United States v. Jamar Randall

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4120
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAMAR SERON RANDALL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:10-cr-00174-MOC-1)
Submitted: November 16, 2015 Decided: December 4, 2015
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Chiege O. Kalu Okwara, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Jill Westmoreland Rose, Acting United States Attorney, Anthony
J. Enright, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jamar Seron Randall appeals the 72-month sentence imposed
by the district court following his straight up guilty plea to
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). 1 On appeal, Randall contends that,
under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), the
district court violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by
engaging in judicial factfinding to increase his base offense
level and establish the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range.
In assessing the district court’s application of the Sentencing
Guidelines, we review factual findings for clear error and legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Strieper, 666 F.3d 288,
292 (4th Cir. 2012). Finding no error, we affirm.
In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held “that any fact that
increases the mandatory minimum is an element [of the offense]
that must be submitted to the jury.” 133 S. Ct. at 2155
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the district court’s
finding that the firearm had an obliterated serial number served
to increase the advisory Guidelines range, but did not affect
1
Randall originally pled guilty to this charge in 2011.
The district court subsequently concluded, on a 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(2012) motion, that Randall was denied effective assistance of
counsel during the plea bargaining process. The court vacated
the judgment to afford Randall an opportunity to enter a new
plea and, in October 2014, Randall once again pled guilty.
2
Randall’s statutory sentencing range. 2 Thus, Alleyne does not
apply. Similarly, Randall’s reliance on Descamps v. United
States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (addressing when courts may use
the modified categorical approach to determine whether a prior
conviction qualifies as a predicate offense for purposes of
recidivist enhancements), is unavailing.
We conclude that the district court did not violate
Randall’s constitutional rights by engaging in judicial
factfinding at sentencing that did not affect his statutory
sentencing exposure. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2 Randall’s statutory mandatory maximum sentence under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) was 10 years’ imprisonment and there was
no statutory mandatory minimum sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2)
(2012).
3