Christopher Parham v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1519
CHRISTOPHER D. PARHAM,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. David J. Novak, Magistrate
Judge. (3:14-cv-00283-DJN)
Submitted: November 30, 2015 Decided: December 28, 2015
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Reversed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas Bryan Byrne, North Chesterfield, Virginia, for Appellant.
Nora Koch, Acting Regional Chief Counsel, Charles Kawas, Acting
Supervisory Attorney, David E. Somers, III, Assistant Regional
Counsel, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania; Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Jonathan
H. Hambrick, Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher D. Parham appeals the district court’s order
affirming the Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income. For the reasons that
follow, we reverse and remand.
On appeal, Parham asserts that a January 30, 2013
questionnaire completed by Dr. DePalma, one of Parham’s treating
physicians, was new and material evidence that rendered the
disability determination of the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
unsupported by substantial evidence. Effectively, Parham
asserts that the questionnaire, which was submitted to the
Appeals Council and made part of the administrative record,
obligated a remand to the ALJ.
When a claimant submits to the Appeals Council “new and
material evidence relating to the period on or before the date
of the ALJ decision,” the Appeals Council is required to
consider that evidence when deciding whether to grant review
over an ALJ decision. Wilkins v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., 953 F.2d 93, 95 (4th Cir. 1991); see 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.970(b), 416.1470(b) (2015). “Evidence is new if it is
not duplicative or cumulative and is material if there is a
reasonable possibility that the new evidence would have changed
the outcome.” Meyer v. Astrue, 662 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In evaluating whether
2
remand is necessary, we view the administrative record as a
whole, including the new evidence, to determine whether
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision.
Wilkins, 953 F.2d at 96; see Meyer v. Colvin, 754 F.3d 251, 257
(4th Cir. 2014) (considering whether new evidence “impugn[s] the
integrity” of ALJ’s decision).
Our review of the record leads us to conclude that Dr.
DePalma’s questionnaire constitutes new and material evidence
that should have prompted a remand to the ALJ for full and
appropriate consideration. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment
of the district court and remand with instructions to reverse
the decision of the Commissioner and remand the case for a
rehearing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (2012). We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
3