Greengael, LC v. Board of Supervisors

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1878
GREENGAEL, LC; VERNELL MONIQUE SMITH; TAMMY DE’VOUE SMITH;
VERNIE M. OVERBEY,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF CULPEPER COUNTY, VIRGINIA,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon, District
Judge. (3:07-cv-00005-nkm)
Submitted: May 8, 2008 Decided: September 5, 2008
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Mark A. Moorstein, Kelly C. Zook, REES BROOME, PC, Gainesville,
Virginia, for Appellants. Robert T. Mitchell, Jr., James A.
Klenkar, HALL, MONAHAN, ENGLE, MAHAN & MITCHELL, Winchester,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
This land use case involves the claims of developer,
Greengael, LC, against the Board of Supervisors of Culpeper County,
Virginia (“the County”), for denying approval of a subdivision plat
and later rezoning its property from residential to industrial use.
It also involves claims against the County by the Smith family
(“the Smith Plaintiffs”), owners of a single-family residence in
Culpeper County, challenging the County’s actions with respect to
Greengael’s property as well as a zoning amendment affecting their
own property. In two separate orders, the district court dismissed
the plaintiffs’ claims. Greengael and the Smith Plaintiffs
(collectively, “Greengael”) appeal. Finding no error, we affirm.
After the County denied approval for Greengael’s
subdivision plat proposing a mixed-use development, including low
and moderate income housing, retail, and single-family homes, and
then changed the zoning of Greengael’s property from residential to
industrial use, Greengael filed two lawsuits in state court
challenging the County’s decisions. The lawsuits raised various
state law claims, as well as federal constitutional claims and
allegations of violations of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 3601-3619 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008), and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (2000).
The trial court consolidated the suits and then dismissed
the federal claims as not ripe because Greengael failed to exhaust
- 2 -
administrative remedies. After Greengael’s claims were presented
and denied administratively, it sought to raise its federal claims
again, but the trial court dismissed them on demurrer as barred by
res judicata. Following a bench trial on the state law claims, the
trial court ruled in Greengael’s favor, concluding that the County
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of state law in
denying approval of the subdivision plat and changing the zoning
classification.
Both Greengael and the County appealed to the Supreme
Court of Virginia. Greengael assigned error to the dismissal of
its federal claims, arguing that the trial court erred in giving
preclusive effect to the initial decision dismissing the federal
claims on jurisdictional grounds. The court reversed the portion
of the trial court’s decision favorable to Greengael. See Bd. of
Supervisors of Culpeper County v. Greengael, 626 S.E.2d 357 (Va.
2006). In light of its conclusion that the County’s actions did
not violate state law, the court found it unnecessary to resolve
Greengael’s challenge to the dismissal of its federal claims,
explaining that Greengael’s federal claims were “moot.” Greengael,
626 S.E.2d at 369.1
In 2007, Greengael, joined by the Smith Plaintiffs,
filed the underlying complaint in federal court raising the same
1
Greengael did not file a petition for writ of certiorari in
the United States Supreme Court.
- 3 -
federal claims alleged in its state court complaint. The district
court granted the County’s motion to dismiss, concluding that
Greengael’s claims were barred by res judicata and the Smith
Plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the County’s conduct with
respect to Greengael’s property. In a later, separate order, the
district court granted summary judgment to the County with respect
to the Smith Plaintiffs’ challenge to the 2006 zoning amendment.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Sec’y of State for
Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir.
2007). “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s motion to dismiss, a judge
must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the
complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007)
(citations omitted). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “[f]actual
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” and have “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 1974 (2007).
We also review de novo a district court’s order granting
summary judgment and view the facts in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Seabulk Offshore, Ltd. v. Am. Home Assur.
Co., 377 F.3d 408, 418 (4th Cir. 2004). Summary judgment is
appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and “the
- 4 -
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c)).
I. Res Judicata
The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000),
requires federal courts to apply state res judicata law to
determine the preclusive effects of a state court judgment. Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 293 (2005);
In re Genesys Data Technologies, Inc., 204 F.3d 124, 129 (4th Cir.
2000). Under Virginia law, the doctrine of res judicata bars a
party from asserting claims that were raised, or that could have
been raised, in previous litigation between the parties. Lofton
Ridge, LLC v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co., 601 S.E.2d 648, 650 (Va.
2004). This doctrine applies whenever a claim “has been resolved
adversely to the plaintiff, whether on the merits or because of
another bar to recovery such as sovereign immunity or the statute
of limitations.” Lambert v. Javed, 641 S.E.2d 109, 111 (Va. 2007).
We reject Greengael’s contention that the Virginia court
did not render a final decision on the merits of its federal claims
because the court did not engage in a substantive analysis of those
claims. The Supreme Court of Virginia sustained the trial court’s
demurrers to Greengael’s federal claims and entered a final
judgment. This disposition is a final decision on the merits under
- 5 -
Virginia law.2 See Reed v. Liverman, 458 S.E.2d 446, 447 (Va.
1995) (dismissal with prejudice after sustaining a demurrer is a
final judgment on the merits); Gimbert v. Norfolk S. R.R. Co., 148
S.E. 680, 690 (Va. 1929) (“A general demurrer which denies the
right of the plaintiff to recover on the cause of action alleged,
which is sustained, is a decision on the merits.”). Additionally,
Greengael’s argument based on Williamson County Reg’l Planning
Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), has
been rejected by the Supreme Court as well as by this court. See
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S.
323, 347 (2005) (expressly declining to create an exception to the
full faith and credit statute “solely to preserve the availability
of a federal forum” for litigants’ federal takings claims); Holiday
Amusement Co. of Charleston, Inc. v. South Carolina, 493 F.3d 404,
409 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that no constitutional issue is
presented by the fact that claims for just compensation will
generally be resolved in state court).3
2
Trafalgar Corp. v. Miami County Bd. of Commr’s, 519 F.3d 285(6th Cir. 2008), cited by the County as supplemental authority, is
analogous. In Trafalgar, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a federal
district court’s grant of summary judgment based on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1783 where a plaintiff previously filed suit in state court
asserting state and federal takings and equal protection claims.
The court rejected the argument that because the federal takings
issue was not actually litigated in state court, res judicata
should not apply to bar the federal action. 519 F.3d at 287.
3
We also reject Greengael’s argument regarding the
availability of an England reservation to preserve its issues to be
heard in federal court as irrelevant. England v. Louisiana State
- 6 -
In sum, Greengael’s federal claims were raised and
resolved in a final decision issued by the Virginia state court,
and Greengael’s claims are now barred by res judicata under
Virginia law. Therefore, as the district court held, it was
required to accord full faith and credit to the Virginia court’s
decision and dismiss the federal claims.4
II. Standing
In order to assert a claim based on the County’s actions
with respect to Greengael’s property, the Smith Plaintiffs needed
to show that they: (1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that was
causally connected to the County’s conduct, and (3) that was likely
to be redressed by a favorable ruling. Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (holding that these three
elements constitute the constitutional minimum for standing). To
meet the first requirement, the party must demonstrate an “injury
in fact” that is concrete and particularized, and actual or
Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 417-19 (1964). It is
undisputed that Greengael did not make, or attempt to make, such a
reservation.
4
We note that the Virginia Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Kitchen v. Newport News, 657 S.E.2d 132 (Va. 2008), does not alter
the district court’s lack of authority to render a decision
contrary to that of the Virginia court. Likewise, the South
Carolina district court’s denial of summary judgment in Connelly
Development, LLC v. City of West Columbia, No. 3:05-00460-MSB
(D.S.C. 2007), is also irrelevant to the dispositive issue of res
judicata in this case.
- 7 -
imminent, as opposed to conjectural or hypothetical. Id. at 560.
We agree with the district court’s conclusion that the injury
alleged by the Smith Plaintiffs, the denial of the opportunity to
purchase affordable housing, was too remote and speculative to
constitute an injury in fact.
III. Zoning Amendment
The Smith Plaintiffs alleged an FHA violation based on a
2006 zoning amendment under which they lost the ability to convert
their existing single-family home into a multi-family dwelling. To
prove a prima facie case of discrimination under the FHA, the Smith
Plaintiffs had to demonstrate that the housing action or practice
being challenged was either motivated by a discriminatory purpose
or had a discriminatory impact. Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs.,
736 F.2d 983, 986 (4th Cir. 1984). We conclude the district court
properly rejected this claim because of the absence of any evidence
of discriminatory intent or effect.5
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders. We
also grant the County’s motion to strike matters outside the record
on appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
5
Cases cited by Greengael involving state law challenges to
exclusionary zoning ordinances are inapplicable. See, e.g.,
Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Mt. Laurel, 336 A.2d 713 (N.J.
1975) (developing municipalities required under state
constitutional mandate to meet reasonable housing needs of low and
moderate income people in their region).
- 8 -
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 9 -