Redner's Markets, Inc. v. Joppatowne G.P. Ltd. Partnership

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1527
REDNER’S MARKETS, INC.,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOPPATOWNE G.P. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:11-cv-01864-RDB)
Submitted: March 26, 2015 Decided: April 2, 2015
Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles M. Kerr, Kathleen M. McDonald, KERR MCDONALD, LLP,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. John J. Miravich, FOX
ROTHSCHILD LLP, Exton, Pennsylvania, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joppatowne G.P. Limited Partnership (Joppatowne) appeals
the district court’s order holding Joppatowne in contempt of the
district court’s prior order granting a permanent injunction in
favor of Redner’s Markets, Inc. (Redner’s), denying Joppatowne’s
motions to strike and to dismiss the contempt motion, and
awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Redner’s as a sanction for
Joppatowne’s violation. On appeal, Joppatowne contends that the
district court erred or abused its discretion in not dismissing
the contempt motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; in
finding that it violated the injunction order; not holding a
trial or evidentiary hearing; not dismissing the contempt motion
on pleading grounds; and in considering and not striking certain
evidentiary proffers submitted by Redner’s. We affirm.
“There can be no question that courts have inherent power
to enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil
contempt.” Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370
(1966). “Moreover, the court that enters an injunctive order
retains jurisdiction to enforce its order.” Alderwoods Group,
Inc. v. Garcia, 682 F.3d 958, 970 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991)).
“A court may impose sanctions for civil contempt ‘to coerce
obedience to a court order or to compensate the complainant for
losses sustained as a result of the contumacy.’” Cromer v.
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Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 390 F.3d 812, 821 (4th Cir. 2004)
(quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp., 61 F.3d 256, 258 (4th Cir.
1995)). “Civil contempt is an appropriate sanction if [the
court] can point to an order of [the court] which set[s] forth
in specific detail an unequivocal command which a party has
violated.” Gen. Motors. Corp., 61 F.3d at 258 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). The appropriate remedy for
civil contempt is within the court’s broad discretion, and we
have recognized that attorney’s fees may be appropriate
compensation. Cromer, 390 F.3d at 822; see Gen. Motors Corp.,
61 F.3d at 259.
To establish civil contempt, a movant must show by clear
and convincing evidence: (1) the existence of a valid decree of
which the alleged contemnor had actual or constructive
knowledge; (2) the decree was in the movant’s favor; (3) the
alleged contemnor by its conduct violated the terms of the
decree and had knowledge (at least constructive) of such
violation; and (4) the movant suffered harm as a result. JTH
Tax, Inc. v. H&R Block E. Tax Servs., Inc., 359 F.3d 699, 705
(4th Cir. 2004) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
Willfulness is not an element of civil contempt. United States
v. Westbrooks, __ F.3d __, 2015 WL 1089006, *4 n.3 (4th Cir.
Mar. 13, 2015); Gen. Motors Corp., 61 F.3d at 258. Moreover, a
court is not necessarily required to hold an evidentiary hearing
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before granting a civil contempt motion. See In re Gen. Motors
Corp., 110 F.3d 1103, 1015 (4th Cir. 1997).
We review a district court’s decision on a civil contempt
motion for abuse of discretion, the underlying legal questions
de novo, and any factual findings for clear error. In re Under
Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
“When a district court’s decision is based on an interpretation
of its own order, our review is even more deferential because
district courts are in the best position to interpret their own
orders.” JTH Tax, Inc., 359 F.3d at 705; see also In re Grand
Jury Subpoena (T-112), 597 F.3d 189, 195 (4th Cir. 2010).
With these principles in mind, we have reviewed the record
and the parties’ briefs, and we conclude that the district court
did not err or abuse its discretion in granting the contempt
motion and denying Joppatowne’s motions to strike and dismiss.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order.
Redner’s has moved for attorney’s fees and costs on appeal, and
Joppatowne opposes the motion. To the extent that the motion is
based on Fed. R. App. P. 38, we deny the motion. To the extent
that Redner’s seeks additional compensation as a remedy for
Joppatowne’s violation of the district court’s injunctive order,
we deny the motion without prejudice to any right Redner’s may
have to seek such compensation in the district court. We
express no view on the propriety or merit of any such motion.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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