United States v. Sandy Parsons

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-4254
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SANDY WADE PARSONS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder,
District Judge. (1:14-cr-00289-TDS-2)
Submitted: January 21, 2016 Decided: January 27, 2016
Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John D. Bryson, WYATT, EARLY, HARRIS & WHEELER, LLP, High Point,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States
Attorney, Anand P. Ramaswamy, Assistant United States Attorney,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Sandy Wade Parsons appeals his conviction and 96-month
sentence for conspiracy to defraud the government in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012); multiple counts of theft of government
funds, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641 (2012), and mail fraud, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); false statements regarding
food assistance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2012);
and aggravated identity theft, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1028A(a)(1) (2012). He argues that his sentence is procedurally
and substantively unreasonable, and also challenges the district
court’s refusal to allow counsel to define “reasonable doubt” in
closing argument. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness “under a deferential
abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. McCoy, 804 F.3d
349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007)). This review entails appellate consideration of
both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the
sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Parsons claims that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable
because the district court imposed a sentence based on unreliable
testimony from a witness Parsons argues is not credible. We review
the district court’s factual findings at sentencing for clear
error, and accord its credibility determinations great deference.
United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 334 (4th Cir. 2009). The
2
district court heard testimony from the witness, Parsons’ counsel
cross-examined him, and other evidence supported his testimony.
The district court fully explained its decision to credit the
witness, and we defer to the court’s credibility determination.
Parsons fails to show that the witness’ testimony did not have
“some minimal level of reliability,” as due process requires. See
United States v. Powell, 650 F.3d 388, 393 (4th Cir. 2011).
Parsons next claims that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable because the court relied on a description of conduct
that refers “almost exclusively” to Casey Parsons, his wife and
codefendant. While this court holds that a sentencing court must
not give excessive weight to any one sentencing factor, United
States v. Howard, 773 F.3d 519, 531 (4th Cir. 2014), the district
court’s sentence suffered from no such failing. The court, though
citing the challenged factor, provided in addition a thorough and
compelling explanation that relied on other sentencing factors and
justifies the sentence imposed.
Parsons also argues that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable because the court varied so greatly from the
Sentencing Guidelines, and because his sentence is nearly the same
as his more culpable codefendant. We conclude, however, that based
on the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in varying substantially upward and that
3
Parsons’ sentence is not disproportionate when compared with that
of his codefendant.
Finally, Parsons urges us to reexamine our precedent
prohibiting counsel from defining “reasonable doubt” to the jury
during closing argument. We have consistently disapproved of such
attempts to define “reasonable doubt” for a jury, concluding that
the words “have the meaning generally understood for them and that
further efforts to restate their meaning with different words tend
either to alter or to obfuscate that meaning.” United States v.
Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290, 1300 (4th Cir. 1995). Because this panel
has no authority to overturn this precedent, see United States v.
Williams, 808 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 2015), this claim must fail.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
4