United States v. Charles Hargrove, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4626
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES HARGROVE, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
Chief District Judge. (5:11-cr-00194-D-3)
Submitted: March 15, 2013 Decided: March 29, 2013
Before WILKINSON, KING, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Robert L. Cooper, COOPER, DAVIS & COOPER, Fayetteville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Yvonne V. Watford-McKinney,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Hargrove, Jr., appeals from his conviction of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or
more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006). His
sole contention on appeal is that the district court erred in
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. We affirm.
We review a district court’s denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United States
v. Battle, 499 F.3d 315, 319 (4th Cir. 2007). In order to
withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, a defendant must show
that a “fair and just reason” supports his request. Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B). “[A] ‘fair and just’ reason . . . is one
that essentially challenges . . . the fairness of the Rule 11
proceeding.” United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394
(4th Cir. 1992) (en banc). The defendant bears the heavy burden
of demonstrating the existence of such a reason. United States
v. Thompson-Riviere, 561 F.3d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2009).
In determining whether a defendant has met this
burden, a district court must consider the six factors
articulated in United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th
Cir. 1991). We have reviewed the record in this case and, after
carefully considering the factors described in Moore, conclude
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Hargrove’s motion to withdraw his plea.
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When conducting Hargrove’s plea colloquy, the
magistrate judge fully complied with the mandates of Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11, and nothing in the record indicates that Hargrove’s
plea was unknowing or involuntary. Further, Hargrove averred
during his Rule 11 hearing that he was satisfied with his
appointed counsel’s representation. Such statements are
presumed true, and Hargrove has not produced any evidence to
support his bald assertion that his counsel’s assistance was
deficient. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977); see
Fields v. Attorney Gen., 956 F.2d 1290, 1299 (4th Cir. 1992)
(“Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, a
defendant is bound by the representations he makes under oath
during a plea colloquy.”).
Additionally, Hargrove has not asserted his innocence.
Moreover, Hargrove did not seek to withdraw his plea until
roughly seven months after his Rule 11 hearing and two months
after he was appointed replacement counsel, a considerable
delay. Moore, 931 F.2d at 248. Because Hargrove has also
failed to show that his counsel’s conduct was improper, we find
that the district court correctly concluded that consideration
of the first four Moore factors counseled against allowing
Hargrove to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, contrary to
Hargrove’s suggestion, the district court was not required to
explain with greater specificity the basis for its determination
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that allowing withdrawal of Hargrove’s plea would also prejudice
the Government and waste judicial resources. See United States
v. Sparks, 67 F.3d 1145, 1154 (4th Cir. 1995) (where a district
court finds that the first four Moore factors weigh against
allowing withdrawal of a plea, the court may “reasonably refrain
from trying to ascertain just how much withdrawal of the plea
would prejudice the government and inconvenience the court”).
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
conclusions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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