Huff v. Mahon

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-6568
JOHNNY R. HUFF,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
DANIEL T. MAHON, Warden of Haynesville Correctional Center;
L. A. CORNER, Operations Officer; L. COLLINS, Hearing
Officer,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:04-cv-00882-REP)
Argued: January 27, 2009 Decided: February 24, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Rebecca Kim Glenberg, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
FOUNDATION OF VIRGINIA, INC., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
William W. Muse, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF VIRGINIA,
Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Robert F.
McDonnell, Attorney General of Virginia, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Johnny Huff appeals the summary judgment entered against
him on his First Amendment claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We
affirm.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The relevant inquiry in a summary
judgment analysis is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
We review the district court’s order granting summary judgment
de novo. Jennings v. U.N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 247 (2007). In doing so, we
generally must view all facts and draw all reasonable inferences
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v.
Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007). However, “facts must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only
if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Id. at 1776
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
In January 2004, while incarcerated at Haynesville
Correctional Center (HCC), Huff wrote a letter to Gene Johnson,
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the director of the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC),
complaining about the prison’s purported practice of requiring
sick inmates to stand outside in cold weather to receive their
medication. Huff sent copies of the letter to various
government officials, advocacy groups, and media outlets, as
well as to HCC Warden Daniel T. Mahon. In the letter, Huff
referred to the “cold, callus, cruel, evil, uncaring,
unmercyful, inhumane officials you have left in charge as
wardens.” J.A. 58. Based on that specific language, Huff was
charged with the institutional offense of “vulgar or insolent
language directed toward an employee.” J.A. 59. Huff was found
guilty of that offense in February 2004 and was fined $12.00.
Shortly thereafter, an Institutional Classification
Authority (ICA) hearing was held. Based in part on the insolent
language charge, the ICA increased Huff’s classification from
Good Conduct Allowance (GCA) Level II to Level III. As a
result, Huff received 10 days of good time for every 30 days
incarcerated instead of the 20 days he would have received at
GCA Level II. The ICA also recommended that Huff be placed in
segregation while awaiting transfer to a higher security
institution. Huff remained in segregation until March 9, 2004,
when he was transferred to Powhatan Correctional Center. Huff
was eventually returned to GCA Level II in August 2005. During
the time that he was classified at GCA Level III, Huff earned
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180 fewer days of good time than he would have earned had he
remained at Level II.
Huff thereafter filed this action against several prison
officials asserting, inter alia, that they retaliated against
him for exercising his First Amendment rights by holding him in
administrative segregation, charging and convicting him of an
institutional infraction, transferring him to a higher security
prison, and increasing his GCA level. Huff seeks compensatory
or nominal damages, punitive damages, and declaratory and
injunctive relief.
After Huff filed this action, VDOC Director Johnson
reviewed the insolent language charge against him. Although
Johnson found that “the language contained in Huff’s letter was
insolent and inappropriate,” he concluded that “because [Huff]
did not identify Warden Mahon by name, . . . it cannot be
determined that the language was directed toward Warden Mahon as
required by” the offense code. J.A. 60-61. Huff’s $12.00 was
returned, but it is unclear whether he was credited with the 180
days GCA that he had lost because he apparently was detained
past his mandatory release date pending civil commitment
proceedings pursuant to Virginia’s Sexually Violent Predators
Act.
On cross-motions, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the prison officials on the First Amendment
4
claim. The court recognized that the First Amendment protects
both the affirmative right to speak and the right to be free
from retaliation for the exercise of that right, and it noted
that the first element that a plaintiff must establish in a
retaliation case is that his speech is protected by the First
Amendment. The court then extensively analyzed the law
pertaining to prisoners’ rights under the First Amendment and
concluded:
An inmate does not have a First Amendment right to
direct disrespectful comments to a prison official,
whether verbally or in writing, because the prison’s
legitimate penological interests in promoting order
and discipline, and in controlling violence clearly
necessitate the prohibition of such comments. . . .
Because the Court finds that the right to direct
disrespectful comments toward prison officials in
written correspondence is inconsistent with Huff’s
status as a prisoner, the Court must conclude that
Huff did not have a First Amendment right to send
written letters to prison officials in which he refers
to them as “cold, callus, cruel, evil, uncaring,
unmercyful, [and] inhumane.” The Court thus finds
that Huff’s speech was not protected and, therefore,
that he has not demonstrated a violation of his
constitutional rights.
J.A. 71-72.
On appeal, Huff does not challenge the validity of the VDOC
“vulgar or insolent language” policy; indeed, he acknowledges
“that a prohibition on vulgar or insolent language directed at
employees generally furthers the prison system’s interests in
discipline, order, security, and civility.” Brief of Appellant,
at 5. Moreover, Huff does not contend that the prison officials
5
punished him for his grievance generally, rather than for the
specific critical language. Instead, Huff contends that the
language he used in the letter does not fall within the scope of
the policy and, accordingly, is protected by the First
Amendment.
Having reviewed and considered the record, briefs, oral
arguments, and applicable law, we are persuaded that the
district court reached the correct result on Huff’s First
Amendment claim. * Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment on
that claim based substantially on the reasoning set forth in the
district court’s careful and thorough opinion.
AFFIRMED
*
See generally Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223 (2001). In
Shaw, the Court reiterated that “the constitutional rights that
prisoners possess are more limited in scope than the
constitutional rights held by individuals in society at large.”
Id. at 229. Further, the Court indicated that the pertinent
question for a prisoner’s First Amendment case is whether the
prison regulation, as applied to the prisoner, is reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests, and the prisoner
must overcome a presumption that the prison officials acted
within their broad discretion in order to prevail. Id. at 232.
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