Teresa Lamonds v. J. T. Pierce

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1346
TERESA BREWER LAMONDS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
J. T. PIERCE, In his official capacity as an officer with
the Candor, North Carolina Police Department,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:09-cv-00962-CCE-LPA)
Submitted: November 27, 2013 Decided: January 6, 2014
Before DUNCAN, DAVIS, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Duane K. Bryant, LAW OFFICES OF DUANE BRYANT, High Point, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Dan M. Hartzog, Kari R. Johnson,
CRANFILL, SUMNER & HARTZOG, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Theresa Brewer Lamonds appeals the district court’s
order granting summary judgment in favor of Sergeant J. T.
Pierce and dismissing her state law malicious prosecution claim
and her excessive force claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(2006). Finding no error, we affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment, “viewing the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.”
Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008). Summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Lamonds first contends that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment in Sergeant Pierce’s favor on her
malicious prosecution claim. To prove a malicious prosecution
claim in North Carolina, a plaintiff must establish:
“(1) defendant initiated the earlier proceeding; (2) malice on
the part of defendant in doing so; (3) lack of probable cause
for the initiation of the earlier proceeding; and
(4) termination of the earlier proceeding in favor of the
plaintiff.” Best v. Duke Univ., 448 S.E.2d 506, 510 (N.C.
1994). Here, the dispute is over whether Sergeant Pierce had
probable cause to charge Lamonds with disorderly conduct for an
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incident at the town hall * and for assault on a government
official.
We conclude that, considering the facts and
circumstances underlying each charge that were known to Sergeant
Pierce at the time, the district court did not err in finding
that, as a matter of law, Sergeant Pierce had probable cause to
bring the charges against Lamonds. See Best, 448 S.E.2d at 510
(“Whether probable cause exists is a mixed question of law and
fact, but where the facts are admitted or established, the
existence of probable cause is a question of law for the
court.”); Martin v. Parker, 563 S.E.2d 216, 218 (N.C. Ct. App.
2002) (discussing probable cause); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-288.4(a)(2) (2011) (defining crime of disorderly conduct);
State v. Noel, 690 S.E.2d 10, 13 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010)
(enumerating elements of assault on a government official);
State v. Mitchell, 592 S.E.2d 543, 547 (N.C. 2004) (defining
criminal assault). Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant
of summary judgment in Sergeant Pierce’s favor on Lamonds’
malicious prosecution claim.
Turning to the excessive force claim, Lamonds asserts
that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated as the result of
*
Lamonds was charged with two counts of disorderly conduct
for her actions on the day in question; however, Sergeant Pierce
brought only one of those charges against her.
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an official policy or custom of the municipality or the police
department. However, she names neither the town nor the police
chief as a defendant. Thus, this claim must fail.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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