United States v. Yastrzemski Lipscombe

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-4192
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
YASTRZEMSKI LIPSCOMBE, a/k/a O,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (8:12-cr-00024-HMH-5)
Submitted: April 29, 2014 Decided: May 12, 2014
Before KEENAN and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
T. Micah Leddy, THE LEDDY LAW FIRM, LLC, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United States
Attorney, Andrew B. Moorman, Sr., Assistant United States
Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Yastrzemski Lipscombe was convicted of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute 1000 kilograms or more of
marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2012).
He was sentenced to 151 months in prison. Lipscombe appeals,
alleging that the district court’s restriction on the scope of
cross-examination violated the Confrontation Clause. We affirm.
Prior to trial, the district court ruled that
Lipscombe could not inquire of cooperating witnesses about the
specific sentences they faced. At trial, coconspirators Larry
Gory, Anthony Yanez, and Demeika Martin testified for the United
States. All had previously pled guilty. Gory testified on
direct that, although the United States did not promise in his
plea agreement that he would receive a sentence reduction in
return for his testimony, he was hoping for such a reduction.
Yanez testified that his plea agreement, which required him to
tell the truth, did not contain a promise from the United States
to move for a sentence reduction. However, Yanez stated that he
hoped for a lenient sentence as a result of his testimony
against Lipscombe. On cross-examination, Yanez reiterated that
he wanted his sentence “to be more lenient.” He added that he
was “facing . . . a severe mandatory minimum sentence” and that,
in addition to telling the truth, he had to provide “substantial
assistance” in order to receive leniency. Finally, Martin
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testified on direct that, while the United States had not
promised a reduction in his sentence, he was hoping for such a
reduction.
District “judges possess wide latitude to impose
reasonable limits on cross-examination, based on concerns
including harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues,
repetition, or marginal relevance.” United States v. Turner,
198 F.3d 425, 429 (4th Cir. 1999). With respect to limitations
on cross-examination of cooperating witnesses, the relevant
issue is “whether the jury possesse[d] sufficient evidence to
enable it to make a discriminating appraisal of bias and
incentives to lie on the part of the witnesses.” United
States v. Cropp, 127 F.3d 354, 359 (4th Cir. 1997). A district
court’s limitation on a defendant’s cross-examination of a
prosecution witness is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Ramos-Cruz, 667 F.3d 487, 500 (4th Cir. 2012).
We are convinced that the jury had before it
sufficient evidence upon which to assess witness bias and
incentive to lie. Through questioning of Gory, Yanez and
Martin, the jury learned that they had entered into plea
agreements with the United States and that they hoped to receive
more lenient sentences in return for testifying at Lipscombe’s
trial. Precluding Lipscombe from eliciting testimony concerning
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the specific sentences the witnesses faced was not an abuse of
discretion.
Accordingly, we affirm Lipscombe's conviction. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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