United States v. Robert Sampson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4744
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ROBERT NEIL SAMPSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, Senior District Judge.
(8:13-cr-00357-RWT-1)
Submitted: October 20, 2015 Decided: November 10, 2015
Before AGEE and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael Lawlor, LAWLOR & ENGLERT, LLC, Greenbelt, Maryland, for
Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States Attorney, Arun G.
Rao, Mara Z. Greenberg, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Gustav W. Eyler, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Robert Neil Sampson pled guilty to conspiracy to interfere
with interstate commerce by robbery, interference with commerce
by robbery, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of
violence. He appeals, asserting that his upward variance
sentence was unreasonable. 1 We affirm.
Sampson contends that his sentence was procedurally and
substantively unreasonable because the district court failed to
meaningfully consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors;
failed to consider Sampson’s chief argument (his age, 53 at the
time of sentencing); failed to explain why a variance sentence
served the purposes of sentencing while a Sentencing Guidelines
sentence did not; and erroneously supported its variance
sentence with details about Sampson’s offenses that were
considered by the Guidelines. We review a sentence for
procedural and substantive reasonableness under an abuse of
discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007). The first step requires this court to ensure that the
district court committed no significant procedural error such as
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider
1 Sampson was sentenced to 300 months in prison; his
Sentencing Guidelines range was 205-235 months.
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the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the
Guidelines range. Id. If we conclude that a sentence is free
of significant procedural error, we then consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence. United States v.
Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010).
In the case of a variance or departure, “‘a major departure
should be supported by a more significant justification than a
minor one,’” United States v. Lymas, 781 F.3d 106, 113 (4th Cir.
2015) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at
50)), and appellate courts apply greater scrutiny to an
explanation supporting a substantial variance, see United
States v. McClung, 483 F.3d 273, 277 (4th Cir. 2007). A
sentencing court’s explanation falters if it fails to provide an
individualized assessment of the facts before it when imposing
the sentence. Lymas, 781 F.3d at 113-14.
Here, the district court’s variance explanation was
sufficient. Sampson was sentenced to a term of imprisonment
approximately 30% higher than the top of his total Guidelines
range. Thus, while the court was required to provide a higher
level of detail in its explanation, the court’s lengthy
discussion of Sampson’s crime and background met that
requirement. While the court relied heavily on the seriousness
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of the crime and the failure of the Guidelines to adequately
punish the crime, the court also considered other statutory
factors. For instance, the court considered the need for
deterrence and protection of the public. The court also
examined Sampson’s background, the affect of his plea agreement,
and his unpredictable criminal behavior.
Moreover, the court explicitly referenced each of the
§ 3553(a) factors and explained how the offenses at issue went
far beyond most robberies by involving extremely violent
behavior and lasting injuries to the victims. The court
specifically pointed to Sampson’s unusual background in
determining that his criminal behavior was unpredictable and
needed to be deterred. While the court did not explicitly
discuss Sampson’s age, the court was clearly aware of that
factor. Furthermore, the court expressly rejected a Guidelines
sentence, noting that it was too far away from the statutory
maximum given the circumstances of the crime. Accordingly, the
district court’s articulation of its reasons for the variance
belies Sampson’s claim of procedural error.
Turning to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence,
we examine the totality of the circumstances to see whether the
sentencing court abused its discretion in concluding that the
sentence it chose satisfied the standards set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a). United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 383
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(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 305 (2014). Sentences that
vary outside the Guidelines range are still entitled to due
deference. Id. When reviewing a variance or departure, we
consider whether the sentencing court acted reasonably both with
respect to its decision to impose such a sentence and with
respect to the extent of the divergence from the sentencing
range. United States v. McNeill, 598 F.3d 161, 166 (4th Cir.
2010). It is within the sentencing court’s discretion to accord
more weight to the aggravating factors and decide that the
sentence imposed would serve the § 3553(a) factors on the whole.
Gall, 552 U.S. at 56-59; see also United States v. Jeffery, 631
F.3d 669, 679 (4th Cir. 2011) (observing that “district courts
have extremely broad discretion when determining the weight to
be given each of the § 3553(a) factors”) (citation omitted).
Here, the court recognized its obligations to impose a
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with the § 3553(a) factors. Regarding the various § 3553(a)
factors, the court detailed the nature and circumstances of the
offenses, noting that Sampson benefitted from a plea agreement
that resulted in the dismissal of various counts. The court
reflected on Sampson’s prior criminal history, concluding that
there were numerous uncounted convictions and many dismissed
charges for serious crimes. The court found that Sampson had
managed to recover from his youthful criminal behavior but that
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he returned to crime after a very long period of time. The
court found that the Guidelines range was insufficient in this
case, based upon the seriousness of the crime and the need to
protect and deter the public.
We conclude that the district court carefully considered
the relevant § 3553(a) factors and tied them to the increased
sentence. While Sampson’s Guidelines range included departures
for a victim sustaining a serious bodily injury, physical
restraint, carjacking, the involvement of controlled substances,
and the loss amount, it was within the court’s discretion to
determine, as it did, that the totality of Sampson’s criminal
behavior, which included carefully planned and very dangerous
robberies causing lasting impact to both victims and businesses,
was not fully accounted for by the Guidelines. We find that the
district court did not give excessive weight to any single
factor, but instead considered all the applicable factors.
Thus, we affirm Sampson’s sentence. Sampson has filed a
motion to file a pro se supplemental brief raising claims of
ineffective assistance and challenging the denial of his motion
to withdraw his plea. 2 Because Sampson is represented by counsel
who has filed a merits brief, he is not entitled to file a pro
2We grant Sampson’s motion for reconsideration challenging
the striking of the proposed brief from the docket.
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se supplemental brief. Accordingly, we deny his motion. See
United States v. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 569 n.1 (4th Cir.
2011) (denying motion to file pro se supplemental brief because
the defendant was represented by counsel). We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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