United States v. Carlos Caro

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-6027
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
CARLOS DAVID CARO,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (2:03-cr-10115-JPJ-1; 2:13-cv-80555-JPJ)
Submitted: February 14, 2017 Decided: April 3, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DUNCAN, Circuit
Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Timothy Michael Gabrielsen, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Tucson, Arizona; Fay Frances Spence, Assistant Federal
Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. Jean Barrett
Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Carlos David Caro seeks to appeal the district court’s
order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The
order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues
a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B)
(2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies
relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by
demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the
district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is
debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003).
When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the
prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural
ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable
claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S.
at 484-85.
We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that
Caro has not made the requisite showing. Although the district
court denied relief on the merits, we deny a certificate of
appealability because we conclude that Caro’s § 2255 motion was
untimely. See United States ex rel. Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792
F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that “we may affirm a
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district court’s ruling on any ground apparent in the record”).
Contrary to Caro’s assertion that his motion was timely under 28
U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4), we conclude that Caro knew of the facts
supporting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in
February 2007, at the latest, and he did not file his § 2255
motion until January 2013. That Caro did not appreciate the
significance of the information that he possessed until much
later does not alter our analysis under § 2255(f)(4). See
Owens v. Boyd, 235 F.3d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Time begins
when the prisoner knows (or through diligence could discover)
the important facts, not when the prisoner recognizes their
legal significance.”).
We also conclude that Caro is not entitled to equitable
tolling of the limitations period. See Whiteside v. United
States, 775 F.3d 180, 184 (4th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (recognizing
that equitable tolling applies to limitations period for § 2255
motion). With respect to Caro’s argument that he is entitled to
equitable tolling based on his mental health diagnoses, he has
not demonstrated that he suffered from “profound mental
incapacity,” such as “institutionalization or adjudged mental
incompetence,” during the running of the limitations period.
United States v. Sosa, 364 F.3d 507, 513 (4th Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, insofar as
Caro claims that equitable tolling should be applied based on
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the ineffectiveness of his trial and appellate counsel in his
capital case, nothing in the record suggests that Caro’s capital
counsel prevented him from timely raising his claim in a
postconviction motion in this case. See Holland v. Florida, 560
U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (holding that equitable tolling is
appropriate only when the movant demonstrates “(1) that he has
been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some
extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely
filing” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Moreover, Caro
knew of the facts underlying his claim in February 2007, at the
latest, and he failed to raise the claim in a postconviction
proceeding until January 2013, which demonstrates a lack of
diligence on his part.
Accordingly, we deny Caro’s motion for a certificate of
appealability and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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