United States v. Heydar Sadeghi

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4829
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
HEYDAR SADEGHI, a/k/a Heydar ‘Ed’ Sadeghi, a/k/a Aeydar
Zadeghi, a/k/a Heidar Sadeghi, a/k/a Mir Goharbar, a/k/a
Mir Sadegh Goharbar,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:11-cr-00070-JCC-1)
Submitted: May 27, 2015 Decided: July 6, 2015
Before AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael S. Nachmanoff, Federal Public Defender, Frances H.
Pratt, Kevin R. Brehm, Assistant Federal Public Defenders,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United
States Attorney, Catherine S. Ahn, Special Assistant United
States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Heydar Sadeghi appeals the district court’s order revoking
his term of probation and sentencing him to 12 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Sadeghi argues that the district court
abused its discretion in finding that he violated his probation
by committing the Virginia offense of abduction, as the
testimony presented at the revocation hearing was insufficient
to establish the elements of that offense. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s
decision to revoke probation. United States v. Williams, 378
F.2d 665, 665 (4th Cir. 1967) (per curiam). The court may
revoke probation when it determines that a condition of
probation has been violated and that the violation warrants
revocation. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985). A
judge’s order revoking probation does not require the level of
proof necessary to support a criminal conviction. United
States v. Ball, 358 F.2d 367, 370 (4th Cir. 1966). Rather, the
district court need only find a violation of a probation term by
a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Bujak, 347
F.3d 607, 609 (6th Cir. 2003); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)
(2012) (supervised release standard); United States v. Copley,
978 F.2d 829, 831 n.* (4th Cir. 1992) (“Supervised release and
probation differ only in that the former follows a prison term
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and the latter is in lieu of a prison term.”). This burden
“simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence
of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” United
States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 631 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks omitted). We review for clear error the
district court’s factual findings underlying a probation
revocation. See United States v. Padgett, Nos. 14-4625, 14-
4627, 2015 WL 3561289, at *1 (4th Cir. June 9, 2015) (supervised
release).
An individual commits the Virginia offense of abduction
when he “by force, intimidation or deception, and without legal
justification or excuse, seizes, takes, transports, detains or
secretes another person with the intent to deprive such other
person of his personal liberty.” Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-47(A)
(2014). Sadeghi argues that the Government failed to prove
either that he used force or intimidation against the victims,
or that he intended to deprive the victims of their personal
liberty.
We find Sadeghi’s arguments unpersuasive. Viewed in the
light most favorable to the Government, the evidence presented
at the revocation hearing established that Sadeghi was driving
two individuals (“the victims”) toward their home when he
noticed a police car parked in front of their destination.
Sadeghi briefly slowed but did not fully stop his car; he
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ordered the victims out, but drove off with them at a high rate
of speed. * Sadeghi refused repeated requests from one of the
victims and a telephoned appeal from a police officer to take
the victims home. Moreover, although he slowed the car on
several occasions and demanded that the victims get out of his
car, he did not stop the car to permit them to exit safely until
he abandoned his flight at a gas station two miles away.
Sadeghi notes that one of the victims testified that she
wanted to be taken home, not merely let out of the car, and that
both victims could have left the unlocked car when Sadeghi told
them to do so. However, in light of Sadeghi’s failure to fully
stop the car, testimony regarding one victim’s frantic demeanor,
and the victims’ inability to leave the vehicle safely,
Sadeghi’s conduct constitutes a use of force or intimidation
adequate to support a charge of abduction. See Sutton v.
Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 665, 670 (Va. 1985) (defining
“intimidate”); Jordan v. Commonwealth, 643 S.E.2d 166, 171-72
(Va. 2007) (defining “force”); Clanton v. Commonwealth, 673
S.E.2d 904, 911 & n.12 (Va. Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing that, in
*
Sadeghi urges us not to rely on testimony and findings
beyond those specifically enumerated or used by the district
court. However, our review is not limited to the grounds relied
upon by the district court, as we are entitled to affirm on any
basis apparent from the record. United States v. Smith, 395
F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2005).
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appropriate circumstances, abduction may be accomplished through
minimal force).
Sadeghi also argues that his repeated attempts to slow the
car and his demands that the victims get out preclude a finding
that he intended to deprive the victims of their personal
liberty. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government,
however, his conduct supports an inference that Sadeghi
“intended to deny the victim[s] [their] freedom from bodily
restraint.” Burton v. Commonwealth, 708 S.E.2d 892, 894 (Va.
2011); see also Chatman v. Commonwealth, 739 S.E.2d 245, 250
(Va. Ct. App. 2013) (“The specific intent to commit a crime may
be inferred from the conduct of the accused if such intent flows
naturally from the conduct proven.” (internal quotation marks
and alteration omitted)); cf. Commonwealth v. Herring, 758
S.E.2d 225, 234 (Va. 2014); Joyce v. Commonwealth, 170 S.E.2d 9,
11 (Va. 1969).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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