Randy Byers v. Alamance County, NC

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1923
RANDY WALTER BYERS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALAMANCE COUNTY, NORTH CAROLINA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
Senior District Judge. (1:13-cv-01102-JAB-JEP)
Submitted: January 29, 2016 Decided: February 16, 2016
Before GREGORY, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Randy Walter Byers, Appellant Pro Se. William L. Hill, FRAZIER
HILL & FURY, RLLP, Greensboro, North Carolina, James Demarest
Secor, III, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Randy Walter Byers appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendant, Alamance
County, North Carolina (hereafter, “the County”), on Byers’
Title VII claim of racially discriminatory hiring. For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, viewing the facts and the reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 380 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In making this determination,
we may not weigh evidence or make credibility determinations,
and we “must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving
party that the jury is not required to believe.” Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000).
However, to survive a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party “cannot solely rely on mere
allegations or denials of his pleadings” but “must set forth
specific facts that go beyond the mere existence of a scintilla
of evidence.” Glynn v. EDO Corp., 710 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.
2013) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
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Title VII prohibits employers from failing or refusing to
hire an individual “because of such individual’s race.”
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). Where, as here, the plaintiff
does not provide direct evidence of discrimination, he may prove
a Title VII claim through the burden-shifting framework set
forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Foster v. Univ. of Md.-E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249 (4th Cir.
2015). To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory
failure to hire, Byers must prove that (1) he is a member of a
protected class; (2) he applied for the position; (3) he was
qualified for the position; and (4) his application was rejected
“under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination.” Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,
406 F.3d 248, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). If he meets this burden, the
burden shifts to the County to produce evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for declining to hire Byers. See Hoyle
v. Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 336 (4th Cir. 2011). If the
County makes such a showing, the burden then shifts back to
Byers to prove that the employer’s asserted justification is
pretextual. See Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Office of the Courts, 780
F.3d 562, 575-76 (4th Cir. 2015).
As an initial matter, although Byers asserts that the
district court improperly excluded various documents appended to
his summary judgment pleadings, the district court’s opinion
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states that it considered these documents in making its summary
judgment determination. Additionally, insofar as Byers raises
new arguments on appeal, these issues are not properly before
the court. See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 285 (4th Cir.
2014).
We have reviewed the record and the parties’ submissions
and find no error in the district court’s conclusion that Byers
failed to provide evidence sufficient to support a prima facie
case of discrimination, as he could not demonstrate that he was
rejected from either position under circumstances giving rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination. See Anderson, 406 F.3d
at 268. Moreover, we agree that the record does not permit the
conclusion that the County’s proffered justifications were
pretext for intentional discrimination. See Jacobs, 780 F.3d at
515-16; Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 211 (4th
Cir. 2014). Thus, the district court committed no reversible
error in granting summary judgment in favor of the County.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument will not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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