United States v. Lance Williams

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-7114
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LANCE ANTONIO WILLIAMS,
Defendant – Appellant.
------------------------
JOHN DONLEY ADAMS,
Court-Assigned Amicus Counsel.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:07-cr-00429-JAB-6)
Argued: October 7, 2015 Decided: December 14, 2015
Before TRAXLER, Chief Judge, and KING and THACKER, Circuit
Judges.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Judge King wrote the
majority opinion, in which Judge Thacker joined. Chief Judge
Traxler wrote a dissenting opinion.
ARGUED: Eric David Placke, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert
Michael Hamilton, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. John Donley Adams,
MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, as Court-Assigned Amicus
Counsel. ON BRIEF: Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender,
OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee. Brian D. Schmalzbach, MCGUIREWOODS LLP,
Richmond, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae.
2
KING, Circuit Judge:
Lance Antonio Williams appeals from the district court’s
denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2). Williams seeks the benefit of recent amendments
to the Sentencing Guidelines and contends that the court in the
Middle District of North Carolina erred when it ruled him
ineligible for a sentence reduction. According to Williams,
Guidelines Amendment 780, which revised the policy statement
governing § 3582(c)(2) sentence reductions, renders him eligible
for relief. The United States Attorney supports Williams’s
position in this appeal. As explained below, we vacate and
remand. 1
I.
On March 3, 2008, Williams pleaded guilty to distributing
cocaine base, in contravention of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Prior
to his guilty plea, the United States Attorney filed a notice,
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851, advising Williams and the district
1Because the United States Attorney sides with Williams in
this appeal, we appointed attorney John Donley Adams of
Richmond, Virginia, as amicus counsel to support the district
court’s ruling. We appreciate his valuable service to our Court
in this matter.
3
court that Williams’s prior North Carolina drug conviction would
be utilized to seek an enhanced penalty under § 841(b)(1)(A). 2
The Probation Officer prepared Williams’s presentence
report (the “PSR”) and recommended that he be sentenced to 240
months in prison. 3 The PSR made that recommendation by starting
at a base offense level of 30, predicated on a drug weight of
fifty-six grams. The offense level was then lowered to reflect
Williams’s acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a final
offense level of 27. With Williams’s criminal history category
of VI, the Guidelines advised a sentencing range of 130 to 162
months. The prosecutor’s § 851 notice, however, triggered
§ 841(b)(1)(A)’s mandatory minimum sentence of 240 months.
Because Williams’s entire advisory Guidelines range fell below
the statutory mandatory minimum sentence, his Guidelines
sentence was the statutory minimum of 240 months. See USSG
§ 5G1.1(b) (“Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is
greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the
2Section 841(b)(1)(A) of Title 21 mandates that, if a
person commits a violation specified in that provision “after a
prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final,
such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which
may not be less than 20 years.”
3The PSR relied on the 2007 edition of the Sentencing
Guidelines. Unless otherwise specified, we refer to the 2014
edition, the Guidelines edition applicable to Williams’s
§ 3582(c)(2) motion. See USSG § 1B1.10(b)(1).
4
statutorily required minimum sentence shall be the guideline
sentence.”).
Prior to the December 9, 2008 sentencing hearing, the
prosecutors filed a motion for a downward departure, pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), recognizing Williams’s substantial
assistance to the authorities. 4 On the prosecutors’
recommendation, the court imposed a sentence of 180 months,
reflecting a twenty-five percent reduction from the 240-month
Guidelines sentence.
On May 9, 2012, more than three years after his conviction
and sentencing, Williams filed a pro se motion for a sentence
reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court did
not act on that motion until after the Probation Officer
submitted a memorandum to the court on May 18, 2015, advising
that Williams was eligible for a sentence reduction. On June
18, 2015, the court appointed a lawyer to represent Williams and
ordered briefing on the sentence-reduction motion. Williams and
4Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e), a prosecutor’s downward-
departure motion confers upon a sentencing court “the authority
to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a
minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense.” Such a sentence must be imposed
“in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued
by the Sentencing Commission.” Id.; see USSG 5K1.1 (requiring
sentencing court to consider quality, credibility, extent,
riskiness, and timeliness of assistance to determine extent of
departure under § 3553(e)).
5
the United States Attorney agreed that Williams was eligible for
a sentence reduction under Guidelines Amendments 750 and 782 —
both of which reduced the offense level applicable to his
conviction — due to the procedural changes introduced by
Guidelines Amendment 780. See USSG app. C, amend. 780 (Supp.
2014) (revising Guidelines to clarify § 3582(c)(2) eligibility
for defendant sentenced below statutory minimum due to
substantial-assistance departure).
By memorandum opinion of July 10, 2015, the district court
denied Williams’s § 3582(c)(2) motion. See United States v.
Williams, No. 1:07-cr-00429 (M.D.N.C. July 10, 2015), ECF No.
372 (the “Opinion”). The Opinion acknowledged that, based on
Amendments 750 and 782, Williams’s final offense level would be
21 instead of 27, resulting in a Guidelines range of 77 to 96
months. Nonetheless, the court ruled that Williams had not
satisfied the eligibility requirements of § 3582(c)(2) because
his 180-month sentence was based on a statutory mandatory
minimum and a statutorily authorized departure for substantial
assistance, rather than on a Guidelines range that had been
subsequently lowered. The court reached that conclusion in
reliance on our 2009 decision in United States v. Hood, 556 F.3d
226 (4th Cir. 2009).
6
Williams filed a timely notice of appeal, and we possess
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a).
II.
We review de novo a district court’s ruling on the scope of
its legal authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). See United
States v. Mann, 709 F.3d 301, 304 (4th Cir. 2013).
III.
On appeal, Williams maintains that he is eligible for a
sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district
court, in its Opinion denying Williams’s sentence-reduction
motion, disagreed with that contention. The amicus counsel
defends the position of the district court in this proceeding.
Williams and the United States Attorney counter that the court
misunderstood the scope of its authority under § 3582(c)(2),
because, inter alia, Amendment 780, promulgated in 2014, revised
the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement governing
eligibility for a sentence reduction. As a result, they contend
that the court’s denial of Williams’s § 3582(c)(2) motion should
be vacated.
7
A.
In order to properly assess Williams’s eligibility for a
sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), we first identify the
relevant principles governing such reductions. That discussion
implicates the Supreme Court’s mandate that a federal court
determine a prisoner’s eligibility under § 3582(c)(2) by
adhering to the Commission’s policy statements, and also
involves the Commission’s authority to dictate the proper
application of the Guidelines.
1.
Congress created the Commission in 1984 to provide
guidance, clarity, and fairness in sentencing. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 991(b). The Guidelines reflect the Commission’s efforts to
that end and assist the federal courts in imposing appropriate
sentences on a case-by-case basis. To ensure that the
Guidelines reflect current views on criminal behavior and
account for revisions to statutory provisions, Congress has
empowered the Commission to amend the Guidelines. See id.§ 994(o), (p). Those amendments are effective unless “otherwise
modified or disapproved by Act of Congress.” Id. § 994(p).
When an amendment lowers the Guidelines range for a particular
offense, the Commission must indicate whether and in what
circumstances such amendment will have retroactive effect — that
is, by “specify[ing] in what circumstances and by what amount
8
the sentences of prisoners serving terms of imprisonment for the
offense may be reduced.” Id. § 994(u).
Congress has authorized the federal courts to grant
sentence reductions based on the Commission’s retroactive
amendments through a narrow exception to the general rule that a
court may not modify a defendant’s sentence “once it has been
imposed.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Pursuant thereto,
in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that
has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o), upon motion
of the defendant . . . , the court may reduce the term
of imprisonment, after considering the factors set
forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are
applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with
applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.
Id. § 3582(c)(2).
As the Supreme Court recognized in 2010, the “policy
statement governing § 3582(c)(2) proceedings” is set forth in
Guidelines section 1B1.10. See Dillon v. United States, 560
U.S. 817, 819 (2010). Section 1B1.10 lists the Guidelines
amendments designated by the Commission for retroactive
application in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. See USSG § 1B1.10(d).
Pertinent here, a sentence reduction is not authorized unless
one of those amendments has “the effect of lowering the
defendant’s applicable guideline range.” USSG
§ 1B1.10(a)(2)(B). To determine whether a particular amendment
9
has that effect, the sentencing court must “substitute only the
amendments” rendered retroactive by the Commission and “leave
all other guideline application decisions unaffected.” Id.
§ 1B1.10(b)(1). When assessing a § 3582(c)(2) motion, the court
must “use the version of [the] policy statement that is in
effect on the date on which the court reduces the defendant’s
term of imprisonment.” See id. § 1B1.10 cmt. n.8.
In Dillon, the Supreme Court reinforced § 3582(c)(2)’s
emphasis on the Commission’s policy statements, and it spelled
out a two-step inquiry for the review of sentence-reduction
motions. See 560 U.S. at 827. At the first step, the
sentencing court must review “the Commission’s instructions in
§ 1B1.10 to determine the prisoner’s eligibility for a sentence
modification and the extent of the reduction authorized.” Id.
(emphasis added). If the court determines that the prisoner is
eligible for a sentence reduction, the court moves to the second
step and determines the extent of the reduction. Id.
2.
The Commission possesses the authority to dictate the
proper application of the Guidelines through the promulgation of
Guidelines amendments. As the Supreme Court has recognized,
“Congress necessarily contemplated that the Commission would
periodically review the work of the courts, and would make
whatever clarifying revisions to the Guidelines conflicting
10
judicial decisions might suggest.” Braxton v. United States,
500 U.S. 344, 348 (1991). The Court applied that principle in
its Braxton opinion by declining to resolve the circuit split on
which it had granted certiorari, because the Commission was
poised to “eliminate [the] circuit conflict.” See id. at 348-
49. By deferring to the Commission’s anticipated resolution of
a circuit split regarding an interpretation of the Guidelines,
the Court implicitly recognized the Commission’s power to
abrogate precedent in the courts of appeals.
We have similarly recognized the Commission’s power to
override our precedent through amendments to the Guidelines.
See, e.g., United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1112-13 (4th
Cir. 1995) (recognizing that amendment to Guidelines commentary
required “us to scrap our earlier interpretation of that
guideline”); United States v. Turner, 59 F.3d 481, 488 (4th Cir.
1995) (explaining that the “Commission has the authority to
review the work of the courts and revise the Guidelines by
adopting an interpretation of a particular guideline in conflict
with prior judicial constructions of that guideline”). We are
not alone among the courts of appeals in yielding to the
Commission’s authority to promulgate amendments to the
Guidelines that effectively vacate circuit precedent. See,
e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Cruz, 692 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th
Cir. 2012) (“Of course, a change in the language of an
11
applicable Guidelines provision, including a change in
application notes or commentary, supersedes prior decisions
applying earlier versions of that provision, just as we would be
bound to apply the updated version of an agency rule or
regulation.”); United States v. Marmolejos, 140 F.3d 488, 493
n.7 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[B]ecause of the Sentencing Commission’s
broad power to interpret the Guidelines, clarifying amendments
should be considered by the sentencing court despite any
conflict with established precedent, unless ex post facto
concerns are present.”); United States v. Prezioso, 989 F.2d 52,
54 & n.1 (1st Cir. 1993) (recognizing applicability of amendment
to commentary despite contrary circuit precedent).
Writing for this Court in United States v. Goines, our then
Chief Judge recognized in 2004 the Commission’s power to impact
precedent in the various circuits, explaining that “Congress
anticipated that the Commission would use the amendment process
to resolve disagreements among courts of appeals.” See 357 F.3d
469, 474 (4th Cir. 2004). When the circuits have split on the
application of a Guidelines provision, the Commission typically
resolves such a disagreement by promulgating a “clarifying
amendment,” which does not alter “the legal effect of the
guidelines, but merely clarifies what the Commission deems the
guidelines to have already meant.” Id. As Goines explained, if
a clarifying amendment “conflicts with our precedent,” we
12
recognize that it has “the effect of changing the law in this
circuit.” Id.Consistent with the foregoing, our precedent in the
sentence-reduction context must give way if it conflicts with
the Commission’s amendments. As the Goines decision emphasized,
Congress has granted the Commission the unusual
explicit power to decide whether and to what extent
its amendments reducing sentences will be given
retroactive effect. The amendment and retroactivity
powers operate in tandem: The Commission decides how
to modify the guidelines and also decides how such
modifications should be implemented. This is
appropriate, as the Commission has both the authority
and the obligation to enact policies designed to
achieve the underlying purposes of the Sentencing
Reform Act.
357 F.3d at 476 (internal quotation marks omitted). Chief Judge
Wilkins also explained that the Commission can utilize that
“unusual explicit power” to abrogate decisions concerning the
Guidelines that risk producing “wildly disparate sentences.”
Id.B.
Having identified the legal framework for sentence
reductions under § 3582(c)(2) and the Commission’s authority to
dictate the availability of such relief, we now turn to our
decision in United States v. Hood, on which the district court
relied. See 556 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2009). We then discuss the
Commission’s promulgation of Amendment 780, which, according to
13
the United States Attorney and Williams, undermines the court’s
reliance on Hood.
1.
Decided in 2009, Hood involved the issue of whether a
defendant who received a substantial-assistance departure from
an above-Guidelines-range mandatory minimum sentence was
eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). See 556
F.3d at 228. Consistent with the Guidelines then in effect, we
ruled that Hood was ineligible for such relief. See id. at 233.
In 2001, Hood pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in contravention
of 21 U.S.C. § 846. See Hood, 556 F.3d at 228. After
calculating Hood’s Guidelines range as 188 to 235 months, the
district court acknowledged that Hood’s prior felony drug
conviction triggered a 240-month mandatory minimum sentence.
See id. at 228-29. Accordingly, by applying Guidelines section
5G1.1(b), the court identified 240 months as Hood’s Guidelines
sentence. On the basis of a § 3553(e) motion, however, the
court departed downward and imposed a sentence of 100 months.
See id. at 229.
In 2008, Hood filed a § 3582(c)(2) motion seeking a
sentence reduction pursuant to Guidelines Amendment 706, which
had lowered the offense level applicable to his underlying drug
offense. See Hood, 556 F.3d at 230. The sentencing court
14
denied Hood’s motion, and we affirmed. Id. In our Hood
decision, we explained that, because Amendment 706 had no impact
on either the statutory mandatory minimum or the substantial-
assistance departure, it did “not have the effect of lowering
the defendant’s applicable guidelines range.” Id. at 232(quoting USSG § 1B1.10(a)(2)(B)). Instead, Hood’s sentence was
“based on a statutory minimum and USSG § 5G1.1(b),” both of
which remained in place after Amendment 706. Id. at 233.
Moreover, the sentence resulted from a § 3553(e) departure
predicated on Hood’s substantial assistance to the authorities
and guided by the factors outlined in Guidelines section 5K1.1.
Id. at 233-34. Because Amendment 706 did not impact any of
those provisions, it could not provide relief for Hood under
§ 3582(c)(2). Id. at 234.
Several of the other courts of appeals adhered to the
approach enunciated in Hood and denied sentence reductions to
prisoners who had been sentenced below statutory mandatory
minimums as a result of substantial-assistance motions. See,
e.g., United States v. Moore, 734 F.3d 836 (8th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Joiner, 727 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2013); United
States v. Glover, 686 F.3d 1203 (11th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Carter, 595 F.3d 575 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Williams, 551 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2009). The Third and D.C.
Circuits, in contrast, ruled that such prisoners could be
15
eligible for relief under § 3582(c)(2). See In re Sealed Case,
722 F.3d 361 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United States v. Savani, 733 F.3d
56 (3d Cir. 2013).
2.
In recognition of the foregoing circuit split, the
Commission promulgated Guidelines Amendment 780 in 2014 to
clarify “when, if at all, § 1B1.10 provides that a statutory
minimum continues to limit the amount by which a defendant’s
sentence may be reduced under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) when the
defendant’s original sentence was below the statutory minimum.”
USSG app. C, amend. 780 (Supp. 2014). The Commission embraced
the apparent minority view, explaining that its Amendment 780
“generally adopts the approach of the Third Circuit in Savani
and the District of Columbia Circuit in In re Sealed Case.” Id.To that end, Amendment 780 revised Guidelines section
1B1.10, the policy statement that dictates eligibility for
§ 3582(c)(2) relief. Amendment 780 moved the list of
retroactive amendments from subsection (c) to subsection (d) and
inserted the following in subsection (c):
If the case involves a statutorily required minimum
sentence and the court had the authority to impose a
sentence below the statutorily required minimum
sentence pursuant to a government motion to reflect
the defendant’s substantial assistance to authorities,
then for purposes of this policy statement the amended
guideline range shall be determined without regard to
the operation of § 5G1.1 (Sentencing on a Single Count
16
of Conviction) and § 5G1.2 (Sentencing on Multiple
Counts of Conviction).
USSG § 1B1.10(c). In justifying the foregoing mandate, the
Commission recognized the value to our system of justice of
those cooperating defendants who provide substantial assistance
to the authorities. According to the Commission, such
cooperating defendants should be rewarded because they
are differently situated than other defendants and
should be considered for a sentence below a guideline
or statutory minimum even when defendants who are
otherwise similar (but did not provide substantial
assistance) are subject to a guideline or statutory
minimum. Applying this principle when the guideline
range has been reduced and made available for
retroactive application under section 3582(c)(2)
appropriately maintains this distinction and furthers
the purposes of sentencing.
USSG app. C, amend. 780 (Supp. 2014).
C.
This appeal requires us to assess the impact of Amendment
780 on our decision in Hood. The amicus counsel contends that
the district court correctly recognized the viability of Hood as
our circuit precedent and thus properly denied Williams’s
§ 3582(c)(2) motion. The United States Attorney, on the other
hand, agrees with Williams and maintains that the court erred by
failing to recognize that Amendment 780 altered the course we
followed in Hood. As explained below, we agree with the United
States Attorney and Williams.
17
1.
In this circuit, we are bound by “the basic principle that
one panel cannot overrule a decision issued by another panel.”
McMellon v. United States, 387 F.3d 329, 332 (4th Cir. 2004) (en
banc). When panel opinions conflict, we are obliged to apply
the “earliest-case-governs” rule and adhere to “the earlier of
the conflicting opinions.” Id. at 333. At the same time, “[a]
decision by a panel of this court, or by the court sitting en
banc, does not bind subsequent panels if the decision rests on
authority that subsequently proves untenable.” U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 983 F.2d
578, 581-82 (4th Cir. 1992). Moreover, the Commission has the
authority to “chang[e] the law in this circuit” regarding
§ 3582(c)(2) eligibility. See Goines, 357 F.3d at 474.
The district court, in deeming Williams ineligible for
relief, applied our Hood decision. It failed to recognize,
however, that Amendment 780’s revision to Guidelines section
1B1.10 had modified the process for determining § 3582(c)(2)
eligibility. Although the Commission did not mention Hood in
its “Reason for Amendment” accompanying Amendment 780, the Hood
decision was consistent with the rulings made in two of the
three appellate decisions that the Commission specifically
disapproved. See USSG app. C, amend. 780 (Supp. 2014); see also
United States v. Joiner, 727 F.3d 601, 609 (6th Cir. 2013)
18
(affirming denial of § 3582(c)(2) motion where defendant’s
sentence was based on statutory mandatory minimum sentence not
lowered by subsequent Guidelines amendment); United States v.
Glover, 686 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2012) (same). Moreover,
the Commission explained that Amendment 780 “generally adopts”
the D.C. Circuit’s approach in 2013 in In re Sealed Case, which
had expressly rejected Hood. See USSG app. C, amend. 780 (Supp.
2014); see also In re Sealed Case, 722 F.3d at 368-69.
Amendment 780 explicitly provides that a defendant in
Williams’s situation is eligible for a § 3582(c)(2) sentence
reduction. The applicable policy statement now requires a
sentencing court to remove Guidelines section 5G1.1 from the
§ 3582(c)(2) eligibility determination. Compare Hood, 556 F.3d
at 234-35 (denying § 3582(c)(2) relief because the impact of
“§ 5G1.1(b) . . . was never removed from operation”), with USSG
app. C, amend. 780 (Supp. 2014) (requiring sentencing court to
determine § 3582(c)(2) eligibility “without regard to the
operation of § 5G1.1”). Because Amendment 780 clarifies the
applicability of § 3582(c)(2) relief in this case and “conflicts
with our precedent,” we must recognize, pursuant to Goines, its
“effect of changing the law in this circuit.” See 357 F.3d at
474.
Hood’s logic, which was predicated on the pre-Amendment 780
Guidelines, is simply inapplicable here. Consistent with the
19
Commission’s power to determine “how to modify the guidelines”
and “how such modifications should be implemented,” Goines, 357
F.3d at 476, the revised Guidelines section 1B1.10(c) mandates a
different result. And, in any event, we are bound by the
“earliest-case-governs” rule. Pursuant thereto, we must adhere
to our pre-Hood decisions — for example, Turner, Capers, and
Goines — and recognize the Commission’s authority to dictate the
proper application of the Guidelines. See McMellon, 387 F.3d at
333.
2.
Our approval of the position espoused by the United States
Attorney and Williams is also consistent with the Sentencing
Reform Act’s focus on “the elimination of unwarranted sentencing
disparity.” See Goines, 357 F.3d at 475-76. A contrary ruling
would permit cooperating defendants with Guidelines ranges above
their statutory minimums — perhaps due to extensive criminal
histories or severe offense conduct — to nevertheless secure
sentencing relief under § 3582(c)(2). On the other hand,
cooperating defendants such as Williams, whose Guidelines ranges
are entirely below their statutory minimums, would be denied
relief. Such a disparity should not occur within the category
of defendants who should benefit from Amendment 780: those “who
provide substantial assistance to the government in the
investigation and prosecution of others.” See USSG app. C,
20
amend. 780 (Supp. 2014). Moreover, Amendment 780 makes no
distinction among such defendants, and we lack the authority to
create one. See United States v. Maroquin-Bran, 587 F.3d 214,
217 (4th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “rewriting [the
Guidelines] is beyond our purview as a court and remains the
domain of either the Sentencing Commission or the Congress”).
Finally, our ruling today furthers “the expressed
Congressional policy of rewarding cooperation” with the
authorities. See United States v. Wade, 936 F.2d 169, 171 (4th
Cir. 1991). Our criminal justice system advances that policy
by, inter alia, affording prosecutors the discretion and
authority to file § 3553(e) motions, which moderate “the
rigorous inflexibility of mandatory sentences where the offender
has rendered substantial assistance to the Government.” United
States v. Daiagi, 892 F.2d 31, 32 (4th Cir. 1989). The prospect
of securing substantial-assistance motions from the prosecutors
encourages defendants to aid in investigations and prosecutions
of their coconspirators and criminal cohorts. That inducement
is a powerful tool for more effective law enforcement, and
placing restrictions on sentence-reduction eligibility for
cooperating defendants such as Williams would weaken that tool.
D.
In these circumstances, we reject the contention of the
amicus counsel that the Hood decision is controlling. We
21
therefore turn to the issue of Williams’s eligibility for a
sentence reduction under the policy statement in Guidelines
section 1B1.10. As explained below, Williams is eligible for
such a reduction.
Section 3582(c)(2) requires a sentencing court to adhere to
the Commission’s policy statement in Guidelines section 1B1.10
when assessing a motion for a sentence reduction. See Dillon,
560 U.S. at 827 (requiring the sentencing court to assess
Guidelines section 1B1.10 “to determine the prisoner’s
eligibility for a sentence reduction”); United States v. Dunphy,
551 F.3d 247, 250 (4th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that “the
Commission’s policy statements implementing the statute’s
authorization of retroactive sentence reductions are binding”).
Because Amendment 780 went into effect prior to the district
court’s resolution of Williams’s § 3582(c)(2) motion, the court
was required to assess the motion in light of the now applicable
policy statement in Guidelines section 1B1.10(c). See USSG §
1B1.10 cmt. n.8 (requiring court to “use the version of this
policy statement that is in effect on the date on which the
court reduces the defendant’s term of imprisonment as provided
by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)”).
In determining whether a retroactive Guidelines amendment
has the effect of lowering a defendant’s advisory Guidelines
range, the court must import the amendment as it appears in the
22
most recent edition of the Guidelines into the original
sentencing calculations, substituting only the retroactive
provisions and leaving “all other guideline application
decisions unaffected.” USSG § 1B1.10(b)(1). If the new
Guidelines calculation results in a lower advisory range, the
prisoner is eligible for a sentence reduction.
The proper application of the policy statement in
Guidelines section 1B1.10 shows that Williams is eligible for
relief. Since Williams’s original sentencing in 2008, the
Commission has promulgated two retroactively effective
Guidelines amendments that lowered the base offense levels for
cocaine base offenses: Amendments 750 and 782. See USSG app.
C, amend. 782 (Supp. 2014); id. app. C, amend. 750 (2011). As
the district court recognized, Amendments 750 and 782 would
reduce Williams’s original total offense level from 27 to 21,
and his advisory Guidelines range would now be 77 to 96 months.
See Opinion 4-5. Although Guidelines section 5G1.1(b) would
otherwise turn the 240-month mandatory minimum into Williams’s
revised “guideline sentence,” the revisions made to Guidelines
section 1B1.10 by Amendment 780 bar the sentencing court from
calculating his amended range in that manner. Accordingly,
because Williams’s revised Guidelines range is lower than his
original range, he is eligible for a sentence reduction under
§ 3582(c)(2).
23
The fact that Williams is eligible for a sentence reduction
under § 3582(c)(2) does not dictate the propriety or amount of
any such reduction. See United States v. Stewart, 595 F.3d 197,
200 (4th Cir. 2010). That decision is for the sentencing court,
after “consider[ing] the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to
the extent that they are applicable.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2);
see Dillon, 560 U.S. at 827 (recognizing sentencing court’s
discretion to decide whether sentence reduction is warranted).
IV.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we vacate the judgment of the
district court and remand for such other and further proceedings
as may be appropriate.
VACATED AND REMANDED
24
TRAXLER, Chief Judge, dissenting:
Williams’s sentence was based on a statutory mandatory
minimum. Congress has not lowered it, and the Sentencing
Commission has no power to lower it. Accordingly, I would
affirm.
I.
District courts “are forbidden, as a general matter, to
modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.”
Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2690 (2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted). This “rule of finality is subject to
a few narrow exceptions” prescribed by Congress in 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c). Id. One of these exceptions applies when a
defendant’s applicable sentencing range is lowered after the
sentencing court has already imposed a prison term:
[I]n the case of a defendant who has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a
sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by
the Sentencing Commission . . . , the court may reduce
the term of imprisonment, after considering the
factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent
that they are applicable, if such a reduction is
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by
the Sentencing Commission.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (emphasis added).
Based on his criminal history and the characteristics of
his crack-distribution offense, Williams’s original advisory
sentencing range was 130-162 months. But, because of a prior
felony drug offense, Williams was subject to a mandatory minimum
25
sentence fixed by Congress of 240 months. See 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A). When a crime carries a mandatory minimum
sentence, a district court must impose at least the mandatory
minimum unless a statutory exception—such as a downward
departure for substantial assistance under § 3553(e)—applies.
See United States v. Campbell, 995 F.2d 173, 175 (10th Cir.
1993) (“When a sentence is fixed by statute, any exception to
the statutory directive must also be given by statute.”). “Only
Congress could authorize a departure from the statutorily
mandated minimum sentence, and it did so in § 3553(e) for the
limited purpose stated there—‘to reflect a defendant’s
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of
another person who has committed an offense.’” United States v.
Hood, 556 F.3d 226, 233 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §
3553(e)). The district court when sentencing Williams
determined that a statutory minimum term of 240 months applied
but then departed downward to 180 months under § 3553(e) to
reflect Williams’s substantial assistance to the government.
Since the applicable mandatory minimum sentence was greater than
the high end of Williams’s advisory sentencing range, the
district court was required to impose the mandatory minimum
sentence without regard to the advisory sentencing range. In
essence, the advisory sentencing range “became irrelevant.” Id.
Accordingly, Williams’s 180-month term of imprisonment could not
26
have been “based on a sentencing range that [was] subsequently .
. . lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2) (emphasis added), because it was not based on a
sentencing range in the first instance.
Likewise, Williams’s advisory sentencing range played no
part in the calculation of the downward departure for
substantial assistance. First, Ҥ 3553(e) allows for a
departure from, not the removal of, a statutorily required
minimum sentence.” United States v. Pillow, 191 F.3d 403, 407
(4th Cir. 1999). Thus, the baseline for that departure is the
statutory minimum—not the otherwise applicable sentencing range.
See id. (concluding a downward departure motion under § 3553(e)
does not “restore[] the otherwise applicable guideline range
that would have applied absent the mandatory minimum sentence”).
The fact that the Commission lowered the advisory sentencing
range has no bearing on the factors relevant to the substantial
assistance given by Williams. See United States v. Spinks, 770
F.3d 285, 287 (4th Cir. 2014) (“[O]ur precedent on this point is
clear: the extent of a § 3553(e) departure below a mandatory
minimum must be based solely on a defendant’s substantial
assistance and factors related to that assistance.”).
In sum, Williams’s sentence was based on the applicable
mandatory minimum fixed by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and the
downward departure he received under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) was
27
based on the substantial assistance he gave the government.
Since only Congress, not the Sentencing Commission, can change
either of these factors, I must conclude that Williams’s
sentence was not “based on a sentencing range that has
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” §
3582(c)(2), and that he is therefore not eligible for a sentence
reduction under that section.
II.
This court’s decision in United States v. Hood is on all
fours with this case and, in my view, is still good law. In
Hood, the defendant pled guilty to a crack drug offense that
yielded a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months, but he was
subject to a 240-month mandatory minimum as a result of a prior
felony drug conviction. The district court imposed the 240-
month sentence but departed downward to 100 months pursuant to §
3553(e) for Hood’s substantial assistance to the government.
The Sentencing Commission subsequently reduced the base offense
level applicable to crack offenses, and Hood sought a reduction
on that basis pursuant to § 3582(c). We held that the
defendant’s sentence “was not ‘based on’ the sentencing range
for crack cocaine offenses that was lowered by Amendment 706.”
Hood, 556 F.3d at 236. Rather, we concluded that Hood’s
sentence “was based on a statutory minimum fixed by 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A), and it was reduced to an appropriate sentence
28
authorized under § 3553(e) for his substantial assistance.” Id.
at 236-37. Hood explained that because “the Sentencing
Commission has no authority to lower a statutory mandatory
minimum,” Amendment 706 “did not have the effect of lowering
Hood’s Guidelines Range.” Id. at 233. Nor, the court reasoned,
did Hood’s sentencing range play any role in the court’s
substantial assistance downward departure. See id. (“Only
Congress could authorize a departure from the statutorily
mandated minimum sentence . . . .”).
Hood, in my view, remains good law despite the apparent
conflict with Sentencing Guidelines Amendment 780, which the
Sentencing Commission added to address “Cases Involving
Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Substantial Assistance.” It
states:
If the case involves a statutorily required minimum
sentence and the court had the authority to impose a
sentence below the statutorily required minimum
sentence pursuant to a government motion to reflect
the defendant’s substantial assistance to authorities,
then for purposes of this policy statement the amended
guideline range shall be determined without regard to
the operation of § 5G1.1 . . . .
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) (emphasis added). Section 5G1.1(b)
recognizes that a mandatory minimum sentence fixed by Congress
trumps an advisory sentencing range determined pursuant to
application of the Sentencing Guidelines: “Where a statutorily
required minimum sentence is greater than the maximum of the
29
applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum
sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”
The parties contend that Amendment 780 eviscerated Hood’s
prohibition against a sentence reduction under § 3582(c) where
the original sentence was “based on a statutory minimum and
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b).” 556 F.3d at 233 (emphasis added).
Amendment 780 directs the sentencing court to determine the
amended sentencing range in these circumstances “without regard
to the operation of § 5G1.1.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c). Since Hood
referred to § 5G1.1(b) in explaining that the sentence in
question was “based on a statutory minimum and U.S.S.G. §
5G1.1(b),” and § 5G1.1 can now be disregarded under Amendment
780 for purposes of determining whether a defendant is eligible
for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2), the contention is
that Hood no longer controls cases such as the one before the
court.
Hood, however, did not turn on the operation of U.S.S.G. §
5G1.1. Rather, Hood’s holding clearly rested on the court’s
conclusion that Hood’s 100-month sentence was based “on the
mandated statutory minimum sentence required by [21 U.S.C.] §
841(b)(1)(A) from which the district court departed as
authorized by § 3553(e), employing the factors identified in
U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.” Hood, 556 F.3d at 235-36. Indeed, Hood’s
sentence would have been the same with or without § 5G1.1--21
30
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) required the imposition of the mandatory
minimum sentence and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) allowed the imposition
of a sentence below the statutory minimum only based on
substantial assistance factors. Section 3582(c) provides that a
defendant’s sentence may be reduced if the sentence he received
was “based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission.” Hood interpreted that
statutory language and held that a statutorily mandated minimum
sentence is not a sentence that is based on a sentencing range.
While the Sentencing Commission has the authority to overrule
circuit precedent interpreting Guidelines provisions, it cannot
overrule circuit precedent interpreting a statutory provision.
Hood’s interpretation of the statutory phrase “based on” thus
remains controlling.
Accordingly, I must conclude that Williams’s sentence was
not “based on a sentencing range that has been subsequently
lowered by the Sentencing Commission,” § 3582(c)(2), and that he
is therefore not eligible for a sentence reduction under that
section. I respectfully dissent.
31