United States v. Takwan Luster

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4318
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TAKWAN DEQUINTEN LUSTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:13-cr-00082-TDS-1)
Submitted: October 18, 2018 Decided: October 23, 2018
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, KING, Circuit Judge, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William S. Trivette, WILLIAM S. TRIVETTE, ATTORNEY AT LAW, PLLC,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Robert Albert Jamison Lang, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Takwan Dequinten Luster appeals the 24-month sentence imposed upon
revocation of his supervised release. Luster’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no potentially
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the sentence imposed by the
district court is plainly substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation
of supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We
will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]e first must determine
whether the sentence is procedurally or substantively reasonable,” evaluating the same
general considerations employed in our review of original sentences. United States v.
Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017). If we find a sentence unreasonable, then we
proceed to determine whether it is “plainly” so. Webb, 738 F.3d at 640.
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.”
Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207 (footnote omitted). The “sentence is substantively reasonable if
the court sufficiently states a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant should
receive the sentence imposed.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Luster has failed to establish
that his revocation sentence is plainly substantively unreasonable. The district court
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properly calculated Luster’s policy statement range of 15 to 21 months’ imprisonment
and statutory maximum of 24 months’ imprisonment. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 7B1.4(a)(1), p.s.; 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012). The court went beyond the
policy statement range to impose the statutory maximum sentence but sufficiently
grounded the sentence in the nature and circumstances of the offense, Luster’s history
and characteristics, and the appropriate balance between deterrence and rehabilitation.
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e) (2012). The court cited Luster’s decisions to
participate in a violent home invasion, to completely disregard the efforts of his probation
officer, and to breach the court’s trust in a significant way. See Webb, 738 F.3d at 641
(recognizing that revocation sentence “should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach
of trust” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Luster’s conviction and
sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Luster, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Luster requests that
a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Luster. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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