United States v. Ivander James, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4421
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
IVANDER JAMES, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. C. Weston Houck, Senior District
Judge. (4:01-cr-00965-CWH-1)
Submitted: January 31, 2017 Decided: July 6, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. Nettles, IV, Assistant Federal Public Defender,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker
Bethea, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ivander James, Jr., appeals from the sentence imposed after
he was resentenced for his conviction for being a felon in
possession of a firearm. At resentencing, the court imposed a
term of imprisonment of time served and a three-year term of
supervised release. Counsel has filed a brief in accordance
with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that
there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning
whether the three-year term of supervised release was a
reasonable sentence. James was advised of his right to file a
pro se informal brief, but has not done so. The Government
declined to file a brief. We affirm.
James suggests that the three-year term is a substantively
unreasonable sentence. Because James was resentenced under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012), the imposition of supervised release
under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a) (2012) became discretionary. We
review questions of law de novo. United States v. Strieper, 666
F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2012). The district court’s imposition
of a sentence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007).
James acknowledges that the Supreme Court has held that
“[s]upervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct
from those served by incarceration” and that “[t]he objectives
of supervised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time
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were to offset and reduce terms of supervised release.” United
States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). In Johnson, the
Court considered whether the defendant was entitled to a
reduction in the term of his supervised release to compensate
him for two and a half years of time served over what was
available after some of his convictions were invalidated. The
Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (2012) did not entitle the
defendant to credit based on over service of an original term of
imprisonment, stating that § 3624(e) “does not reduce the length
of a supervised release term by reason of excess time served in
prison.” Johnson, 529 U.S. at 60.
We have confirmed since Johnson that a supervised release
term consecutive to a term of imprisonment cannot be served
concurrently to a term of imprisonment because the purpose of
supervised release is different from that of incarceration. See
United States v. Neuhauser, 745 F.3d 125, 129 (4th Cir. 2014)
(evaluating whether civil confinement after criminal sentence
completed counted toward supervised release term); United
States v. Buchanan, 638 F.3d 448, 451 (4th Cir. 2011)
(considering tolling of supervised release while defendant
absconded).
A “term of supervised release . . . [is] part of the
sentence,” United States v. Evans, 159 F.3d 908, 913 (4th Cir.
1998), and is therefore reviewed for reasonableness. Gall, 552
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U.S. at 51. If a sentence is procedurally reasonable, we review
for “substantive reasonableness . . . under an
abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Carter, 564
F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). The sentence must be
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the
purposes” of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing
the maximum three-year term of supervised release. The court
specified the need for supervision, stating that James had been
incarcerated for a lengthy period of time and that the purpose
of supervised release was to have someone to help him get
situated and provide supervision of his transition to life
outside of prison. The court acknowledged that James could
later move the court to terminate supervision. James has not
rebutted the presumption of reasonableness.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the amended judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform James, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If James requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
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was served on James. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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