United States v. Eric Payne

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4160
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERIC PAYNE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Theodore D. Chuang, District Judge. (8:16-cr-00315-TDC-1)
Submitted: May 9, 2018 Decided: May 22, 2018
Before TRAXLER and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jenifer Wicks, THE LAW OFFICES OF JENIFER WICKS, Takoma Park, Maryland, for
Appellant. Stephen M. Schenning, Baltimore, Maryland, Acting United States Attorney,
Hollis Raphael Weisman, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Payne appeals his conviction for simple assault, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 113(a)(5) (2012). Payne was convicted in a bench trial before a magistrate judge and
appealed to the district court. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3401(a), 3402 (2012). The district court
affirmed Payne’s conviction and sentence. Payne now appeals to this court, challenging
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Finding no error, we affirm.
“An appellate review conducted by a district court after a bench trial before a
magistrate judge is not a trial de novo; rather, the district court utilizes the same standards
of review applied by a court of appeals in assessing a district court conviction.” United
States v. Bursey, 416 F.3d 301, 305 (4th Cir. 2005). “And our review of a magistrate
court’s trial record is governed by the same standards as was the district court’s appellate
review.” Id. at 305-06. Thus, “[f]indings of fact made by the trial court are reviewed for
clear error, and issues of law [] are reviewed de novo.” Id. at 306.
A defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces a heavy burden.
United States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997). In determining whether
the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction, we determine “whether there is
substantial evidence in the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
government, to support the conviction.” United States v. Palacios, 677 F.3d 234, 248
(4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Substantial evidence is “evidence that
a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion
of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, “[d]eterminations of credibility are within the sole province of the
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[factfinder] and are not susceptible to judicial review.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
“[F]ederal statutes criminalizing ‘assault’ incorporate the long-established
common law definition of that term.” United States v. Passaro, 577 F.3d 207, 217-18
(4th Cir. 2009). “At common law, assault consisted of either attempted battery or the
deliberate infliction upon another of a reasonable fear of physical injury.” United States
v. Hampton, 628 F.3d 654, 660 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also United States v. Campbell, 259 F.3d 293, 296 & n.3 (4th Cir. 2001) (simple assault
is attempt to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury). Because a battery has
come to be defined as a completed assault, an assault is necessarily included in every
battery. Hampton, 628 F.3d at 660. Under common law, the crime of battery is satisfied
by the slightest offensive touching. United States v. Castleman, 134 S. Ct. 1405, 1410
(2014).
Here, the victim testified that Payne twice struck him in the chest during an
altercation in a restaurant where the victim worked. The witnesses who testified at trial
did not see the altercation and therefore, their testimonies neither supported the victim’s
testimony nor contradicted it. Based on the victim’s testimony alone, there was
substantial evidence supporting the magistrate judge’s finding of Payne’s guilt.
We therefore affirm Payne’s conviction. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court
and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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