United States v. Denetria Myles

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4107
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DENETRIA MYLES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (3:12-cr-00239-GCM-DCK-24)
Submitted: November 30, 2015 Decided: January 6, 2016
Before KING, SHEDD, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven T. Meier, MEIER LAW, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, Acting United States
Attorney, Anthony J. Enright, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Denetria Myles was convicted after a jury trial of
conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2012),
and bank fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 2 (2012).
She was sentenced to 51 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Myles
challenges the district court’s denials of her motion in limine
as to late discovery and her motion to dismiss for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. We affirm.
Myles first contends that the district court erred in
denying her motion in limine to exclude evidence that, she
asserts, the Government produced after the close of discovery.
“We review a district court’s decision regarding whether a party
has violated [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 16, as well as its decision to
order a particular sanction, for abuse of discretion.” United
States v. Gonzales-Flores, 701 F.3d 112, 117 (4th Cir. 2012).
When, as here, the district court’s decision is based on an
interpretation of its own order, “to sustain appellate review,
district courts need only adopt a reasonable construction of the
terms contained in their orders.” Wolfe v. Clarke, 718 F.3d
277, 284 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
JTH Tax, Inc. v. H&R Block E. Tax Servs., 359 F.3d 699, 705 (4th
Cir. 2004). Here, the scheduling order specified deadlines for
motions to compel discovery and responses to those motions but
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did not explicitly establish a deadline for the completion of
discovery. Therefore, the court reasonably found that Myles’
position overstated and misread the order and properly denied
the motion in limine.
Additionally, to the extent that Myles also contends the
Government committed a violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), we discern no error. When, as here, a defendant
fails to preserve an argument by “object[ing] on the same basis
below as [s]he contends is error on appeal,” this court reviews
for plain error. United States v. Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452, 459
(4th Cir. 2014); see Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct.
1121, 1126-27 (2013) (discussing plain error standard). We
conclude that Myles has failed to show plain error.
Here, the challenged evidence revealed Myles’ fraudulent
notarization of multiple signatures, and the jury reasonably
concluded that, in light of the evidence against Myles, she
intended to defraud with the purpose of furthering the
conspiracy. Myles fails to demonstrate that this evidence was
unfairly prejudicial. See United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613,
619-20 (4th Cir. 2003) (setting forth standard for admission of
evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 403). Similarly, she fails to
establish a Brady violation because she has made no assertions
that the evidence was favorable to her, material, in the
Government’s possession prior to trial, or not disclosed upon
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request. See Watkins v. Rubenstein, 802 F.3d 637, 642 (4th Cir.
2015) (discussing elements necessary to establish Brady
violation).
Finally, Myles challenges the district court’s denial of
her motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
“This [c]ourt reviews de novo a district court’s decision on a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.”
Durden v. United States, 736 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013).
Section 3231 of Title 18 of the United States Code confers
subject-matter jurisdiction in all federal criminal
prosecutions. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2012). This unquestionably
includes the bank-fraud statute with which Myles was charged, 18
U.S.C. § 1344.
An element of a § 1344 violation is that “the institution
was a federally insured or chartered bank.” United States v.
Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2014). While a bank’s
federally insured status provides the jurisdictional nexus for
the statute, “any challenge claiming that the government failed
to prove at trial that essential element does not thereby
undermine the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, or its power
to hear the case.” United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 964
(9th Cir. 2003); accord United States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 178
(4th Cir. 2001) (holding that whether jurisdictional element of
criminal offense is “demonstrated in an individual circumstance
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does not affect a court’s constitutional or statutory power to
adjudicate a case” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
“[D]efects in the government’s evidence regarding a bank’s
federally-insured status in a bank robbery case go to the merits
of the case.” Ratigan, 351 F.3d at 963.
Here, even assuming the Government failed to prove the
insurance element beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court
did not lack jurisdiction over the case. Additionally, as the
court aptly observed, Myles’ motion to dismiss improperly relied
on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012), which governs federal-question
jurisdiction in civil, not criminal, cases. Moreover, to the
extent that Myles challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting her bank-fraud conviction, we conclude such a claim
is meritless. Myles’ stipulation admitted the facts
constituting the insurance element of bank fraud, and the
Government presented evidence at trial establishing the
insurance status of banks identified as lenders in the fraud
charge of which the jury convicted her.
Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly
denied the motions in limine and to dismiss, and we affirm the
district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
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in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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