United States v. Rashard Cleveland

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4506
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RASHARD CHAZELL CLEVELAND,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:12-cr-00068-CCE-1)
Submitted: March 12, 2015 Decided: March 16, 2015
Before GREGORY, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark A. Yurachek, MARK ALLEN YURACHEK & ASSOCIATES, Falls
Church, Virginia, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States
Attorney, Angela H. Miller, Michael F. Joseph, Assistant United
States Attorneys, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rashard Chazell Cleveland appeals from his convictions for
use of an unauthorized device and aggravated identity theft. He
pleaded guilty, reserving the right to appeal the district
court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence.
Cleveland argues that, contrary to the district court’s
findings, his consent to the search was coerced by officers who
detained him after completing the purpose of the original
traffic stop for driving without a seatbelt. Finding no error,
we affirm.
We review factual findings underlying a district court’s
denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246
(4th Cir. 2011). We may reverse for clear error only if “left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.” United States v. Wooden, 693 F.3d 440, 451 (4th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because the
district court denied the motion to suppress, we construe the
evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, the
party prevailing below. United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531,
534 (4th Cir. 2013). We defer to the court’s credibility
findings. United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 150 n.1 (4th
Cir. 2009). With these standards in mind, after reviewing the
record, the parties’ briefs, and fully considering the
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arguments, we conclude that the district court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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