Guardado de Ruiz v. Holder

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-2196
MARIA ANTONIA GUARDADO DE RUIZ; BALMORE MANUEL RUIZ-
GUARDADO,
Petitioners,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: April 28, 2011 Decided: May 19, 2011
Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Erin Hustings, Washington, D.C., for Petitioners. Tony West,
Assistant Attorney General, Leslie McKay, Assistant Director,
Melissa K. Lott, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Maria Antonia Guardado de Ruiz (“Guardado de Ruiz”)
and her daughter, Balmore Manuel Ruiz-Guardado, natives and
citizens of El Salvador, petition for review of an order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“Board”) dismissing their appeal
from the immigration judge’s order denying the applications for
asylum, withholding of removal and withholding under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We deny the petition for
review.
Guardado de Ruiz, who was the primary applicant for
relief, claimed she was persecuted on account of her membership
in a particular social group: current and past owners and
workers in the transport industry. The Board concluded that
while Guardado de Ruiz did identify a particular social group,
she failed to show past persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of her membership in that group. The
Board found that it was not her membership in the group that
motivated the gangs, but rather the gangs’ desires to increase
their own revenues.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorizes
the Attorney General to confer asylum on any refugee. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(a) (2006). It defines a refugee as a person unwilling or
unable to return to her native country “because of persecution
or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
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religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2006).
“Persecution involves the infliction or threat of death,
torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom, on account of one
of the enumerated grounds . . . .” Qiao Hua Li v. Gonzales, 405
F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
An alien “bear[s] the burden of proving eligibility
for asylum,” Naizgi v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir.
2006); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(a) (2010), and can establish
refugee status based on past persecution in her native country
on account of a protected ground. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)
(2010). “An applicant who demonstrates that he was the subject
of past persecution is presumed to have a well-founded fear of
persecution.” Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir.
2004). Without regard to past persecution, an alien can
establish a well-founded fear of persecution on a protected
ground. Id. The well-founded fear standard contains both a
subjective and an objective component. The objective element
requires a showing of specific, concrete facts that would lead a
reasonable person in like circumstances to fear persecution.
Gandziami-Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir.
2006).
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To establish eligibility for withholding of removal,
an alien must show a clear probability that, if she were removed
to her native country, her “life or freedom would be threatened”
on a protected ground. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2006); see
Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 2004). A “clear
probability” means that it is more likely than not that the
alien would be subject to persecution. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, 429-30 (1984).
The protected ground must be a central reason for
being targeted for persecution. A central reason is one that is
more than “‘incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate
to another reason for harm.’” See Quinteros-Mendoza v. Holder,
556 F.3d 159, 164 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting In re J-B-N-, 24 I. &
N. Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2007)).
A determination regarding eligibility for asylum or
withholding of removal is affirmed if supported by substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole. INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992). Substantial evidence is
such evidence that is relevant evidence that a reasonable person
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Karimijanaki v. Holder, 579 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2010).
Administrative findings of fact, including findings on
credibility, are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to decide to the contrary. 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006). Legal issues are reviewed de novo,
“affording appropriate deference to the BIA’s interpretation of
the INA and any attendant regulations.” Lin v. Mukasey, 517
F.3d 685, 691-92 (4th Cir. 2008). This court will reverse the
Board only if “the evidence . . . presented was so compelling
that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite
fear of persecution.” Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483-84; see
Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n.14 (4th Cir. 2002).
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
Board’s findings and that the record does not compel a different
result. The opinion in Tapiero de Orejuela v. Gonzales, 423
F.3d 666, 672-73 (7th Cir. 2005), is clearly distinguishable
because there was evidence that the persecutors were motivated
to target the group based on the group’s immutable
characteristics. We also find Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d
980, 997-98 (6th Cir. 2009), to be clearly distinguishable as
the evidence in that case showed that the persecutor was
motivated by class differences and the Petitioner’s class’
refusal to submit to the paternal society.
We also conclude Guardado de Ruiz failed to exhaust
her claim that she was persecuted on account of her family. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) (2006); Asika v. Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 264,
267 n.3 (4th Cir. 2004) (“We have no jurisdiction to consider
this argument, however, because [the alien] failed to make it
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before the Board and, therefore, failed to exhaust ‘all
administrative remedies.’”). In addition, we note that she
abandoned her claims regarding the Board’s denial of CAT relief
and that she has a well-founded fear of persecution on account
of her actual or perceived political opinion. See Yousefi v.
INS, 260 F.3d 318, 326 (4th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED
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