United States v. Pablo Ramirez-Alaniz

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-6003
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Petitioner - Appellee,
v.
PABLO RAMIREZ-ALANIZ,
Respondent - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (5:14-hc-02159-BR)
Argued: December 9, 2015 Decided: January 26, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the
opinion, in which Judge Duncan and Judge Agee joined.
ARGUED: Joseph Bart Gilbert, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert J.
Dodson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Thomas P. McNamara, Federal
Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Jennifer D. Dannels, Assistant
United States Attorneys, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:
The district court committed Pablo Ramirez-Alaniz, a
Mexican national who had been charged with illegally reentering
the United States following deportation, to the custody and care
of the Attorney General pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4246. The court
found that Ramirez-Alaniz, who was being detained at the Federal
Medical Center in Butner, North Carolina (“FMC Butner”), for a
mental health evaluation following his illegal reentry, was
“suffering from a mental disease or defect as a result of which
his release [-- whether in the United States or Mexico --] would
create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or
serious damage to the property of another.”
Ramirez-Alaniz now challenges this civil commitment order,
arguing that because he would be deported to Mexico if released,
the district court’s finding of risk of danger to other persons
or property would apply to persons and property in Mexico,
giving improper extraterritorial effect to § 4246. He notes
that “the dangerousness prong [of § 4246] applies [solely] to
effects within the United States, because the legislation fails
to clearly indicate that Congress intended extraterritorial
application.” (Emphasis added).
We conclude, however, that because the district court found
that Ramirez-Alaniz’s release would also pose a risk of danger
to persons or property in the United States, we need not reach
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whether § 4246 applies extraterritorially. Accordingly, we
affirm, albeit on reasoning different from that given by the
district court.
I
In January 2011, after Ramirez-Alaniz pleaded guilty in
Oregon to charges relating to discharging a firearm in his
apartment, pointing the firearm at another individual, and
resisting arrest, an Oregon state court sentenced him to 30
months’ imprisonment. During his incarceration, he was given
medication for mental health issues. Thereafter, he was
deported to Mexico and prohibited from reentering the United
States.
About two weeks later, however, on December 6, 2012,
Ramirez-Alaniz was detained by border patrol agents in Arizona
and charged with illegal reentry following deportation, in
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). While detained, Ramirez-
Alaniz exhibited poor institutional adjustment, sexually
inappropriate behavior, and noncompliance with the
administration of medication. As these conditions escalated, a
staff psychiatrist recommended his transfer to an inpatient
psychiatric hospital. The district court in Arizona ordered
that Ramirez-Alaniz be evaluated for competency restoration and
treatment under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 and, if he could not be
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restored to competency, that Ramirez-Alaniz remain hospitalized
and undergo a dangerousness evaluation, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§§ 4246 and 4248. Accordingly, Ramirez-Alaniz was transferred
to FMC Butner for evaluation and treatment.
A panel of mental health evaluators at FMC Butner
determined that Ramirez-Alaniz was incapable of proceeding with
the pending criminal case in the District of Arizona and that
his competency was unlikely to be restored in the foreseeable
future due to cognitive limitations. In a subsequent forensic
evaluation completed in June 2014, the FMC Butner medical staff
concluded that Ramirez-Alaniz was suffering from “a mental
disease or defect as a result of which his release would create
a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious
damage to the property of others.”
On receipt of this forensic evaluation, the government
initiated the present proceeding by filing a Certificate of
Mental Disease or Defect and Dangerousness in the Eastern
District of North Carolina on July 22, 2014, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 4246(a), and the district court thereafter conducted a
commitment hearing. During the hearing, the court considered
forensic reports and testimony from Dr. Carlton Pyant, a staff
psychologist at FMC Butner, and Dr. Katayoun Tabrizi, a
psychiatrist appointed by the court, both of whom had evaluated
Ramirez-Alaniz.
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Dr. Pyant diagnosed Ramirez-Alaniz as suffering from
schizophrenia, an unspecified neurodevelopmental disorder, and
an alcohol use disorder. Dr. Pyant noted that prior to
receiving treatment at FMC Butner, Ramirez-Alaniz had shown
“poor impulse control”; he was “sexually provocative and
dangerous”; “his speech was disorganized”; “his judgment [was]
poor”; he was “hearing voices”; he engaged in significant
substance abuse; and he was “essentially unable to control
himself.” Dr. Pyant reported, however, that Ramirez-Alaniz had
been compliant with the administration of medication in the
structured environment of FMC Butner and, with medication, had
demonstrated “some insight into his behavior.” For example,
Ramirez-Alaniz told Dr. Pyant that the medication had helped to
“stop the voices” and prevent “sexual thoughts.” Dr. Pyant also
noted that, with medication, Ramirez-Alaniz had been respectful
of the rights of others, had a positive attitude, and was
cooperative with staff. Nonetheless, Dr. Pyant was of the
opinion that Ramirez-Alaniz would not continue with his
medications if released because he had made statements to that
effect and because he had “minimal to no social support” in the
United States to provide necessary “ongoing supervision to
ensure medication compliance.” Dr. Pyant also noted that
Ramirez-Alaniz was unable to provide a realistic plan “to locate
appropriate aftercare resources.” Accordingly, he concluded
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that Ramirez-Alaniz, if released, would pose a substantial risk
of bodily injury to other persons or serious damage to the
property of other persons.
Similarly, Dr. Tabrizi diagnosed Ramirez-Alaniz with
schizophrenia, an alcohol use disorder, and a cocaine use
disorder. She also made a provisional diagnosis of an
intellectual disability. She noted indicia of cognitive delays,
such as observations that Ramirez-Alaniz was unable to recall a
total of three words after the passing of five minutes, that he
could not state the current month, and that he could not perform
simple arithmetic. She also noted several factors that
increased Ramirez-Alaniz’s risk for future violence, including a
psychotic mental health illness; a history of firearm
possession, resisting arrest, drug use, and alcohol addiction;
and social obstacles, including unemployment and lack of social
support in the United States. She emphasized, however, that
Ramirez-Alaniz had only one documented episode of dangerous
behavior in the five years during which he lived in the United
States and that he had responded well to medication. She noted
that, with medication, Ramirez-Alaniz was respectful,
cooperative, and had a good sense of humor when she interviewed
him. Ultimately, Dr. Tabrizi concluded that Ramirez-Alaniz’s
“release back to Arizona for deportation would not create a
substantial risk of bodily injury or damage to the property of
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another in the United States,” but this conclusion was based
primarily on her assumption that Ramirez-Alaniz would be
deported to Mexico and, pending deportation, would remain in
custody. While Dr. Tabrizi recognized that Ramirez-Alaniz might
try to reenter the United States after deportation, she
discounted this risk because of “the uncertainty about the
likelihood of” his reentry. She recognized, however, that if
Ramirez-Alaniz were to be released into a “community in the
United States on his own,” a problem would exist with “his being
able to access mental health treatment and get his medications.”
Accordingly, she agreed that in that circumstance, Ramirez-
Alaniz would meet the criteria for civil commitment under
§ 4246.
At the hearing, Ramirez-Alaniz also testified. He
expressed his willingness to receive medication to treat his
mental illness and stated, in view of his potential deportation,
that he wished to return to Mexico “as soon as possible.” He
“promised” that, if deported, he would not return to the United
States without permission.
In argument to the district court, counsel for Ramirez-
Alaniz stated his firm conviction that, if released, Ramirez-
Alaniz would be deported to Mexico “forthwith,” noting that it
would be “preposterous” to assume that the government would not
deport him inasmuch as he is “exactly the kind of person who
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will be processed for deportation.” Consequently, counsel
argued that Ramirez-Alaniz would not pose a risk to persons or
property in the United States. The government argued, however,
that immediate deportation was not a sure thing, as no
Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainer was then pending.
After receiving supplemental briefing on whether the reach of
§ 4246 should be limited to persons and property in the United
States, the district court concluded that § 4246 means “that a
person should be civilly committed if he suffers from a mental
disease or defect as a result of which his release would create
a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person,
regardless of their citizenship or geographic location.”
(Emphasis added). The court then found, by clear and convincing
evidence, that “[w]hether [Ramirez-Alaniz] is released in the
United States or his native Mexico, his release would pose a
high risk of dangerousness given his psychotic disorder and
cognitive deficits.” (Emphasis added). Accordingly, the court
ordered that Ramirez-Alaniz be committed to the custody and care
of the Attorney General.
Following the district court’s commitment order, the
district court in Arizona dismissed the criminal indictment
against Ramirez-Alaniz. Therefore, following the commitment
order, no detainer, criminal proceeding, or deportation
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proceeding was -- nor currently is -- pending against Ramirez-
Alaniz.
From the district court’s civil commitment order, Ramirez-
Alaniz filed this appeal, contending that § 4246 is not
implicated by his circumstances because, if released, he would
be immediately deported to Mexico and § 4246 applies only to
protect persons and property in the United States. He argues
that the district court erred in construing § 4246 to include
any risk to persons or property in Mexico.
II
Section 4246 of Title 18 provides that when the director of
a hospital facility “certifies” that a person in the custody of
the Bureau of Prisons or the Attorney General “suffer[s] from a
mental disease or defect” that would pose a “substantial risk”
of bodily injury to persons or serious damage to property, he
must, in the absence of suitable arrangements for state custody,
file the certificate in the district court where the person is
in custody, thus commencing a civil commitment proceeding. 18
U.S.C. § 4246(a). Upon notice to the person and the government,
the district court must then conduct a hearing to determine the
risk of the person’s danger to other persons and property. Id.
§ 4246(a), (c). If the court finds “by clear and convincing
evidence that the person is presently suffering from a mental
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disease or defect as a result of which his release would create
a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious
damage to property of another,” the court must commit the person
to the custody of the Attorney General. Id. § 4246(d).
In this case, Ramirez-Alaniz does not challenge the
district court’s finding that he would pose a substantial risk
of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to
another’s property. Rather, he argues that § 4246 should not be
applied to commit him because he will be deported to Mexico and
the risk which the court found will be relevant only to persons
and property in Mexico, not to persons or property in the United
States. Consequently, he reasons, the district court, in
finding that Ramirez-Alaniz posed a risk of dangerousness
whether he is “released in the United States or his native
Mexico,” erred in construing § 4246 to cover effects in Mexico.
(Emphasis added). Stated otherwise, Ramirez-Alaniz argues that
the district court erred when it applied § 4246 to persons and
property “anywhere in the world,” thus failing to recognize the
general presumption against the extraterritorial application of
statutes absent a clear congressional expression of such
application.
The government argues that even if Ramirez-Alaniz is
promptly deported, § 4246 “provides for civil commitment
regardless of the at-risk person’s citizenship or geographical
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location.” It also argues that Ramirez-Alaniz’s deportation is
not certain and that, if released, Ramirez-Alaniz would pose a
risk to persons and property in the United States. Finally, the
government argues that even if Ramirez-Alaniz were to be
deported, his possible reentry would pose a substantial risk of
danger to persons or property in the United States given his
“history of illegally reentering” the country.
While Ramirez-Alaniz focuses his argument on the effect of
his conduct in Mexico, based on his assumption that if released,
he would be deported to Mexico immediately, the argument
overlooks the fact that if released, Ramirez-Alaniz would, based
on the record before us, be released into the United States.
There is no proceeding or detainer pending against Ramirez-
Alaniz that would preclude his presence in the United States
upon release. And Ramirez-Alaniz has provided no factual basis
upon which to conclude that the district court’s finding that
his release would pose a high risk of dangerousness “[w]hether
he is released in the United States or his native Mexico” was
clearly erroneous. (Emphasis added). Thus, because Ramirez-
Alaniz’s release would pose a risk of danger to persons or
property in the United States, we need not address his argument
that § 4246 does not apply extraterritorially.
Ramirez-Alaniz also contends that even if his release would
pose some risk of danger to persons or property in the United
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States, allowing a court in the United States to civilly commit
foreign nationals, such as him, who face possible deportation
would effectively commit such persons to “serve de facto life
sentences at the expense of American taxpayers.” He argues that
reading § 4246 to permit these life sentences would be an
“absurd result” and would raise “serious constitutional
questions.”
We find this argument beset by speculation and hyperbole.
Section 4246 itself provides numerous avenues by which Ramirez-
Alaniz can be released after commitment. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 4246(d)(2), (e), (g). In addition, Ramirez-Alaniz has
challenged neither the government’s statement at the commitment
hearing that it was exploring informal processes to move him to
Mexico nor the government’s statement in its brief that
Immigration and Customs Enforcement “still has the option to
initiate deportation proceedings against him” even now that he
is civilly committed.
As to his concern regarding “constitutional problems raised
by the district court’s decision,” we recognize that “civil
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation
of liberty that requires due process protection.” Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). But Ramirez-Alaniz does not
argue that he was denied due process through the commitment
hearing. And whether due process would be denied with respect
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to any future effort by him to obtain release can, at this time,
only be speculative.
At bottom, we affirm the civil commitment order based on
the district court’s finding of risk of harm in the United
States, without determining whether 18 U.S.C. § 4246 extends to
risks that Ramirez-Alaniz’s release might also pose outside the
United States.
AFFIRMED
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