State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Matthew Medgyesy

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-1570
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MATTHEW MEDGYESY; KIMBERLY MEDGYESY,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Mary G. Lewis, District Judge.
(6:12-cv-00044-MGL)
Submitted: February 27, 2015 Decided: May 5, 2015
Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jeffrey A. Merriam, S. Brook Fowler, CARTER, SMITH, MERRIAM,
ROGERS & TRAXLER, PA, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellants. T. David Rheney, Stephanie G. Flynn, GALLIVAN,
WHITE & BOYD, P.A., Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Matthew and Kimberly Medgyesy appeal the district court’s
orders granting summary judgment in favor of State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) and denying their
subsequent postjudgment motion. “We review a court’s order
granting summary judgment de novo.” Feldman v. Law Enforcement
Assocs. Corp., 752 F.3d 339, 348 (4th Cir. 2014). Summary
judgment should be granted only when “there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). With regard to the postjudgment motion, our
review is for an abuse of discretion. Mayfield v. Nat’l Ass’n
for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir.
2012). We affirm.
The Medgyesys first argue that the district court erred by
concluding State Farm was entitled to a conclusive presumption
that it had made them a meaningful offer of underinsured
motorist (“UIM”) coverage. South Carolina requires automobile
insurers to offer optional UIM coverage up to the limits of the
insured’s liability coverage. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-160
(2015). Such an offer must be meaningful. Cohen v. Progressive
2
N. Ins. Co., 737 S.E.2d 869, 872 (S.C. Ct. App. 2013). If the
insurer fails to make a meaningful offer of UIM coverage, a
court will reform the policy to include that coverage up to the
insured’s limits of liability coverage. Id. An insurer is
entitled to a conclusive presumption that it made a meaningful
offer of UIM coverage if the insured has signed a form that uses
a state-approved offer format and meets certain statutory
requirements. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-77-350(B) (2015).
The Medgyesys concede that the offer forms used by State
Farm followed a state-approved format, were signed by Matthew,
and satisfied all of the technical requirements in S.C. Code
Ann. § 38-77-350(A) (2015). They argue, however, that the offer
forms contain ambiguities caused by the handwritten entries of a
State Farm agent. These ambiguities, the Medgyesys reason,
should have precluded a finding that State Farm had made a
meaningful offer under § 38-77-350.
Under South Carolina law, insurance policies are subject to
the formalistic rules of interpretation that are applied to
contracts generally. Bell v. Progressive Direct Ins. Co., 757
S.E.2d 399, 406 (S.C. 2014). “It is a question of law for the
court whether the language of a contract is ambiguous.”
Williams v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 762 S.E.2d 705, 710 (S.C.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A contract is
ambiguous when it is capable of more than one meaning or when
3
its meaning is unclear.” N. Am. Rescue Prods., Inc. v.
Richardson, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___, 2015 WL 80900, at *3 (S.C. Jan.
7, 2015). “Whether a contract is ambiguous is to be determined
from examining the entire contract, not by reviewing isolated
portions of the contract.” Williams, 762 S.E.2d at 710. The
construction that reasonably gives effect to the whole
instrument and each of its parts will be adopted. Yarborough v.
Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 225 S.E.2d 344, 349 (S.C. 1976).
Only if the terms of the contract are ambiguous may the court
look to extrinsic evidence to determine the parties’ intent.
C.A.N. Enters., Inc. v. S.C. Health & Human Servs. Fin. Comm’n,
373 S.E.2d 584, 586 (S.C. 1988).
We conclude that the offer forms were not ambiguous. The
Medgyesys assert that the offer forms are susceptible to three
meanings. However, the offer forms are only reasonably
susceptible to the meaning offered by State Farm because only
that meaning gives effect to each part of the offer forms.
Yarborough, 225 S.E.2d at 349. Accordingly, we conclude that
any error in the district court’s failure to consider the
alleged ambiguity is necessarily harmless.
Next, the Medgyesys claim that the district court erred by
not considering whether its decision invites an absurd result,
thereby defeating the purpose of South Carolina UIM statutes,
and by granting summary judgment when a factual dispute remained
4
over the amount of UIM coverage to which the Medgyesys were
entitled. For both of these claims, the Medgyesys rest on the
assumption that the offer forms contained ambiguities. Because
the offer forms did not contain ambiguities, any errors asserted
by the Medgyesys on these grounds would be harmless.
Accordingly, we affirm the decisions of the district court.
See United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2005).
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
5