Jean Germain v. Bobby Shearin

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-6144
JEAN BERNARD GERMAIN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
BOBBY SHEARIN; JAMES HOLWAGER; LIEUTENANT HARBAUGH; SERGEANT
SMITH; BRUCE A. LILLER; SERGEANT MCALPINE; LAURA MOULDEN,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, Senior District
Judge. (1:11-cv-01613-JFM)
Submitted: April 28, 2014 Decided: May 2, 2014
Before GREGORY, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jean Bernard Germain, Appellant Pro Se. Stephanie Judith Lane-
Weber, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jean Bernard Germain appeals a district court order
granting summary judgment to Sergeant Smith. We review de novo
a district court’s grant of summary judgment, “viewing the facts
and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party.” Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d
291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary judgment is proper “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We affirm.
A viable claim that a prison official did not provide
adequate medical care has an objective and subjective component.
Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff
must show that the official acted with deliberate indifference
to a serious medical need. Id. A serious medical need is “one
that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Id.,(internal quotation marks omitted). An official acts with
deliberate indifference when he knows of and disregards the risk
posed by the serious medical need. Id. Mere negligence is not
deliberate indifference. Id. Deliberate indifference has two
aspects. It must be shown that the officer had “actual
knowledge of the risk of harm to the inmate” and that the
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officer must have “recognized that his actions were insufficient
to mitigate the risk of harm. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
We conclude that the record does not show that there
was a genuine dispute on the issue of whether Sergeant Smith
recognized that his actions were insufficient to mitigate the
risk of harm. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
order. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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