United States v. William Gazafi

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4522
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM GAZAFI,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:13-cr-00472-RWT-1)
Submitted: January 28, 2015 Decided: March 2, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Meghan Skelton, Appellate
Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J.
Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Thomas M. Sullivan,
Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
William Gazafi appeals the 120-year, within-Guidelines
sentence imposed following his guilty plea to six counts of
production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2251(a) (2012). He argues that the district court failed to
explain its chosen sentence and that the sentence is
substantively unreasonable.
We review sentences for reasonableness “under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We first ensure that the
district court committed no “‘significant procedural error,’”
including improper calculation of the Guidelines range,
insufficient consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012)
factors, and inadequate explanation of the sentence imposed.
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
Gazafi first challenges the district court’s
explanation of the sentence. In evaluating the sentencing
court’s explanation of a selected sentence, we have consistently
held that, while the district court must consider the statutory
factors and explain the sentence, it need not “robotically tick
through” every § 3353(a) factor on the record, particularly when
the court imposes a sentence within the properly calculated
Guidelines range. United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345
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(4th Cir. 2006). At the same time, the district court “must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. While the “individualized assessment need
not be elaborate or lengthy, . . . it must provide a rationale
tailored to the particular case at hand and adequate to permit
meaningful appellate review.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We conclude that the district court adequately
explained its decision to impose a within-Guidelines sentence.
The court considered several of the § 3553(a) factors within its
discussion, including the nature and circumstances of the
current offense; Gazafi’s history and characteristics; and the
need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense,
to provide deterrence, and to protect the public. While the
district court emphasized the heinous nature of Gazafi’s
offenses and their effect on the victims, the court also
considered Gazafi’s lack of criminal history and his military
career. The court found that the positive aspects of Gazafi’s
military service were outweighed by his misuse of the trust his
position engendered. The court distinguished the sentences
imposed on other defendants in the district, concluding that
Gazafi’s crimes were among the worst the court had encountered.
Finally, the court concluded that a lengthy sentence was
necessary to protect the public.
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Next, Gazafi argues that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable. Substantive reasonableness is determined by
considering the totality of the circumstances. “Any sentence
that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range
is presumptively [substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption
can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th
Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
We conclude that Gazafi has failed to rebut the
presumed reasonableness of his within-Guidelines sentence. The
district court assessed the totality of the circumstances,
including the applicable § 3553(a) factors, in concluding that a
lengthy sentence was necessary to protect the public and to
reflect the heinous nature of the crimes. The court determined
that the breadth and circumstances of Gazafi’s crimes warranted
a 120-year sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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