”
Clark v. Commonwealth, 691 S.E.2d 786, 789 (Va. 2010). “To
sustain a conviction for battery, the Commonwealth must prove a
willful or unlawful touching of another.” Parish v.
Commonwealth, 693 S.E.2d 315, 318 (Va. Ct. App. 2010).
20
Despite the differing accounts of how Mr. Fialdini came
into contact with Deputy Cote, it is undisputed that Mr.
Fialdini’s palms hit Deputy Cote’s left shoulder area, giving
Deputy Cote “sort of a jolt.” J.A. 163. From this fact alone,
we conclude that a reasonable officer could believe, “in light
of the contours of the offense at issue,” that probable cause
existed for Mr. Fialdini’s arrest. Rogers, 249 F.3d at 290.
Accordingly, we hold that Mr. Fialdini failed to produce
substantial evidence that Deputy Cote lacked probable cause for
his arrest. Consequently, as we hold that the arrest of Mr.
Fialdini was constitutionally valid, it follows that his claim
of malicious prosecution must fail. Durham, 690 F.3d at 190
(holding that state law malicious prosecution claim failed
because probable cause existed for plaintiff’s arrest and
detention) (citing Lewis v. Kei, 708 S.E.2d 884, 889-90 (Va.
2011)).
C.
As to Mrs. Fialdini’s claims of false arrest and malicious
prosecution against defendants Cote and Sanford, we similarly
affirm the district court. Mrs. Fialdini was charged with
violating a Loudoun County ordinance, which prohibits an
individual from “resist[ing] hinder[ing] or obstruct[ing] any
Deputy Sheriff in making an arrest, in serving a warrant, order,
notice or process or in the performance or discharge of any of
21
his or her duties.” J.A. 269.2. Mrs. Fialdini argues that
several facts relevant to a finding of probable cause are in
dispute, and that there is insufficient evidence that she was
attempting to resist, hinder, or obstruct Deputies Sanford and
Cote.
We first note that both the magistrate judge who issued
the warrant and the district court agreed that the evidence was
sufficient to establish probable cause for Mrs. Fialdini’s
arrest. Second, a reasonable officer would have concluded that
probable cause existed for Mrs. Fialdini’s arrest. Mrs.
Fialdini testified during her deposition that she followed
Deputies Cote and Sanford downstairs as they were searching the
basement, because it was possible that her son would be in that
part of the house. She also admitted that the deputies
instructed her to “back up” because she was “too close.” J.A.
218. Appellants concede that Mrs. Fialdini was moving toward
the basement bedroom door where Deputy Sanford was standing when
she was ordered to go to the floor.
Appellants devote much argument to the fact that Deputy
Cote caused the arrest warrant to issue, but testified during
his deposition that he did not fully observe the events leading
up to Mrs. Fialdini’s arrest. However, both Deputy Cote and
Deputy Sanford were present in the same room at the time of the
events leading to Mrs. Fialdini’s arrest, and both testified
22
that Mrs. Fialdini was approaching Deputy Sanford after having
received explicit orders to stay back. On the facts presented
in the record, we find no error in the district court’s
determination that, even viewing the facts in the light most
favorably to Mrs. Fialdini, there was probable cause to effect
her arrest. Accordingly, we conclude that Deputies Cote and
Sanford are entitled to qualified immunity.
V.
Finally, we hold that Mrs. Fialdini’s Fourth Amendment
claim based on the ordering of a strip search while she was
detained at the Loudoun County jail also fails. We agree with
the district court that this claim fails because Mrs. Fialdini
has not produced sufficient evidence to survive summary
judgment.
Mrs. Fialdini submits that defendants Cote and Kennedy
violated the Fourth Amendment when they ordered defendant Jane
Doe to strip search her. The sole support for Mrs. Fialdini’s
unlawful strip search claim is Mr. Fialdini’s statement that he
overheard Deputy Cote order Deputy Kennedy, to “take care of”
Mrs. Fialdini, and that Mr. Fialdini interpreted this order to
mean that a strip search and body cavity check were to be
performed. J.A. 339. Neither Deputy Cote nor Deputy Kennedy
admitted to ordering a strip search of Mrs. Fialdini. Indeed,
23
Appellants stated in their depositions that they never heard
anyone explicitly order a strip search.
“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there
is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not suffice, nor does
a mere scintilla of evidence in support of” the nonmoving
party’s case. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d
645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). On the facts in the record, Mrs.
Fialdini has not produced evidence sufficient to survive summary
judgment with respect to their illegal strip search claim. We
thus affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment.
VI.
For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the
district court is
AFFIRMED.
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