United States v. Cedric Jenkins

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4101
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CEDRIC DEWIN JENKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:13-cr-00487-NCT-2)
Submitted: November 30, 2015 Decided: January 27, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Stacey D. Rubain, QUANDER & RUBAIN, P.A., Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. JoAnna Gibson McFadden, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cedric Dewin Jenkins appeals the 160-month sentence imposed
following his guilty plea to conspiracy to commit bank fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2012). On appeal, Jenkins’
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there are no meritorious
grounds for appeal but questioning whether Jenkins’ guilty plea
is valid and whether Jenkins’ sentence is reasonable. ∗ Jenkins
has filed a supplemental pro se brief, asserting that the
district court erred in applying various sentencing
enhancements. Finding no meritorious grounds for appeal, we
affirm.
Because Jenkins did not move to withdraw his guilty plea in
the district court, we review the validity of his plea for plain
error. United States v. Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 422 (4th
Cir. 2015). The record reveals that the district court
substantially complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting
Jenkins’ plea. The court’s minor omissions do not affect
Jenkins’ substantial rights. See United States v. Davila, 133
∗Jenkins’ attorney also questions the validity of the
appeal waiver in the plea agreement. Because the Government
does not seek to enforce the waiver, and we will not enforce the
waiver sua sponte, we have reviewed the case in accordance with
Anders. United States v. Poindexter, 492 F.3d 263, 271 (4th
Cir. 2007); see United States v. Jones, 667 F.3d 477, 486 (4th
Cir. 2012).
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S. Ct. 2139, 2147 (2013). Moreover, the district court ensured
that Jenkins’ plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an
adequate factual basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d
114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
We also conclude that Jenkins’ sentence is both
procedurally and substantively reasonable. The record reveals
no clear error by the district court in applying a two-level
enhancement for leadership, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 3B1.1(c) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n 2013), and
a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice, pursuant to
USSG § 3C1.1. See United States v. Andrews, __ F.3d __, __,
2015 WL 6575671, at *2-3 (4th Cir. Oct. 30, 2015) (No. 14-4422)
(stating standard of review of § 3C1.1 enhancement); United
States v. Steffen, 741 F.3d 411, 414 (4th Cir. 2013) (stating
standard of review of § 3B1.1(c) enhancement). Nor did the
district court plainly err in applying a four-level enhancement
for the number of victims in the conspiracy, pursuant to USSG
§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) (2013). Thus, the district court properly
calculated the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range, and the
court appropriately explained the sentence in the context of the
relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors. See Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Moreover, Jenkins’ within-
Guidelines sentence is presumptively substantively reasonable,
United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert.
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denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014), and he fails to rebut that
presumption on appeal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for
appeal. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.
This court requires that counsel inform Jenkins, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Jenkins requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Jenkins. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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