United States v. Tony Humphrey

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4453
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TONY HUMPHREY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
Chief District Judge. (3:12-cr-00228-FDW-1)
Submitted: February 18, 2015 Decided: March 2, 2015
Before MOTZ and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven T. Meier, MEIER LAW, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tony Humphrey pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to two counts of Hobbs Act robbery, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (Counts One and Ten); two counts of
attempted Hobbs Act robbery (Counts Three and Eight); one count
of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (d)
(2012) (Count Six); and two counts of brandishing a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2012) (Counts Two and Four). The district
court sentenced Humphrey to a total of 471 months’ imprisonment,
consisting of eighty-seven months’ imprisonment on Counts One,
Three, Six, Eight, and Ten, to be served concurrently; seven
years’ imprisonment on Count Two, to be served consecutive to
all other sentences; and twenty-five years’ imprisonment on
Count Four, to be served consecutive to all other sentences. On
appeal, Humphrey’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning the substantive
reasonableness of Humphrey’s sentence. We affirm.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case, and have found no meritorious issues. Before
accepting Humphrey’s guilty plea, the magistrate judge conducted
a thorough plea colloquy, satisfying the requirements of Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11 and ensuring that Humphrey’s plea was knowing,
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voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. See
United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991).
Moreover, the district court made no significant procedural
error at sentencing. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007).
Counsel questions whether Humphrey’s sentence is
substantively reasonable. We assess substantive reasonableness
by considering the totality of the circumstances. “Any sentence
that is within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range
is presumptively [substantively] reasonable. Such a presumption
can only be rebutted by showing that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
[(2012)] factors.” United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306
(4th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421(2014).
After careful review of the record, we conclude that
Humphrey had failed to rebut the presumed reasonableness of his
sentence. The district court considered Humphrey’s childhood
and mental health problems, but concluded that these factors did
not excuse his violent crimes. The court determined that a
sentence at the low end of the Guidelines range was necessary to
reflect the seriousness of Humphrey’s criminal conduct and to
deter others from violent crime, but also recognized the
mitigating factors and that Humphrey was making efforts to
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improve his life. We therefore conclude that Humphrey’s
sentence is reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform Humphrey, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Humphrey requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Humphrey.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the material before this
court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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