United States v. Brian LaFlame

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4348
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
BRIAN LAFLAME,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge.
(8:12-cr-00486-RWT-1)
Submitted: September 17, 2013 Decided: September 26, 2013
Before AGEE, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, Martin G. Bahl, Appellate
Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Hollis Raphael
Weisman, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenbelt, Maryland,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Brian LaFlame was convicted by a magistrate judge of
fleeing to elude a police officer, in violation of Md. Code
Ann., Transp. § 21-904 (LexisNexis 2009), and interfering with
agency functions, in violation of 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1) (2013).
He was sentenced to 12 months’ probation, community service, and
a driver improvement program. LaFlame appealed to the district
court, and the court affirmed the criminal judgment.
LaFlame now appeals the district court’s order
affirming that judgment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating
that there are no meritorious issues for appeal but questioning
whether (1) the magistrate judge erred in denying LaFlame’s
suppression motion, (2) LaFlame’s convictions are not supported
by sufficient evidence, and (3) LaFlame’s sentence is
unreasonable. LaFlame was notified of his right to file a pro
se supplemental brief but has not done so. The Government has
declined to file a response brief. For the reasons that follow,
we affirm.
A district court reviewing a bench trial conducted by
a magistrate judge “utilizes the same standards of review
applied by a court of appeals in assessing a district court
conviction.” United States v. Bursey, 416 F.3d 301, 305 (4th
Cir. 2005); see Fed. R. Crim. P. 58(g)(2)(D). In turn, our
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“review of a magistrate court’s trial record is governed by the
same standards as was the district court’s appellate review.”
Bursey, 416 F.3d at 305-06.
In considering the denial of a suppression motion, we
review the district court’s legal determinations de novo and its
factual findings for clear error. United States v. Kelly, 592
F.3d 586, 589 (4th Cir. 2010). “[W]e view the facts in the
light most favorable to the Government, as the party prevailing
below.” United States v. Black, 707 F.3d 531, 534 (4th Cir.
2013). We also must defer to the trial court’s credibility
findings, as it is that court’s role “to observe witnesses and
weigh their credibility during a pre-trial motion to suppress.”
United States v. Griffin, 589 F.3d 148, 150-51 n.1 (4th Cir.
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[A] traffic stop, whether based on probable cause or
reasonable suspicion,” must be reviewed “under the standard set
forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 . . . (1968).” United
States v. Digiovanni, 650 F.3d 498, 506 (4th Cir. 2011). Under
this standard, the police officer’s decision to stop the vehicle
must be “justified at its inception,” and “the police officer’s
subsequent actions [must be] reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances that justified the stop.” Id.
“[T]he decision to stop an automobile is reasonable
where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
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violation has occurred.” Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
810 (1996). A traffic stop also is constitutionally permissible
when the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on specific
and articulable facts, to believe that “criminal activity may be
afoot.” See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30. Thus, a Fourth Amendment
violation occurs where “there is neither probable cause to
believe nor reasonable suspicion that the car is being driven
contrary to the laws governing the operation of motor vehicles
or that either the car or any of its occupants is subject to
seizure or detention in connection with the violation of any
other applicable law.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650
(1979). Whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion exists
to justify a traffic stop is determined by viewing the evidence
under the totality of the circumstances. United States v.
Sowards, 690 F.3d 583, 588 (4th Cir. 2012) (probable cause);
United States v. Foster, 634 F.3d 243, 246 (4th Cir. 2011)
(reasonable suspicion).
Our review of the record indicates that the magistrate
judge properly denied LaFlame’s suppression motion. The initial
stop of LaFlame’s vehicle was supported by reasonable suspicion
that LaFlame was driving while intoxicated. See, e.g.,
Amundsen v. Jones, 533 F.3d 1192, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 2008)
(collecting cases); Gaddis ex rel. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364
F.3d 763, 771 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding reasonable suspicion
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where defendant “weaved twice to the left to touch the dividing
line in a fairly short span” and “was leaning over to the right
inside his car”); United States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1199
(10th Cir. 1999) (finding reasonable suspicion when defendant’s
motor home “drift[ed] onto the shoulder twice within a quarter
mile without any adverse circumstances like road or weather
conditions to excuse or explain the deviation”); United
States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding
reasonable suspicion when driver “weaved across the emergency
lane twice” and officer’s testimony suggested stop to
investigate drunk driving was not pretextual). LaFlame provided
further justification for the stop by failing to respond to the
officer’s visual and audible signals to pull over, supporting
probable cause to believe LaFlame was committing the violation
of fleeing to elude. Moreover, the record provides no grounds
to conclude that the traffic stop was unreasonably extended
beyond the initial justification for the stop. See United
States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 335-37 (4th Cir. 2008)
(addressing circumstances in which extending traffic stop beyond
investigating initial offense is justified). We therefore
discern no Fourth Amendment violation on the facts presented.
Next, we review de novo the sufficiency of the
evidence to support LaFlame’s convictions. United States v.
McLean, 715 F.3d 129, 137 (4th Cir. 2013). In evaluating this
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question, we must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the government and accepting the
factfinder’s credibility determinations, the verdict is
supported by “[s]ubstantial evidence,” that is, “evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” United States v. King, 628 F.3d 693, 700
(4th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A
defendant bringing a sufficiency challenge must overcome a heavy
burden, and reversal for insufficiency must be confined to cases
where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v.
Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 419 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 179 (2012).
Our review of the record demonstrates that the trial testimony,
taken in the light most favorable to the government, provided
ample support for LaFlame’s convictions. See Md. Code Ann.,
Transp. § 21-904(a)-(c) (elements of flee to elude offense); 36
C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1) (elements of interfering with agency
functions); United States v. Bucher, 375 F.3d 929, 932 (9th Cir.
2004) (defining “interference” under § 2.32(a)(1)); United
States v. Willfong, 274 F.3d 1297, 1303 (9th Cir. 2001) (proof
of active resistance sufficient for § 2.32(a)(1)).
Finally, we review a sentence for reasonableness,
applying “a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v.
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United States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). We must first ensure
that the sentencing judge committed no “significant procedural
error,” including “failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous
facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.”
United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks, alterations, and footnote omitted).
If we find the sentence procedurally reasonable, we must
consider its substantive reasonableness — that is, “whether the
[sentencing judge] abused his discretion in determining that the
§ 3553(a) factors supported the sentence.” United States v.
Diosdado-Star, 630 F.3d 359, 366 (4th Cir. 2011) (internal
quotation marks and alteration omitted).
The Guidelines do not apply to the sentencing of petty
offenses. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.9 (2011).
“In the absence of an applicable sentencing guideline, the court
shall impose an appropriate sentence, having due regard for the
purposes set forth in [§ 3553(a)(2)].” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1)
(2006).
Here, the magistrate judge considered the parties’
arguments and gave a detailed explanation for the sentence
imposed. The judge considered the relevant § 3553(a) factors,
including the nature and seriousness of the offense, LaFlame’s
inability to pay a fine and lack of criminal record, and the
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available sentencing options. Moreover, the court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that these factors supported the
sentence imposed. We therefore conclude LaFlame’s sentence was
reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm LaFlame’s conviction and sentence. This
court requires that counsel inform LaFlame, in writing, of the
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If LaFlame requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on LaFlame.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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